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Tamara van der Does
CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS’ RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND POLITICAL
ENGAGEMENT ACROSS EUROPE
In contrast with the secularization trend among Christians in Europe, the constant ﬂow
of immigrants since WWII has led to a rise in religious diversity and religiosity. How do
minority religious groups integrate into the European political landscape? This dissertation
investigates the salience of religion for children of immigrants from all faith traditions during
their process of incorporation into European societies. I propose that religion is a source of
politicized collective identities. Moreover, I argue that the Muslim identity is distinctive in
that it functions as a racialized pan-ethnic identity: an imposed categorization that uniﬁes
individuals from diﬀerent backgrounds to encourage political mobilization. I ﬁrst apply lon-
gitudinal methods to analyze the co-evolution of religiosity and national identities among
adolescents as they progress through secondary school in four Western European countries. I
ﬁnd that Christian children of immigrants and natives become more secular over time; how-
ever, religious identities and religious practices continue to be more important for children of
immigrants as compared to natives. Moreover, Muslim children of immigrants increase their
participation in religious services all the while developing a stronger attachment to their
European national identities. Turning from adolescents to adults, I then use multilevel data
from twenty European countries to examine how religiosity among children of immigrants is
shaped by regional and national contexts. Except for Muslims, the religiosity of children of
immigrants is lower in regions with lower native religiosity. However, both Muslim and Or-
thodox children of immigrants are more religious in countries with stronger multiculturalism
and anti-discrimination policies. Finally, I examine the relationship between religion and
political engagement among adult children of immigrants across Europe. I ﬁnd that children
vi
of immigrants’ involvement with religious communities and sense of group consciousness are
both associated with more political acts. The relationship between religious attendance and
political participation is stronger among Muslims and among children of immigrants living
countries with broader multiculturalism policies. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest the
resurgence of religion as a meaningful and resourceful identity for children of immigrants,
the continuing importance of multiculturalism policies, and the emergence of new political
communities.
Patricia McManus, PhD
Clem Brooks, PhD
Jennifer C. Lee, PhD
Dina Okamoto, PhD
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Children of Immigrants’ Religious Identity and Political
Engagement Across Europe
Although Christianity is the dominant religious tradition in Europe, the share of
Europeans who do not identify with any religion has increased steadily in recent decades
(Norris and Inglehart 2011). This secularization trend is predicted to continue in the
future: in 2010, 18.8% of the European population was unaﬃliated, and this proportion is
expected to grow to 20% by 2020 and 23.3% by 2050. As a comparison, in 2010 17.1% of
North Americans were unaﬃliated, 3.2% of Sub-Saharan Africans were unaﬃliated, and
0.6% of individuals living in North Africa or the Middle East were unaﬃliated. The trend
towards secularization among native-born Europeans coincides with successive waves of
immigration from non-European countries since World War II. Migrants bring their own
religious traditions: Christians from Sub-Saharan Africa, Orthodox Christians from
ex-USSR countries, and Muslims from North Africa and the Middle East (Castles et al.
2014). Until today, migration from war-torn regions continues to bring new populations
and religions to Europe. Though ﬁrst-generation migrants go through many challenges as
they incorporate into European countries, the changing social fabric has an even greater
impact on their children. Children of immigrants1 grow up between two worlds and try to
uphold their families’ values and traditions while at the same time incorporating culturally,
economically, socially, and politically.
1Throughout the dissertation, I deﬁne children of immigrants as individuals with at least one parent
born outside of the country of residence (host country), and who were either born there or immigrated as
small children. This is equivalent to the 1.5, 2nd, and 2.5 generation as commonly used in the immigration
literature.
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How does the conﬂuence of religious diversity and secularization shape the political
incorporation of children of immigrants? In this dissertation, I explore the relationship
between religion and political incorporation among children of immigrants in adolescence
and adulthood. Bloemraad (2006) argues that participation in politics is not only a critical
measure of immigrants’ political incorporation, but also a sign of cultural, social, and
economic assimilation. Through political engagement, children of immigrants demonstrate
their integration in the host country and in the national political discourse. Moreover, by
participating in politics, children of immigrants can actively change the political landscape
and policies aﬀecting them (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Putnam 2001; Warner 1993). In the
United States (US), solidarity and collective political mobilization are fueled by resources
and allegiances found within religious organizations (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Leighley
and Vedlitz 1999; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1993). In the European secular
context, civic organizations and strong ethnic identities are found to increase the political
engagement of European children of immigrants (Fennema and Tillie 1999;
Fischer-Neumann 2014; Klandermans 2008; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014), but little is
known about the relationship between religion, national identities, and political
engagement.
I mobilize theoretical perspectives on social boundaries and pan-ethnic identities to
understand the religious identity of Muslim children of immigrants. Due to the rapid
growth of the European Muslim population and the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment among
European natives2, children of immigrants who identify as Muslim experience a negative
social context. However, they also have opportunities for new connections extending
beyond national origins based on their shared identity and experience as Muslim
Europeans. Immigrant assimilation theorists argue that in Europe, there is a “bright”
social boundary — a strong diﬀerentiation in people’s minds — between “us” Europeans
2Throughout this dissertation, I deﬁne “European natives” as individuals with parents and grandparents
born in Europe who speak the oﬃcial European language at home, only identify with a European ethnic
identity, and only practice a traditionally European religion.
2
and “them” Muslims (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999). This bright social boundary
can slow down the economic incorporation of religious children of immigrants and can
create salient or even “reactive” religious identities: attitudes of confrontation with
mainstream3 culture and institutions (Foner 2015; Massey and Sa´nchez 2010; Rumbaut
1994). However, children of immigrants who share a religious tradition but have diverse
national and cultural origins can also re-appropriate external categorizations to create new
pan-ethnic identities as a tool for political mobilization (Espiritu et al. 2000; Kibria 1998;
Okamoto 2006). The Muslim category in Europe is therefore more than just a religious
identity. European Muslim can be understood as a racialized pan-ethnic category — a
re-interpretation of an external racial categorization due to common experiences, and a
tool for mobilization. Muslim organizations have the potential to function as pan-ethnic
organizations. European qualitative research indicates that national Muslim organizations
often take a pan-Muslim stance (Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005). Muslims in
Europe are a diverse group, with multiple national origins, languages, and religious
traditions, but a central claim of this dissertation is that for Muslim children of
immigrants, Muslim identity and Islamic religious organizations foster the development of a
pan-ethnic religious identity, reaching across national origins and encouraging political
mobilization around shared interests.
This dissertation uses a comparative approach to study the political incorporation of
religious children of immigrants in Europe. It focuses on the context of reception, both in
terms of state policy and public opinion regarding immigration and immigrants.
Immigration theorists argue that state policies can shape immigrant outcomes, and that
states actively create and sustain categorizations, attitudes, and possibilities for
representation (Lentin 2007; Massey 1999). Western liberal states have created their
national identities and politics based on a white Christian history; therefore, their
3By “mainstream,” I refer to the set of cultures and institutions that are understood by native Europeans
to be part of their country. The mainstream, however, is constantly changing as children of immigrants are
incorporating (Alba and Nee 2003)
3
institutions and policies are not completely secular or “blind” to religious diﬀerences
(Adamson 2011; Kastoryano 2002; Taylor et al. 1994; Vasta 2007). In European and North
American countries, states shape the incorporation of children of immigrants through
policies that acknowledge, enable, and sometimes politicize minority organizations and
identities (Kastoryano 2002; Mooney 2009; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). For example, the
state’s relationship with religion determines how religious communities can help
immigrants and their children understand the country’s political system (Mooney 2009).
Moreover, children of immigrants living in states that focus their political discourse on
limiting or accommodating the practice of Islam are more likely to mobilize around that
religious identity (Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005). Research in Europe is focused
on changes over time in multiculturalism polices and their eﬀect on the economic and
cultural incorporation of children of immigrants (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Koopmans
2013b; Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Modood 2013; Vasta 2007), but it has mostly ignored
how states inﬂuence children of immigrants’ religiosity and political participation.
Core Questions
The goal of this dissertation is to determine how religion shapes the political
incorporation of children of immigrants across political and social contexts in Europe. To
that end, I draw on the theoretical model exempliﬁed in Figure 1.1. Each empirical chapter
addresses a distinct set of questions. I ﬁrst investigate the joint development of religious
identities, religious behaviors, and national identities among children of immigrants of
multiple religions. Second, I analyze how the social and political context shapes adult
children of immigrants’ religiosity. Finally, I examine the role of religious organizations in
encouraging political participation in adulthood.
4
Figure 1.1: Theoretical model for the dissertation.
How do religious identities, religious behaviors, and national identities develop during
adolescence among children of immigrants, and how do these trajectories vary by religious
aﬃliation?
Using theories of political socialization, identity development, religion, and immigrant
incorporation, I argue that children of immigrants develop politicized religious identities in
5
adolescence. Politicized collective identities emerge out of a group struggle under a hostile
political context leading to a commitment to collective engagement and reinforced by
public behavior. In the ﬁrst empirical chapter, I examine if some children of immigrants
develop stronger religious identities and increase their religious practice for three years in
adolescence. I look at changes over time in the importance of religion, frequency of prayer,
and participation in religious events for Christian and Muslim children of immigrants and
compare their trajectories with Christian native Europeans. I test the hypothesis that
Muslim children of immigrants develop a speciﬁc type of politicized collective identity — a
pan-ethnic identity — in the context of bright religious boundaries. I investigate if
experiences of segregation and discrimination at school explain the higher salience of
religious identity and more frequent religious practice of Muslims compared to other
groups. Furthermore, I consider if this strong identity and religiosity is pan-ethnic or is
instead reactive. I check if Muslim children of immigrants in adolescence also experience
decreasing ties to their national origins and increasing ties to the host country, as a sign of
engagement with the mainstream.
How do state policies, native religiosity, and anti-immigrant sentiment shape the religiosity
of children of immigrants?
I argue that the religiosity of children of immigrants reﬂects both their social
environment and national policies. I use theories of social boundaries and immigrant
assimilation to explain children of immigrants’ religious incorporation and their response to
anti-immigrant attitudes. I use previous work on national-level policies to describe how
states can contribute to children of immigrants’ religiosity and to a politicization of
religion. Multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies inﬂuence religiosity by
accommodating multiple cultural expressions but also by sustaining debates around the
adjustment of certain religious groups. Therefore, in the second empirical chapter, I
investigate subjective religiosity and religious behavior among adult children of immigrants
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in twenty European countries. Applying assimilation theories, I explore if children of
immigrants’ religiosity is aﬀected by the religious levels of natives living in the same region.
I investigate if Muslim children of immigrants are less religiously incorporated compared to
other religious groups due to bright religious boundaries. Moreover, I analyze if Muslim
children of immigrants in regions with strong anti-immigrant attitudes attempt to
minimize their otherness or if they instead embrace their religion as a “reaction” against
the mainstream. Finally, I compare twenty European countries in terms of their
multiculturalism policies and anti-discrimination provisions. I test if multiculturalism
policies and anti-discrimination policies increase religiosity among children of immigrants.
How does engagement with religious institutions contribute to political engagement?
Combining theories of political participation, ethnic social capital, and religious
institutions, I investigate if co-religious communities encourage political participation of
adults through organizational resources and a sense of religious group consciousness. As
classically deﬁned, political participation spans multiple acts, from displaying a campaign
sticker to participating in a protest. For children of immigrants who already identify with a
religion, group consciousness — a facet of politicized collective identities — is measured
using a sense of perceived group discrimination on the basis of religion. In the third
empirical chapter, I investigate if attendance at religious events encourages political
participation of adult children of immigrants, both Christian and Muslim, and if the eﬀect
of religious attendance is moderated by a sense of group consciousness. I then test the
hypothesis of a European Muslim pan-ethnic identity. I analyze if Muslim children of
immigrants’ engagement with pan-ethnic religious organizations (mosques) leads to greater
mobilization compared to children of immigrants from other religions. Finally, I extend my
analysis of the political context and test if multiculturalism policies and political rights for
foreigners strengthen the relationship between children of immigrants’ religious attendance
and political engagement, and whether they directly increase the political participation of
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children of immigrants.
This project connects theories of identity development, religion, political engagement,
social boundaries, pan-ethnic identities, state policies, and immigrant incorporation in new
ways that advance each ﬁeld individually. This dissertation is the ﬁrst to incorporate
religion into the study of political socialization and identity exploration in adolescence. I
advance the ﬁeld of sociology of religion by investigating the role religion can play in
building group consciousness and identities with consequences beyond religiosity. This
project is the ﬁrst to apply theories of racialized pan-ethnic identities to religion in Europe
using the social boundary framework. Finally, this dissertation advances studies of
immigration and incorporation by bridging two previously separate research domains: the
eﬀects of state policies on immigrant incorporation on one hand, and children of
immigrants’ religiosity on the other. More broadly, this project addresses the larger
sociological question of how societies continue to function during times of animosity
between groups, as well as how marginalized minority groups can be a part of the
mainstream democratic process and advance their rights.
Politicized Religious Identities and Pan-ethnicity
During times of political socialization and identity exploration in adolescence, children
of immigrants learn about the political context and how they are systematically excluded
by the majority because of ethnic or religious diﬀerences. Children of immigrants’
politicized religious identities are further shaped by their interactions with European
natives and institutions, and may become “reactive” or pan-ethnic when faced with a
negative social context.
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Collective religious identity and religiosity
Religious identity and religiosity are separate yet mutually reinforcing. Empirical work
focusing on children of immigrants in Europe tends to measure religiosity as an overarching
concept including personal religious identity, beliefs, and practice (e.g. Gu¨ngo¨r et al. 2011;
Maliepaard and Phalet 2012). However, this is a Christian-centrist view of religion, which
does not account for experiences outside of Europe and the US. In line with some religion
theorists, I consider religious identity and religiosity as two diﬀerent concepts that reaﬃrm
each other (Chaves 2010; Voas and Fleischmann 2012; Warner 1994). Religiosity refers to
the strength of one’s religious beliefs and frequency of religious practices (Voas and
Fleischmann 2012), while religious identity refers to religious aﬃliation and its perceived
importance (Tajfel and Turner 1986). There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between
personal religious identities, religious behavior, and collective identities. Frequent religious
behavior indicate a personal religious identity but also reaﬃrms and strengthens collective
religious identities, especially when individuals develop a sense of group consciousness built
out of shared experiences and commitment to collective action (Ashmore et al. 2004; Cerulo
1997; Peek 2005; Platt 2014). As described by Peek (2005), “religious dress, practices, and
organizational aﬃliations serve as important identity markers that help promote individual
self-awareness and preserve group cohesion.” In her study of the development of a Muslim
identity in the US, Peek (2005) describes how this collective religious identity becomes
more salient for immigrants and their children due to the politicization of Islam after 9/11.
Politicized religious identities in adolescence
Adolescence is a crucial time for political socialization. In adolescence, children start
to form political habits and attitudes as political events and issues become more relevant
to them (Campbell 2008; Flanagan 2010; Sears and Valentino 1997). Thus, adolescents
start to form opinions about the political landscape and learn useful skills for political
participation. This political socialization can happen through parents, organizations, and
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schools (Flanagan 2010). Empirically, being active in clubs and associations has been found
to increase adolescent participation in politics (McFarland and Thomas 2006; Que´niart 2008;
Quintelier 2015). For children of immigrants, religious organizations may be some of the
few places where they can learn about relevant political issues and develop tools for change.
Membership in these organizations might be the consequence or the marker of another process
in adolescence: the search for a positive sense of self.
Children of immigrants develop politicized religious identities in adolescence as they
become aware of political issues aﬀecting their religious group and start to connect with
co-religious individuals. In adolescence, children of immigrants are involved in identity
exploration (Erikson 1968; Phinney 1993). During that time, they start to realize that they
are treated diﬀerently by natives and institutions due to their national origins (Phinney
1993). Religion may provide children of immigrants with self-worth, meaning, and a
supportive community during stressful times of identity search amid incorporation (Cadge
and Ecklund 2007; Warner 1993). Politicized collective identities are born out of group
struggles under a hostile political context (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Therefore, in
adolescence, children of immigrants who experience discrimination and prejudice based on
religious diﬀerences are more likely to connect with others with the same religious
background and develop strong politicized religious identities. Children of immigrants with
a salient politicized religious identity often increase their religious practice to publicly
display their group membership (Peek 2005; Platt 2014). Furthermore, children of
immigrants who feel the most excluded by mainstream society might develop salient
religious identities, either as a reaction against that mainstream or instead as a way to
engage with the larger political context.
Religious boundaries in Europe
In adolescence and throughout adulthood, children of immigrants come into contact
with native Europeans and European institutions outside of their family. These
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interactions reinforce categorizations and thereby shape children of immigrants’ identities.
According to Sanders (2002, p.327), “[...] boundaries are patterns of social interaction that
give rise to, and subsequently reinforce, group members’ self-identiﬁcation and outsiders’
conﬁrmation of group distinction.” According to new assimilation and social boundary
theories, day-to-day interactions between individuals reinforce categories centered on
national, cultural, or even physical diﬀerences (Alba 2005; Wimmer and Soehl 2014;
Zolberg 1999). However, social boundaries can also be sustained through cultures and
institutions. In the US, bright boundaries around race have impeded the institutional
incorporation of children of immigrants who are considered closer to being “Black” by the
US American white majority (Alba 2005; Fox and Guglielmo 2012; Kasinitz et al. 2009;
Massey and Sa´nchez 2010; Waters 2009). Other non-Black groups might experience blurred
boundaries surrounding religious or other cultural diﬀerences, which are permeable and not
a barrier to incorporation (Alba and Nee 2003). Under the context of bright racial
boundaries and subsequent racial discrimination, children of immigrants’ racial identities
become more salient (Massey and Sa´nchez 2010), and their ethnic identities often become
racialized (Okamoto 2014; Ong et al. 1996). In Europe, however, bright boundaries are not
constructed on a racial basis but rather on a religious one (Alba 2005; Lamont 2003;
Zolberg 1999).
Bright boundaries separating Muslims from non-Muslims promote the development of
politicized religious identities. There is still a debate if bright boundaries centered on
religion in Europe emphasize the distinction between non-Muslims and Muslims or between
Protestant/Catholic Christians and everyone else (Wimmer and Soehl 2014). However, in
continuity with Zolberg (1999) and Alba (2005), I argue that the brightest group boundary
in Europe is between “us” native Europeans and “them” Muslims. The attitude of
European natives towards Muslims is partly a consequence of Muslims’ sizable population
— the largest minority group in Western Europe (Castles et al. 2014; Lamont 2003) — and
lower socioeconomic status. It is also a consequence of the disadvantaged position that
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Muslim immigrants occupy within European cultures that are based on Christian
institutions. Native white Europeans are either non-religious, Catholic, or Protestant, and
some consider Muslims to have a culture incompatible with Western ideals (Taylor et al.
1994). European institutions created for Christian and secular individuals are less capable
of accommodating Muslim beliefs and practices (Adamson 2011; Kastoryano 2002; Taylor
et al. 1994; Vasta 2007). Therefore, bright boundaries in Europe have formed around
religious diﬀerences, separating Muslims from the native majority (Alba 2005; Foner 2015;
Wimmer and Soehl 2014; Zolberg 1999). This bright boundary is exempliﬁed by high levels
of segregation and discrimination of Muslims (Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014). Other
religious groups do not experience such bright social boundaries but rather other, more
permeable, categorizations. Orthodox Christian children of immigrants, for example,
experience blurred social boundaries around their national origins or other cultural
diﬀerences. Due to experiences of social exclusion from natives and institutions, Muslim
children of immigrants might develop a stronger politicized religious identity, either as a
“reaction” towards the mainstream or as a way to connect with others across ethnic origins.
Muslim pan-ethnicity
Segmented assimilation theorists argue that children of immigrants can take multiple
paths as they incorporate into the host country: a “straight line” assimilation if they
encounter a positive social context of reception, a structural incorporation based on strong
ethnic networks and communities, or a “downward” assimilation when faced with
discrimination and low ethnic social capital (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou
1993; Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997). This last path can lead individuals to develop a
“reactive” identity, characterized by attitudes of confrontation, defensiveness, and
solidarity against the mainstream (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993;
Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997).
Muslim children of immigrants are more aware of how they diﬀer from natives due to
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constant categorization as “other” by European states, cultures, institutions, and
individuals. According to segmented assimilation theory, Muslim children of immigrants
might therefore develop a reactive religious identity. Though the precise operationalization
of reactive identities varies, in line with other European empirical research, I believe the
core aspect to be a rejection of the mainstream, as exempliﬁed by a weak identiﬁcation
with the host country. Previous research sometimes describes the strong Muslim identity
and religiosity as reactive. Cross-sectional research indicates that Muslim children of
immigrants are more tied to their religion than other religious groups and grow increasingly
religious over generations and time spent in the country. Moreover, high Muslim identity
salience and religiosity is positively related to perceived discrimination and negatively
associated with ties to the host country (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Gu¨ngo¨r et al. 2011;
Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). However, previous research of
Muslim children of immigrants’ does not investigate the intertwined temporal development
of religious and national identities in adolescence, and ignores alternative hypotheses that
may explain the formation of the salient Muslim identity.
I argue that in the context of bright imposed religious boundaries, Muslim children of
immigrants do not develop a reactive identity but instead a pan-ethnic identity: a speciﬁc
type of politicized collective identity that re-interprets imposed categorizations and reaches
across national origins. Pan-ethnic identities are both imposed by the receiving society and
re-deﬁned by second-generation immigrants who share common histories and institutions
(Kibria 1998; Nagel 1994; Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). For example, studies
in the US ﬁnd that children of immigrants are inﬂuenced by existing racial and ethnic
categories and take on labels such as “Latino” and “Asian” (Cornell 1996; Feliciano 2009;
Kibria 2000; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Tuan 1999). Groups that are structurally similar
and have shared experiences of discrimination have the potential to develop pan-ethnic ties
(Kibria 2000; Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 2014; Portes 1996; Waters 2009). This
can happen within pan-ethnic organizations, where children of immigrants can point out
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and discuss group discrimination and potential collective action (Kibria 1998; Park 2008).
Because of bright religious boundaries, there may be an ongoing process of ethnicization of
Muslims in Europe (Kastoryano 2002), similar to the racialization of ethnic identities in the
US (Okamoto 2014; Ong et al. 1996). While imposed by the political discourse and the larger
social context, this Muslim identity spans national origins (Adamson 2011; Kastoryano 2002)
and therefore has the potential for pan-ethnic allegiances, communities, and mobilization.
While reactive identities reﬂect a stance against the host country, pan-ethnic identities reﬂect
more engagement with mainstream politics.
European States and Religion
Religious identities and religious behaviors are not shaped by social boundaries only.
In the secular or mono-religious European context, religious rights and diversity are often
debated at the political level, and the resulting policies shape children of immigrants’ political
socialization, religious freedom, and possibilities for political engagement.
Europe and the secularization hypothesis
As they have modernized, European countries have been rapidly secularizing. However,
their Christian past still shapes current institutions and policies. In sociology of religion,
Western Europe is the exempliﬁcation of the secularization hypothesis, which posits that
individuals and organizations become less religious during the process of industrialization
and modernization (Chaves 1994; Gorski and Atinordu 2008; Tschannen 1991). European
countries, which have held Catholicism, Protestantism, or sometimes Orthodox Christianity
as state religions since the rise of nation states, have experienced a decline in Christian
observance, belief, and practice following the industrial revolution. There are, however,
large variations by country (Gorski and Atinordu 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2011). While
many countries began secularizing in the late nineteenth century, the exact starting point
and speed varied according to each country’s particular relationship with the church (Norris
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and Inglehart 2011). In 2010, Europe as a continent had the second largest proportion of
religiously unaﬃliated individuals, after Asia (Hackett et al. 2015). However, while European
countries today are more secular than before, their population is still Christian in majority
and their every-day policies and structures are shaped by Christianity. Western liberal
nation-states have built their identities and politics on the foundation of a white Christian
history and must now adapt to the religious diversity brought by immigration, especially
from Muslim-majority countries (Adamson 2011; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Foner and Alba
2008; Mooney 2009; Taylor et al. 1994; Vasta 2007).
History of migration in Europe
After a period of outward migration and colonization before the two world wars, European
states began attracting migrants from more diverse and more religious countries. States
strongly aﬀected by the wars — Germany, France, Belgium, Britain, or the Netherlands
— organized guest-worker programs to rebuild infrastructures. These “guest” workers were
mostly southern Europeans from Italy, Yugoslavia, or Greece, but some also came from
Morocco and Turkey, especially in the case of the Netherlands and Germany (Castles et al.
2014). At the same time, old colonial powers such as Britain, France, Belgium, and the
Netherlands also had a large migration ﬂow from their old colonies. These two forms of
migration continued well into the 50s and 60s but ended with the oil crisis and the rise of
neoliberal policies in the mid-1970s (Castles et al. 2014). Since the 1970s, European nations
put restrictions on labor migration and post-colonial entry, though immigration continued
through family reuniﬁcation policies and refugee programs (Castles et al. 2014). In the late
1980s and 1990s, wars in the Balkans and the fall of the Soviet Empire lead to an increase
in east-west migration. Overall migration ﬂow patterns have since changed: countries in
Southern Europe are now immigration destinations while countries in Central and Eastern
Europe are places of transit (Castles et al. 2014). Most recently, the Syrian wave of refugees,
one of the largest in history, put pressure on many European states to follow or break their
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policies of welcome.
Multiculturalism policies
In response to an increasingly diverse population in the early 1970s, some European states
began developing policies that reﬂected their multicultural reality (Kastoryano 2002). The
goal of these so-called “multiculturalism” policies was to recognize and encourage cultural
diversity while also helping immigrants and their children integrate structurally (Koopmans
2013b; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). However, since the 1990s, and especially after 9/11
and a series of European terrorist attacks, European states have been moving away from the
multiculturalism framework to instead focus on incorporation, security, and national unity
(Joppke and Morawska 2003). Nevertheless, many multiculturalism policies are still in place
today, and some countries continue to increase their multicultural provisions (Banting and
Kymlicka 2013).
Multiculturalism policies enable more religious freedom, politicize religious identities,
and shape the relationship between religious organizations and mainstream institutions.
First, children of immigrants who live in countries with more multiculturalism policies are
able to practice their culture and identify with a non-native European group, all the while
incorporating into public life (Koopmans 2013b; Wright and Bloemraad 2012).
Anti-discrimination policies provide increased protections for religious minority groups.
Second, multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies highlight diﬀerences and sustain
categorizations (Fossati 2011; Taylor et al. 1994). Strong multiculturalism and
anti-discrimination policies are the consequence of a larger political debate about religions,
which would then be reﬂected in more politicized religious identities. Third, children of
immigrants’ political participation is aﬀected by national-level policies. Multiculturalism
policies increase the likelihood of identity politics while national political rights for legally
residing foreigners create a culture of minority participation and trust in mainstream
institutions (Aleinikoﬀ and Klusmeyer 2001; Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad et al. 2008).
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Finally, multiculturalism policies shape the relationship between the state and religious
organizations. By recognizing religious groups, the state can enable religious organizations
to play a larger role in the incorporation of children of immigrants (Kastoryano 2002;
Mooney 2009; Taylor et al. 1994). If not recognized by the state, minority organizations
cannot utilize oﬃcial power structures and resources to help children of immigrants.
Religious Organizations and Political Engagement
In adulthood, children of immigrants who attend religious services have additional
resources for political engagement and further develop their politicized religious identities
through a sense of group consciousness. Theorists of political participation ﬁnd that social
organizations provide not only individual resources, but also greater social networks and a
motivation for group mobilization.
As I expand in the next paragraphs, I apply theories of ethnic and religious
organizations developed in the US to religion in Europe. I argue that attending religious
events provides resources to children of immigrants useful for political participation. For
individuals experiencing social exclusion, religious organizations develop politicized
collective identities through a sense of group consciousness and pan-ethnicity.
Resources from religious organizations
Religious organizations equip children of immigrants and native Europeans with resources
and skills critical for political participation. It is known that many types of organizations
provide material help and classes to increase their members’ material and human capital
(Pattillo-McCoy 1998; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Moreover, individuals can learn directly
from organizational leaders about political issues aﬀecting them (Harris 1994; Jones-Correa
and Leal 2001). Through participation in organizations and their structures, members also
learn about civic processes and thus develop their civic skills (Secret et al. 1990).
Religious organizations often play a greater role among ethnic minorities with fewer
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resources. For example, in the US, ethnic religious organizations are more likely than white
American churches to increase the political participation of their members (Verba et al.
1995). This may be because children of immigrants are more reliant on religious organizations
for material and human capital, or because religious organizations serve to strengthen and
expand social networks.
Through religious organizations, members develop their social capital and strengthen
their ethnic identities, both of which lead to more political engagement (Coleman 1988;
Portes 1998; Putnam 2001). Individuals in religious organizations expand their social
networks and can meet other members from diﬀerent backgrounds. These “bridging” social
contacts provide information on politics not available through other networks (Cadge and
Ecklund 2007; Putnam 2001). Religious organizations can link children of immigrants with
individuals who are more incorporated into the cultural mainstream and more comfortable
with the host country’s institutions (Allen 2010; Hirschman 2004; Levitt 2003; Warner
1997; Withnow and Hackett 2003). In addition, institutions based on one national origin
provide strong “bonding” networks that foster ethnic identities by embracing cultural
particularities (Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; Lim and Putnam 2010; Putnam 2001).
For example, religious organizations oﬀer a space where immigrants and minority groups
can participate in traditional activities and celebrate their cultural uniqueness (Cadge and
Ecklund 2007; Mooney 2009; Warner 1993). Furthermore, religious organizations have been
found to provide a haven for individuals experiencing discrimination (Sherkat and Ellison
1999; Warner 1993). These shared experiences of discrimination may increase group-level
commitment to political action (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Harris 1994).
Religious group consciousness
Political mobilization around a collective identity develops in the context of shared
personal experiences of stigma and discrimination (Bernstein 2005; Hochschild and
Mollenkopf 2009; Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005). Ethnic and religious
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organizations increase group consciousnesses: group identity and an added sense of power
deprivation and commitment to collective action (Harris 1999; Wilcox and Gomez 1990).
This notion of group consciousness, as described by political scientists, is a concept similar
to politicized collective identities, a term preferred by the social psychology literature
(Fleischmann et al. 2011; Simon and Klandermans 2001), but with less attention to the
process of identity politicization and with more focus on the commitment to political
action. I consider group consciousness to be a facet of politicized group identities. High
levels of group consciousness lead individuals to realize that their group may be at a
disadvantage but also that they can take action and inﬂuence politics (Peterson 1992). In
the US, members of African American churches develop a sense of group consciousness
through conversations with other churchgoers about issues pertaining to their group, as
well as through narratives of empowerment prominent in church services (Harris 1999;
Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Secret et al. 1990; Wilcox and Gomez 1990). Children of
immigrants from all faith traditions have the potential to develop a sense of group
conscientiousness if they experience discrimination as a group.
Mosques as pan-ethnic organizations
I argue that due to bright boundaries around religion and to pan-ethnic identities
developed in adolescence, mosques can function as pan-ethnic organizations. Similarly to
Christian organizations, mosques encourage political mobilization through a sense of group
consciousness, but unlike other faith traditions in Europe, mosques also connect individuals
across national backgrounds and re-appropriate imposed categorizations. In the US,
pan-ethnic organizations are the cornerstone of political mobilization for marginalized
minorities (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 2014). These organizations are a key factor
in promoting group identities for children of immigrants across national origins and
bringing forth the group’s concerns to the national level (Lopez and Espiritu 1990;
Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). In pan-ethnic organizations, individuals develop
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a greater sense of pan-ethnic group consciousness used for political mobilization (Espiritu
1992). Research in the US on Latino- and Asian-Americans shows that anti-immigrant
attitudes, violence, exclusion and segregation lead to pan-ethnic mobilization through
organizations (Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). Pan-ethnic organizations are
also shaped by the political context. Okamoto (2014) explains that more open national
policies regarding citizenship, immigration, and civil rights create an opening for
pan-ethnic organizations to form and grow. In a context of simultaneous bright social
boundaries and multiculturalism policies, mosques may allow Muslim children of
immigrants to develop ties across national background, re-interpret the meaning of being a
European Muslim, and organize to change policies.
Outline of Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into three empirical chapters, each answering the questions
detailed above. For each chapter, I develop the relevant theoretical background and previous
empirical research. Before describing the sample and results, I oﬀer a detailed explanation of
the data source and the methods used. I ﬁnish each chapter with a summary of the results
and a discussion. I provide supplementary materials: additional tables for each chapter
(Appendix A) and the indicators for my policy scores (Appendix B).
In Chapter 2, I investigate the development of politicized religious identities in
adolescence for Christian and Muslim children of immigrants in four Western European
countries: Germany, the Netherlands, England, and Sweden. I combine theories of identity
exploration, religiosity in adolescence, and immigrant incorporation to provide a framework
to understand trends over time and the role of the social context. Most children of
immigrants secularize over time but, by the end of high school, they still give more
importance to religion and practice religion more often than natives. Due in part to
segregation, Muslim children of immigrants give more importance to religion than other
groups and participate more in religious communities between ninth and eleventh grade.
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During that same period, Muslim children of immigrants become less tied to their national
origins and more tied to the host country, precluding the hypothesis of a reactive Muslim
identity and instead showing the potential for a Muslim pan-ethnic identity.
Chapter 3 extends the analysis to religiosity in adulthood and to the social and political
contexts of twenty European countries. Using theories of assimilation and social
boundaries, I explore how natives’ own religiosity and anti-immigrant attitudes shape
children of immigrants’ religiosity. Due to social boundaries infused in culture and
institutions, Muslim children of immigrants are less religiously incorporated, but they do
not have a reactive religiosity in an anti-immigrant context. I advance the study of state
policies and incorporation by showing that Muslim children of immigrants are more
religious in countries with both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies, while
other minority religious groups are only aﬀected by the strength of anti-discrimination
policies.
In Chapter 4, I investigate the consequences of involvement in religious communities for
children of immigrants’ political incorporation. I use theories of religious organizations,
ethnic social capital, and group consciousness to explain the possible mechanisms linking
religious organizations with political engagement. Across twenty European countries, I ﬁnd
that children of immigrants who attend religious services frequently are also more
politically engaged, especially if experiencing collective social exclusion. Muslim children of
immigrants depend on religious organizations for political incorporation more than any
other group. Again, this ﬁnding points to the potential for mosques to function as
pan-ethnic organizations. Finally, I test the relationship between the state, organizations,
and individual political incorporation. I ﬁnd that strong political rights for immigrants and
multiculturalism policies encourage children of immigrants’ political engagement, and more
multiculturalism policies also increase the positive role of religious organizations.
In the concluding chapter, I discuss the unlikely role of religion as a bridge instead of
a barrier for the incorporation of children of immigrants in a secular European context. I
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examine the diﬃculties of exploring religious boundaries and the need for more research
to investigate if and how Muslim communities can be a foundation for pan-ethnic political
engagement and mobilization. I emphasize the importance of multiculturalism policies at a
time where many European countries are experiencing a retreat from a multicultural rhetoric.
I propose additional lines of inquiry for future research and implications beyond academia.
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Chapter 2
The Development of Religious Identities and Religious Behaviors for Children
of Immigrants in Adolescence: Towards or Away from the Mainstream
Between twelve and nineteen years old, adolescents start to form their own identities,
inﬂuenced more and more by peers, the media, and the greater political context (Crosnoe
and Johnson 2011; Dornbusch 1989). For children of immigrants, this developmental
process is complicated by their growing awareness that they are treated diﬀerently by the
majority (Erickson 1992; Erikson 1968; Phinney 1993). Children of immigrants start to
realize that political issues on incorporation, discrimination, or equal rights, concern their
own experiences (Campbell 2008; Flanagan 2010; Sears and Valentino 1997). At the same
time, at home, children of immigrants continue to learn about their families’ cultural
origins and practices (Feliciano 2009; Phinney 1993). For immigrants and their children,
religion is one way to uphold traditions and at the same time connect to a greater
supportive community (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Hirschman 2004). Religion thus becomes
an important social identity for children of immigrants in a sometimes-hostile environment
(Ysseldyk et al. 2010).
In Europe, research on the religious identity and the religious behavior of children of
immigrants focuses primarily on Muslims. Previous empirical work shows that the religious
identity of Muslims does not decline with generations but is negatively correlated with ties
to the host country (Connor 2010; de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Fleischmann et al.
2011; Gu¨ngo¨r et al. 2013; Jacob and Kalter 2013; Maliepaard et al. 2012; Martinovic and
Verkuyten 2012; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Therefore, this
strong Muslim identity is often associated with an oppositional stance against the
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mainstream, along the lines of a “reactive” identity as deﬁned by the segmented
assimilation literature (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994, 2005; Waters 1999).
However, most of these studies center on adults. Few studies address the processes of
identity formation in adolescence, and no study compares the joint development of religious
and national identities among Muslim and non-Muslim children of immigrants. In
adolescence, Muslim children of immigrants might start realizing that many European
natives see them and their parents’ culture as monolithic and incompatible with Western
ideals (Cesari 2003; Foner and Alba 2008; Taylor et al. 1994). As such, children of
immigrants experience “bright” boundaries centered on religion, separating “us” native
Europeans from “them” Muslims (Alba 2005; Zolberg 1999). Muslim children of
immigrants might turn to religion, not to reject the host country’s culture, but instead to
connect with similar individuals and engage with mainstream institutions.
This chapter investigates children of immigrants over time, as they develop religious
identities and join new communities between fourteen and seventeen years old. I compare
the trajectories of religious identity salience and religious behavior of Muslim and Christian
children of immigrants to the trajectories of native Christians in Germany, England, Sweden,
and the Netherlands. Using longitudinal data between ninth and eleventh grade, I test if
diﬀerences between Muslims and non-Muslims are due to experiences with bright boundaries.
Finally, I investigate if children of immigrants who experience a growth in religious identity
salience or in frequency of religious behavior “react” against the mainstream or instead
develop more ties to the host country.
Politicized Religious Identities and Religious Behaviors in Adolescence
Religious identities are marked and reinforced by religious behavior. I investigate
religious identity salience, or importance given to religion, alongside changes in religious
behavior: frequency of prayer and attendance at religious events. Religious identities are
expressed by one’s religious aﬃliation and the perceived importance of that identity (Tajfel
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and Turner 1986). For all social identities, following behavioral norms both expresses one’s
identity and, in turn, increases a sense of group identity membership, a mutual relationship
especially applicable to religion (Ashmore et al. 2004; Maliepaard and Phalet 2012; Platt
2014). Praying frequently and attending religious events will reinforce attachment to
religion, and a strong importance given to religion will lead individuals to pray and
participate more in the religious community (Ashmore et al. 2004; Maliepaard and Phalet
2012; Peek 2005; Platt 2014; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). In adolescence, children of
immigrants might explore their identities within religious communities.
In adolescence, children of immigrants explore multiple aspects of identity: gender,
race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, etc. Social psychologists have long been interested in
adolescence, a crucial period for identity formation (Erikson 1968; Phinney 1993). Ethnic
minority students frequently experience dissonance or “a growing awareness that not all
cultural values of the dominant group are beneﬁcial to [them]” and start exploring their
ethnic culture and identity (Phinney 1993, pg.69). As suggested by previous work (Padilla
1980; Padilla and Perez 2003; Phinney 1993), identity development might become even
more challenging for young immigrants who often deal with societal standards that are
incongruous with their cultural heritage (Feliciano 2009; Phinney et al. 2001). This process
is also likely to happen for religious identities, which are both tied to national origins and
often used in Europe as a basis for discrimination (Alba and Silberman 2002; Massey and
Sa´nchez 2010; Zolberg 1999). Segregation and discrimination around religion might
encourage adolescent religious children of immigrant to develop a positive sense of self
through religion and religious communities (Phinney 1993). However, children of
immigrants also respond to how natives and institutions categorize them.
In adolescence, children of immigrants’ religious identities might become increasingly
salient and politicized through contacts with peers and institutions. Even if they are still
inﬂuenced by their parents’ religion, children start to become more and more inﬂuenced
by peers and institutions in adolescence. For European natives, this process is expressed
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through a decrease in religiosity over time (Martin et al. 2003; Ozorak 2016; Regnerus et al.
2004; Smith et al. 2002). However, the secularization trend in adolescence might not be
applicable to all children of immigrants. First, immigrant parents might put more eﬀort
into transmitting their religious and national culture to their child in adolescence (Bankston
and Zhou 1996; Gu¨ngo¨r et al. 2011; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992). Second, an increase in
experiences with social exclusion by peers and institutions might lead children of immigrants
to realize that they are treated diﬀerently because of their religion. Consequently, they might
develop politicized religious identities out of shared awareness of grievances (Fleischmann
et al. 2011; Simon and Klandermans 2001). Religious communities are especially important
in creating a sense of collective consciousness out of politicized identities.
Children of immigrants’ religious identities will develop in relationship to national
identities. Individuals have multiple identities that can be ranked and activated
(Leszczensky 2016; Peek 2005; Stets and Burke 2000; Stryker 1968), and can either be
intertwined or develop independently (Phinney et al. 2001). Theories of bi-culturalism
explain that individuals can view their identities as either compatible or in conﬂict
(Benet-Mart´ınez et al. 2002). Measuring the strength of an identity, or identity salience, is
one way to compare identities and their changes over time. Identity salience refers to the
position of an identity in an identity hierarchy (Stryker and Burke 2000) but can also be
measured as the importance of the identity for the individual (Fleischmann et al. 2011;
Maliepaard and Phalet 2012; Peek 2005; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). While some salient
identities might be “reactions” towards the mainstream, politicized religious identities can
lead to more ties across national origins and more engagement with the host country’s
mainstream political institutions. I investigate how religious identity and religious practice
develop alongside national identities in adolescence.
In Figure 2.1, I lay out the process of religious identity formation in adolescence, the
inﬂuence of one’s background and social boundaries, and how religion relates to national
identities using a Structural Model Equations Modeling approach. I model both overall
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religious identity salience and religious practice (baseline) and changes during adolescence
(growth). In early adolescence (before ninth grade), children have a religious identity
salience and religious behavior mostly shaped by their parents’ religiosity and immigration
background. Over time, experiences with social boundaries, due to their religious
aﬃliation, may increase both religious identity salience and religious behavior. Finally,
depending on the type of religious identity developed, changes in religious identity salience
and practice may reﬂect more or less ties with national origins and the host country.
Figure 2.1: Theoretical model for Chapter 2.
Baseline Religious Identity and Behavior: Migration and Incorporation
Religion is especially important for immigrants, who connect religious practice with
their origins and use it for support and integration (Akresh 2011; Allen 2010; Cadge and
Ecklund 2007; Hammond 1988; Min 1992; Mooney 2009; Peek 2005; Warner 1993, 1997).
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Through religious practice, immigrants can meet co-nationals and uphold traditions from
their home country (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Peek 2005;
Warner 1993). Moreover, in times of hardship, stress, and alienation brought by the
processes of migration and incorporation, religion can provide a sense of meaning and
belonging (Allen 2010; Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Ebaugh 2001; Hirschman 2004; Peek
2005; Smith 1978a; Warner 1993). Religious organizations also sometimes provide material
and social resources, linking immigrants to larger national institutions in the host country
(Allen 2010; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Mooney 2009).
Religion also helps the children of immigrants in their own processes of identity
exploration and incorporation in the host country (Bankston and Zhou 1996; Berry 1997;
Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Chong 1998; Ebaugh 2001; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Smith
1978a). In the US and in Europe, religion and religious organizations continue to play a
large role in maintaining ethnic identities for second-generation children already
acculturated into the host country (Bankston and Zhou 1996; Chong 1998; Hirschman
2004; Min 1992; Smith 1978b; Warner 1997). Religious communities also sometimes help
diverse children of immigrants to construct new positive social identities in the context of
discrimination and exclusion (Cadge and Ecklund 2007). Indeed, the subjective meaning of
religion is diﬀerent for second-generation immigrants spending all or most of their lives in
the host country. Religious organizations therefore help the second-generation to maintain
ties with their origins while also securing a place for themselves in the host country. Due to
the search for ties with their family’s origins alongside the need for meaning and
community in a new context, I argue that children of immigrants will have a stronger
religious identity salience and engage in religious behavior more frequently compared to
natives.
(H1) On average, children of immigrants will have a stronger religious
identity and engage in religious behavior more frequently than their
native peers.
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Religion will not be as important for all immigrants, due to variation in both dogma
and the social context of reception (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Ebaugh 2001; Foner and
Alba 2008). Religions have diﬀerent requirements regarding practice — dogma — which
apply to immigrants, children of immigrants, and natives alike. Islam has formal
requirements on the number of daily prayers (ﬁve) and attendance at religious events (once
a week for Friday prayer). However, while the ﬁve daily prayers are part of the core of
Islam, attendance at Friday congregational prayer (Jum’ah) is not in the ﬁve pillars of
Islam and not required (sometimes not allowed) for Muslim women. Attendance at Mass is
part of the seven sacraments of the Catholic church, but daily prayer, while encouraged, is
not required. Most Protestant denominations strongly encourage weekly attendance at
church and prayers before all meals of the day, however, these are not considered to be
compulsory. Among children of immigrants, I expect Muslims to have the highest
frequency of prayer. However, I expect children of immigrants to have similar levels of
subjective religiosity and attendance at religious events. Moreover, the social context of
incorporation — at the individual and institutional level — might lead to diﬀerent levels of
religious identity and religious behavior for Christian and Muslim children of immigrants.
Religion Under Bright Social Boundaries
During the process of incorporation, children of immigrants often lose their cultural
particularities. According to classic and new assimilation theories, children of immigrants
and native Europeans become more similar to each other over years and generations (Alba
and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964). While European natives might adopt some customs from
immigrant cultures, children of immigrants will experience the most changes over time (Alba
and Nee 2003). Therefore, because of secularization trends in Europe and the role of religion
as a cultural identity instead of something exempliﬁed in daily practice, most children of
immigrants are expected to lose their strong ties to religion as they spend more time in
the host country. There is evidence in Europe and in the US that in an accepting social
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context, children of immigrants’ religiosity become more similar to natives over time (Cadge
and Ecklund 2007; Cesari 2003; Gans 1979; Gu¨ngo¨r et al. 2011; Hammond 1988; Hirschman
2004). However, in the context of bright boundaries, children of immigrants might develop
stronger religious identities and consequently be more religious.
New assimilation and social boundary theories suggest that Muslim children of
immigrants might develop a salient politicized religious identity because of interactions
with institutions and natives categorizing them as “other” (Alba 2005; Massey and Sa´nchez
2010). Alba (2005) and Zolberg (1999) argue that in Europe bright social boundaries are
centered around religion instead of race or ethnicity. Boundaries shape and are shaped by
individuals’ beliefs and day to day interactions (Alba 2005). Bright boundaries increase
perceived diﬀerences between groups and therefore shape both natives’ actions towards
children of immigrants and children of immigrants’ group identities (Brown 2000;
Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Peek 2005; Yancey et al. 1976). Therefore, the presence of
a bright boundary around any given minority status characteristic — e.g., race, citizenship,
religion — will increase the salience of that characteristic (Foner and Alba 2008; Sainsbury
2012). Massey and Sa´nchez (2010) explain that bright boundaries can shape identity
development and potential group cohesion through shared experiences of discrimination,
thus creating politicized collective identities. I argue that because of a bright religious
boundary in Europe, Muslims will experience a growth in importance given to religion and
religious practice over time. On the other hand, other religious groups who do not
experience this bright boundary will become more similar to natives over time.
(H2) On average, Muslim children of immigrants will have a stronger religious
identity and engage in religious behavior more frequently than Christian
children of immigrants.
(H3) Christian and Muslim children of immigrants will have diﬀerent trajectories
over time:
(H3a) Christians will become more similar to natives over time.
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(H3b) Muslims’ religious identity and religious behavior will increase over time,
resulting in an increased diﬀerentiation from both natives and Christian
children of immigrants.
The experience of bright boundaries happens not only through direct interactions with
the majority, but also through experiences with institutions and the larger cultural context.
First, segregated schools and friendship networks are an expression of social boundaries
between two groups (Wimmer 2013). Second, actions from natives at school, by law
enforcement, or in public transportation will also aﬀect how children of immigrants view
themselves (Soininen 1999; Vasta 2007). Bright boundaries can be reﬂected in personal
experiences of perceived discrimination. Third, social boundaries will be expressed through
culture. Therefore, children of immigrants from non-western origins will be more likely to
be seen as foreigners and these three experiences of bright boundaries will lead cultural
particularities to be maintained over generations. However, social boundaries are also
experienced through interaction with institutions that cannot be measured using
quantitative data analysis, therefore some diﬀerences in religious identity salience and
frequency of religious behavior between groups will remain unexplained even accounting for
segregation, discrimination, and cultural diﬀerences. With more time spent in the host
country interacting with natives and institutions, children of immigrants will have a higher
religious identity salience and practice religion more often.
(H4) The diﬀerence between Muslim and Christian children of immigrants in
baseline levels and growth of religious identity salience and religious behavior
will be partially explained by personal experiences of segregation,
discrimination, and cultural diﬀerences.
Pan-ethnic vs. Reactive Religious Identities
Children of immigrants who do not experience bright boundaries will assimilate over
time and therefore drop ties to their country of origin and increase the strength of their
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host country national identity. However, Muslims’ increase in religious identity salience and
religious behavior over time could be either a way to engage with the mainstream or a
“reaction” against the mainstream.
In the context of bright religious boundaries, Muslims’ politicized religious identity may
be pan-ethnic: a re-interpretation of imposed categorizations across ethnic lines. While
ﬁrst-generation immigrants understand themselves using their country of origin, children of
immigrants incorporate into established social categorizations. Therefore, under bright
boundaries a Muslim religious identity might become a pan-ethnic identity: a politicized
collective identity which reinterprets existent categorizations and reaches across national
origins. Consequently, mosques might become pan-ethnic organizations, bringing
individuals from various backgrounds together and fostering a sense of collective
consciousness. Research on pan-ethnicity ﬁnds that when children of immigrants
experience similar segregation and institutional discrimination from natives, they develop
ties across ethnic backgrounds (Espiritu 1992; Kibria 1998; Nagel 1994; Okamoto 2014;
Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). Peer negative attitudes, discrimination, and imposed
categorizations might force children of immigrants to turn to religion: an identity that
gives them value and an accepting group (Hirschman 2004; Jamal 2005; Portes and
MacLeod 1996; Warner 1993; Waters 2009). The emergence of a pan-ethnic identity among
Muslims implies the primacy of religious identities and religious communities over national
origin identity, and a motivation to engage with the host country’s political system.
The pan-ethnic identity hypothesis is an alternative to the idea of a reactive Muslim
identity or reactive religiosity, exempliﬁed by disengagement with the host country’s culture
and institutions. According to segmented assimilation theory, a strong religious identity or
religiosity developed out of social exclusion could reﬂect a reaction against the mainstream
(Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997). Indeed,
children of immigrants sometimes incorporate into existing minority groups and cultures
under experiences of segregation, discrimination, and lack of opportunity. Thus, a reactive
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ethnic identity develops towards the mainstream, as a product of confrontation and rise
of defensive identity (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993; Thomson and Crul
2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012; Zhou 1997). The diﬀerentiation between reactive and pan-
ethnic identities is not clear in the literature. Espiritu (1992) explains that a reactive pan-
ethnic solidarity develops under threat and sometimes leads to more mobilization. However,
this is not in line with segmented assimilation theorists who posit reactive identities as
distinct from ethnic solidarity and deﬁnitely not a source of political engagement (Portes
and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994). I argue therefore that the concept of reactive solidarity in
the pan-ethnic literature and reactive identity in the incorporation literature are diﬀerent.
Speciﬁcally, pan-ethnic identities reﬂect an engagement with mainstream culture and the
potential for political mobilization while reactive identities reﬂect a disengagement with the
mainstream and the development of politically disenfranchised subcultures. Moreover, pan-
ethnic identities are uniquely associated with a decrease in ties with national origins, while
reactive identities can be mono-ethnic in nature.
(H5) Alongside changes in religious identity salience and religious behavior, children
of immigrants will develop stronger or weaker ties to their origin country and
the host country during adolescence.
(H5a) Christians’ origin country identity salience will decrease, and their host
country identity salience will increase.
(H5b) Pan-ethnic Muslim identity: Muslims’ origin country identity salience
will decrease, and their host country identity salience will increase.
(H5c) Reactive Muslim identity: Muslims’ host country identity salience will
decrease over time.
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and England are ideal cases to analyze social
boundaries and identity formation in Western Europe. These four countries are among the
largest immigrant-receiving countries in Europe and all share a common Christian history.
All four countries had several big waves of immigration in the ﬁfty years following World
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War II. Germany and Sweden had the highest per capital immigration rate, followed by the
Netherlands, and ﬁnally England (Koopmans et al. 2012). According to Pew Research
Center estimates, Germany has also the largest Muslim population in Western Europe,
which totals to 4.8 million in 2010 (5.8% of the total population) (Hackett 2015). However,
the Netherlands has one of the highest Muslim population per capita (6% of the total
population is Muslim), second only to France. England and Sweden have respectively 4.8%
and 4.6% of their population that is Muslim. While all four countries provide religious
freedom to their members and immigrants, they each have strong ties to Christian
denominations. For example, even with a mostly secularized population, the Netherlands
holds Calvinism as a quasi-state church. Until 2000, the Lutheran Church was the state
religion in Sweden and the Church of England (Anglican) is still formally tied to the state
in England. In Germany, special state sponsored status has been given to the Roman
Catholic Church, a Protestant coalition, and Jewish communities. However, Islam has not
been accepted as large or stable enough to be granted the same privileges.
Previous Findings on the Religious Identities and Religious Behavior of Children
of Immigrants in Europe
Previous research in Europe focuses on the incorporation of Muslim children of
immigrants and ignores religious identities of other children of immigrants. The few
comparative studies ﬁnd that Muslim children of immigrants have higher religiosity than
their peers both in the survey country (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Jacob and Kalter
2013; van Tubergen 2007), and in their origin country (Gu¨ngo¨r et al. 2013). There are no
studies that compare the religious identity salience and the religious practice of Muslim
children of immigrants, Christian natives, and Christian children of immigrants.
Research on immigrants’ religiosity over time is sparse and inconclusive, many studies
using age or generations as a proxy for changes over time. In a cross-sectional analysis of
Moroccan-Dutch children of immigrants, Verkuyten et al. (2012) ﬁnd that younger
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adolescents are more religious compared to older children of immigrants. Looking at
diﬀerences by generation, Jacob and Kalter (2013) ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in religiosity
between Muslims and other groups is stable across generations. Moreover, Platt (2014)
ﬁnds that communal aspects of religiosity are not less important for the second-generation
compared to their parents. In the only true longitudinal study on religiosity, Gu¨ngo¨r et al.
(2012) ﬁnd that in adolescence there is not a decrease in religiosity for Turks in Belgium.
No study compares Muslims over time to both Christian natives and Christian children of
immigrants.
Social psychologists in Europe and the United States look at Muslims’ religious identity
in particular and argue that it is an important and meaningful social group which provides
a sense of group membership linked to beliefs and practices (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007;
Ysseldyk et al. 2010). Parents’ religiosity and socialization strongly predicts children’s
religiosity (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Fleischmann and Phalet 2011; Jacob and
Kalter 2013). Structural incorporation (better employment and education) leads to lower
probability of religious aﬃliation and religiosity (van Tubergen 2007; van Tubergen and
Sindrado´ttir 2011). The strength of immigrants’ religious identity is also inﬂuenced by the
number of co-ethnic peers in the neighborhood and at school (de Hoon and van Tubergen
2014; van Tubergen 2007; Verkuyten et al. 2012). So far, no study has found a relationship
between perceived discrimination, segregation, and religious identity for immigrants in
Europe. Studies of Turks in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands ﬁnd that there is a
strong relationship between being Turkish and Muslim (Gu¨ngo¨r et al. 2012; Maliepaard
et al. 2010; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007), sometimes even
stronger for second-generation immigrants compared to their parents (Maliepaard et al.
2010).
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Data Source, Measures, and Method
Data source and case selection
I analyze adolescents and the development of their religious identities and religious
behaviors in Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, and England between ninth and eleventh
grade. These four countries were selected by the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal
Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) funded by the Norface Era Net Plus
Migration in Europe program (Kalter et al. 2016). This project followed adolescent
children of immigrants and their peers between 2010 and 2013. In 2010, the research team
selected schools with a probability proportional to their size while over-sampling schools
with a higher proportion of children of immigrants. Then, the team randomly selected
classes within the schools in grades where most children were already fourteen years old
and interviewed all students enrolled in these classes. The grades selected were equivalent
to ninth grade in Germany, eighth grade in Sweden, tenth grade in England, and third
grade of secondary for the Netherlands (I will use ninth grade for simplicity and
equivalency with the US educational system). The initial survey covered 480 schools and
958 classrooms comprising of 18,902 students, 18,716 of whom participated in the ﬁrst
wave. A total of 11,896 parents were also interviewed at that time, including 157 parents
with children who did not participate until the next wave and four parents whose child was
never interviewed. In the second wave, the research team interviewed a total of 15,217
students both in and out of schools, and 10,902 students again in the third wave. After the
third wave, the organization stopped doing a uniﬁed data collection in all four countries. I
focus on adolescents who participated in at least one wave and had a parent interviewed:
11,892 students.
I compare the religious identity salience and religious practice of native Europeans and
children of immigrants who report a religious aﬃliation. A total of 7,779 adolescents identify
with a religion in the ﬁrst wave or subsequently if missing at ﬁrst. I keep adolescents who
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become unaﬃliated after the ﬁrst or second wave — 10.4% of students — as this would be
reﬂected in a decrease in religious identity salience and practice over time. Native Europeans
are more likely than children of immigrants to become unaﬃliated over time.
I deﬁne native Europeans as children who have both parents and grandparents born in
the survey country. Of all native Europeans, 52.6% report a religious aﬃliation, and almost
all aﬃliated natives (98.5%) identify as Christians. Therefore, I exclude native adolescents
who report an aﬃliation with a religion other than Christianity. Christian natives are split
between Catholicism (30.5% of Christian natives), Protestantism (30.5%), and just
“Christian” or “other Christian” (38.98%). The survey questionnaire does not diﬀerentiate
between denominations within “other Christian”, spanning from eastern Orthodox
traditions to evangelic groups. Among participating students with a parent interviewed, a
total of 3,460 are native Europeans identifying as Christians.
Alongside native Europeans, I focus on children of immigrants who have spent enough
time in the host country to be familiar with its culture. I include children of immigrants
who moved to the survey country at or before the age of six (1.5 generation) as well as
children of immigrants who were born in the host country with at least one parent born
abroad (2nd and 2.5 generation). Children of mixed parents, especially those who identify
with a minority religion, are not exempt from discrimination and categorizations by
natives. Among children of immigrants, 15.1% report no religious aﬃliation, 33.0% are
Christian, 43.8% are Muslim — with no possible diﬀerentiation between Shi’a, Sunni, or
other traditions — and 6.84% identify with another religion. Within Christian children of
immigrants, 36.27% identify as Catholic, 20.1% identify as Protestant and 43.6% are just
Christian or other Christian. Other religions include Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, and
Judaism, but none of these groups are large enough to be included in the analysis. For
example, only sixty adolescents without missing values report being Hindu, the largest
group within other religions. Among participating students with a parent interviewed,
2,727 are children of immigrants identifying as either Christian or Muslim.
37
I restrict my sample to students who have at least two waves present for time variant
measures (religious identity salience, religious practice, and national identities) in order to
have the correct baseline and growth estimates. Consequently, I exclude 384 Christian
natives, 215 Christian children of immigrants, and 240 Muslim children of immigrants from
the analysis. I remove an additional 345 adolescents due to missing values on time invariant
covariates. The ﬁnal sample totals 5,003 adolescents, including 2,917 native Christians, 1,045
Christian children of immigrants, and 1,041 Muslim children of immigrants.
National contexts
I investigate the changes in religious identity salience and religious behavior for
Christian natives and Christian and Muslim children of immigrants between ninth and
eleventh grade. In Table 2.1, I present the population estimates for the proportion of each
immigrant generation and religious aﬃliation by country in 2011.
Table 2.1: Proportion of ninth graders by religious aﬃliation and generation status in four
European countries in 2010, weighted population estimates.
Percentages of population in ninth grade Germany England Netherlands Sweden
Natives 0.592 0.650 0.738 0.566
No religion 0.196 0.595 0.574 0.398
Christian 0.797 0.391 0.415 0.586
Muslim 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Other 0.006 0.013 0.009 0.014
Children of Immigrants 0.255 0.169 0.152 0.233
No religion 0.109 0.228 0.336 0.278
Christian 0.545 0.371 0.338 0.407
Muslim 0.311 0.269 0.258 0.274
Other 0.035 0.131 0.068 0.041
First-generation immigrants 0.026 0.071 0.012 0.054
Third-generation immigrants 0.126 0.109 0.098 0.146
Source: 2010 - 2013 CILS4EU.
Each country has a diﬀerent history of migration which shapes the composition of
immigrant generations and religious traditions. Germany and Sweden have the largest
proportion of fourteen-year-olds with immigrant parents (25.5 and 23.3% of children of
immigrants in ninth grade, respectively) compared to other countries. Germany and
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Sweden also have the largest proportion of ninth graders who are third-generation
immigrants, with at least one grandparent born outside of the survey country (12.6 and
14.6%). On the other hand, England has the largest percentage of ninth graders that are
immigrants themselves (7.1%). The Netherlands, who has comparable numbers of second
and third-generation immigrants to England (around 16% of children are second-generation
and around 10% are third), only has 1.2% of ninth graders who are ﬁrst-generation
migrants. Having more third-generation adolescents present in the country might provide
an already established co-religious community. However, a large wave of recent immigrants
might make religious identities more salient.
Across all countries, European natives tend to be either unaﬃliated or Christian.
Germany has by far the largest proportion of native children that are Christian: 79.7% of
all native ninth graders are Christian while only 19.6% are unaﬃliated. Germany is unique
in this sample. Sweden only has 58.6% of native children that are Christian and has twice
the amount of unaﬃliated ninth graders (39.8%) compared to Germany. There are only
around 40% of native children in England and the Netherlands who are Christian while
around 58% do not report a religious aﬃliation and around 1% are part of another religious
aﬃliation. In all countries, almost none of the native ninth graders identify as Muslim.
Christian children of immigrants in Germany or Sweden might be able to retain a higher
religiosity due to the country’s Christian majority. However, Muslim children of
immigrants in all countries will experience institutions and contexts that were created in a
Christian or secular environment.
Unsurprisingly, the largest proportion of religious children of immigrants are in Germany
and Sweden. As there are many native Christians in these two countries, religious immigrants
might be drawn to settle there, or culturally incorporated children of immigrants might feel
like it is more acceptable to identify with a religion. More than 50% of children of immigrants
in Germany are Christian and 31.1% are Muslim. In Sweden, 40.7% of children of immigrants
are Christian and 27.4% are Muslim. The Netherlands has the largest proportion of second-
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generation ninth graders who are unaﬃliated (33.6%) while England has the largest group of
children of immigrants from other religions (13.1%). Children of immigrants in Germany and
Sweden may feel a bigger distinction between Christianity and Islam while in the Netherlands
the boundary might be more between being secular and religious. England, on the other
hand, is a more diverse national context.
Adolescents’ religious identities, religious behaviors, families, and experiences of
boundaries
The means and proportions for my dependent and independent variables are presented
in Table 2.2. The ﬁrst part of the table describes the religious identities, religious practice,
and demographics for natives and children of immigrants from Christian and Muslim faith
traditions. The second part of the table presents national identities and other covariates
speciﬁc to children of immigrants: individual experiences with social exclusion, cultural
incorporation/diﬀerences, and the salience of both origin country and host country
identities. All measures of social exclusion, cultural incorporation/diﬀerences, and controls
were measured during ninth grade, or in subsequent grades if missing at ﬁrst. Questions on
experiences of discrimination are only available in ninth grade. Information on parents are
measured using the survey of one parent in the ﬁrst wave, but are imputed with answers
from the child in case of missing values.
For my dependent variables, I include one measure of religious identity salience and two
measures of religious practice. First, I include a measure of religious identity salience with
the question “how important is religion to you” using a four-point Likert-type scale answer:
very important (3), fairly important (2), not very important (1), and not at all important (0).
Second, I include frequency of prayer, which ranges from never praying (0) to praying ﬁve
times a day or more (5). Finally, I include a measure of attendance at religious events: how
often the respondent attends a religious meeting place or a religious class, from 0 (never)
to 4 (every day). These measures provide information on both current personal religious
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Table 2.2: Natives and children of immigrants’ identities, demographics, parental
background, and experiences with social boundaries in four European countries.
Mean/Proportions
Full Native Children of immigrants
Range Sample Christians Christians Muslims
N=5,003 N=2,917 N= 1,045 N=1,041
All religious adolescents
Religion
Person-mean religious identity salience 0 − 3 1.535 1.156 1.645 2.490
Person-mean frequency of prayer 0 − 5 1.516 1.156 1.617 2.421
Person-mean attendance at events 0 − 4 1.153 0.991 1.200 1.559
Demographics in ninth grade
Girl 0 − 1 0.544 0.542 0.558 0.535
Age 13 − 17 14.510 14.457 14.539 14.630
Parental background
Parents consider religion important 0 − 1 0.590 0.466 0.648 0.877
Single or reconstructed family 0 − 1 0.245 0.238 0.341 0.168
Neither parent with college degree 0 − 1 0.682 0.634 0.695 0.806
Unemployed household 0 − 1 0.082 0.038 0.085 0.200
Children of immigrants
Social boundaries
Percent immigrant in school 0 − 2
0-30% (reference group) 0.303 0.438 0.167
30-60% 0.313 0.297 0.329
60-100% 0.384 0.265 0.503
Social exclusion
Few friends from survey country 0 − 1 0.384 0.264 0.504
Perceived discrimination scale 0 − 2.5 0.276 0.276 0.276
Cultural incorporation/diﬀerences
Other language spoken at home 0 − 1 0.825 0.686 0.964
Non-western origins 0 − 1 0.610 0.355 0.866
National identities
Person-mean origin identity salience 0 − 4 2.238 1.902 2.576
Person-mean host identity salience 0 − 3 1.832 2.007 1.656
Source: 2010 - 2013 CILS4EU.
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identity salience but also signs for future developments of a collective religious identity.
In Table 2.2 are the person-mean averages of religious identity salience and religious
practice over the three grades. Across ninth, tenth and eleventh grade, children of immigrants
have a stronger religious identity and engage in religious behavior more frequently compared
to religious natives. Native Christians on average consider religion to be not very important
while children of immigrants of all faith traditions are closer to considering it fairly important.
Moreover, native Christians pray on average less than once a month while Christian children
of immigrants pray at least once a month. The diﬀerence in religious attendance between
Christian natives and children of immigrants is very small, both groups attend religious
services on average less than once a month.
Muslim children of immigrants not only have a higher frequency of religious practice (as
expected from the requirements of Islam) but also consider religion to be more important
and attend religious services more than all other groups. On average, Muslim children of
immigrants pray and attend religious services at least once month. The greatest diﬀerence
between Muslims and non-Muslims is in religious identity salience: Muslims on average
consider religion to be at least fairly important.
I control for demographics measured in ninth grade which have been found to aﬀect
religiosity and identity development of adolescents. I investigate if identity changes are
diﬀerent for boys and girls. I control for age to take into account that some children might
have already developed ethnic and religious identities before reaching ninth grade (I compare
children to the median age for that grade). Children who are missing on information for
their age are given, by country, the mode for birth year and median for month and interview
date. The sample is split almost equally between boys and girls and on average children are
fourteen and a half years old.
For parental background, I include a measure of parental subjective religiosity (1=religion
is important). Compared to all other groups, Muslims tend to have parents who are very
religious themselves. 87.7% of Muslim compared to 64.8% of Christian children of immigrants
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and 46.6% of Christian natives have a parent who believes religion is important or very
important.
To control for the household situation and socioeconomic status, I measure if the child
lives in a one-parent or recomposed family, if neither parent has a university degree, and if
both parents are unemployed. In Germany, England, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 24.5% of
children in ninth grade live in a single-parent or reconstructed family, 68.2% of children live
in a household without any college graduates, but only 8.2% are in a completely unemployed
household. However, there are large variations in family background by immigrant status and
religion: 34.1% of Christian children of immigrants live in single or reconstructed families
compared to 23.8% of natives and only 16.8% of Muslims. On the other hand, 80.6% of
Muslim children of immigrants have both parents without a college degree and 20% live in
an unemployed household, compared to 63.4% and 8.5% respectively of Christian natives.
In order to measure children of immigrants’ experiences with social boundaries, I use
information on school context, social exclusion, and cultural incorporation/diﬀerences. First,
I include a measure of the percentage of immigrants in the school, comparing individuals
in schools with less than 30% immigrants to those with between 30 and 60% immigrants
and to those in schools with more than 60% immigrants. Segregated schools may increase
the number of co-religious and re-enforce social boundaries with native Europeans. Second,
I include the number of friends from the survey country (1= few or less than half friends
from survey country, 0=half, more than half, or all friends from survey country). Third, I
include a perceived discrimination using summated scale (α = 0.636) of four measures of the
frequency of discrimination 1) in school 2) in public transportation 3) in shops and by 4)
the police. All four measures range from never (0) to always (3). Finally, I include cultural
incorporation/diﬀerences in order to see if children of immigrants who are most diﬀerent
from natives retain these cultural diﬀerences over time. If the child speaks another language
at home, they are considered less culturally incorporated. Cultural diﬀerence is measured
by using a control for region of origin (non-Western=outside of Europe, Canada, the US,
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Israel, and Australia).
I compare changes in religious identity salience and religious practice to changes in the
strength of national identities. I use a measure of origin country/ethnic identity salience
asking if the child feels that he or she belongs to another group than the host country
(chosen from a list of countries and ethnic groups) and “how strongly” does he or she feels
to that group: very strongly (4), fairly strongly (3), not very strongly (2), not at all strongly
(1), or no other group (0). Most natives did not choose another group. To measure ties to
the host country, I use the question “how strongly do you feel like you belong to [survey
country]” which is coded from not at all strongly (0) to (3) very strongly.
Compared to Christian children of immigrants in ninth grade, Muslim children of
immigrants are in more segregated schools, have more segregated friendships, are more
culturally diﬀerent, and identify more with their country of origin but less with the host
country. Half of Muslims are in schools with at least 60% of students from an immigrant
background, compared to only 26.5% of Christian children of immigrants. Moreover, half of
Muslims have few friends from the host country (50.4%) while only 26.4% of Christian
immigrants have segregated friendships. However, Christian and Muslim children of
immigrants tend to report the same amount of overall discrimination. Muslim children of
immigrants are more diﬀerent culturally from native Europeans than Christian immigrants:
96.4% of Muslims speak another language at home and 86.6% come from non-Western
countries. Over the three years, Muslims are fairly strongly or very strongly attached to
another group while Christians are not very strongly attached. On the other hand,
Christians are very strongly attached to the host country while Muslims are between fairly
and very strongly attached.
Method: Latent Growth Curve Analysis
Model Speciﬁcation. I use Latent Growth Curve Analysis (LGCA) to investigate how
children of immigrants develop their religious identities between ninth and eleventh grade
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(Audrain-McGovern et al. 2003; Chen and Lin 2016; Needham 2007, 2008). This method
models changes over time in the dependent variables (religious identity salience, frequency
of prayer, and religious attendance) with a latent line (or curve) and provides estimates for
the baseline and growth. Figure 2.1 represents the theoretical model of the LGCA using a
Structural Equations Modeling format for simplicity. The Intra-Class Correlation (ICC) for
natives and children of immigrants for each dependent variable is between 0.682 and 0.746,
which shows that there is enough variation within adolescents over time to justify a latent
growth analysis.
I compute the estimates for the baseline and growth in religious identity salience and
religious practice by running a multilevel mixed-eﬀects model using maximum likelihood
estimations. The intercept of the model represents the latent baseline for each dependent
variable and the eﬀect of grade on the outcome represents the latent slope or growth over
time (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). I choose a linear representation of changes over
time as both categorical and quadratic modeling of grades lead to similar results in modeling
changes in religious identity salience and frequency of prayer. However, there is evidence
that attendance at religious events has a quadratic form and that changes over time taper oﬀ
in eleventh grade. I use mixed-eﬀects models in order to have time nested in each individual
and include a random coeﬃcient for time. Using likelihood-ratio tests for each measure of
religious identity salience and religious practice, I ﬁnd that having a random intercept and
coeﬃcient for time is better than the simple model using ﬁxed eﬀects.
I use a generalized linear model with unstructured covariance in STATA 15. This model
allows me to incorporate survey weights. In the pooled models using all four countries, I
standardize the weights so that the weighted sample sizes are identical in each country. This
method enables each country to contribute equally to the estimates (Kalter et al. 2016). The
results without weights show more precise signiﬁcant diﬀerences between Muslim children
of immigrants, Christians, and natives: at the worst, my models underestimate diﬀerences
between groups. I use unstructured covariance to estimate the variance at each grade and
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between each pair of grades without imposing any structure (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal
2012). I have at least two grades present for each individual and enough individuals by
grade. Small sample sizes and nested models preclude separate estimates by country. I am
unable to account for children of immigrants clustered in schools because the cluster option
is not allowed with a multilevel mixed-eﬀects generalized linear model with weights. The
following equation presents the multilevel mixed eﬀects model used to estimate the latent
growth curves:
Yij = β0j + β1jtij + ij
β0j = γ00 + γ01Wj + μ0j
β1j = γ10 + μ1j
This set of three nested equations predicts religious identity salience or religious practice
Yij over i number of time points t (here three grade years), for j children, with a matrix
of covariates Wj. The ﬁrst equation is similar to a simple linear regression where Yij is
the estimated outcome and the errors ij have a normal distribution. This is the level-one
equation for years nested within individuals. The child speciﬁc intercept (or baseline identity
salience) is β0j and the child speciﬁc estimate for growth is β1j. The second equation predicts
the child speciﬁc baseline, which is allowed to vary in the previous equation (β0j). Because
I am only using time invariant covariates in this case, Wj, they are only used to predict
the baseline. The model with time invariant covariates does provide a better ﬁt than the
unconditional model (χ2, p < 0.001). In order to investigate the eﬀect of a covariate on the
changes in religious identity salience or religious behavior, I include an interaction between
that covariate and the time variable. For example, I include an interaction between religious
aﬃliation and growth, which signiﬁcantly improves model ﬁt (χ2, p < 0.001). The third
equation predicts the child speciﬁc estimate for growth which is also allowed to randomly
vary in the ﬁrst equation (β1j). Both μ0j and μ1j have a bivariate distribution centered at
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zero and an unstructured covariance matrix.
Analysis Plan. First, I investigate if religious children of immigrants (H1), and
especially Muslims (H2), have a higher baseline religious identity salience and baseline
frequency of religious behavior than Christian natives, unconditionally and conditionally on
demographics and parental background. Second, I test if over time Christian children of
immigrants become more similar to natives (H3a) and if Muslim children of immigrants
experience an increase in religious identity salience and religious practice (H3b). Third, I
investigate if the diﬀerences between Muslim and Christian children of immigrants is
maintained when considering experiences with social boundaries (H4). Finally, I investigate
the changes in the strength of national identities over time for Christians and Muslims
(H5).
Results
Baseline religious identity salience and religious behavior
Children of immigrants, and especially Muslims, have higher measures of religious
identity salience and engage in religious behavior more frequently in ninth grade compared
to Christian natives. The baseline and growth estimates over three years for religious
identity salience, frequency of prayer, and attendance at religious events are displayed in
Table 2.3. For each outcome, I ﬁrst present the unconditional model with only diﬀerences
between Christian natives, Christian children of immigrants, and Muslim children of
immigrants. This is equivalent as computing the baseline and growth for each group
separately without any controls. Then, I add individual controls (conditional models) that
might shape religious identity salience and religious behavior, and, in the ﬁnal models, I
include controls for family background.
Christian children of immigrants have a more salient religious identity and pray more
often than natives. In the unconditional models, Christian children of immigrants believe
religion to be more important compared to natives (p < 0.001) and have a higher frequency
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of prayer (p < 0.01). Christian children of immigrants have on average a higher frequency
of attendance at religious events compared to natives, but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.
While on average children of immigrants have a higher religious identity salience and practice
religion more often compared to natives, the biggest diﬀerence is between Muslim children
of immigrants and all other adolescents.
Muslim children of immigrants have the strongest religious identity and the most
frequent religious practice compared to all other groups. The largest diﬀerence between
Muslim children of immigrants and Christian natives is in religious identity salience: in the
unconditional models, Muslim children of immigrants tend to believe religion is between
fairly and very important while Christian natives and children of immigrants believe it is
between not very and fairly important (p < 0.001). Muslims also tend to pray more than
once a month while other groups pray less (p < 0.001). All groups tend to have more
similar frequency of religious attendance, though Muslims still have signiﬁcantly higher
religious practice (p < 0.001) compared to both Christian natives and Christian children of
immigrants.
The diﬀerence between children of immigrants and natives remains even when controlling
for demographics and country of survey. However, there are expected diﬀerences by gender
and age. Adolescent girls have a more salient religious identity (p < 0.01) but do not pray
more or attend more religious events. In the conditional models, age is associated with lower
religious practice: older students in the same grade pray less frequently (p < 0.001) and
attend religious services less often (p < 0.001) than younger students. Finally, while there
are close to no diﬀerences between Germany, England, and the Netherlands, adolescents
have a signiﬁcantly lower religious identity salience and less frequent religious behavior in
Sweden.
Children of immigrants have a higher religious identity salience and pray more
frequently compared to natives even controlling for parent’s religiosity and family
background. Accounting for parental religiosity and other family experiences decreases, but
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does not eliminate, the diﬀerences between groups in religious identity salience. Christian
children of immigrants from an a-religious intact family with a high socioeconomic
background have a more salient religious identity (p < 0.001) and pray more often
(p < 0.05) than religious natives with the same background. Muslim children of immigrants
still have a signiﬁcant diﬀerence compared to natives in their importance given to religion
(p < 0.001), frequency of prayer (p < 0.001), and frequency of attendance at religious
events (p < 0.01). The magnitude of the diﬀerence in religious identity salience and
religious practices between Muslim children of immigrants and natives is, however, reduced
when accounting for parents’ high religiosity and socioeconomic status.
Adolescents from intact and religious families are more religious, but they are not aﬀected
by their family’s socioeconomic status. As expected, having a parent who believes religion
is important increases both religious identity salience and religious practice (p < 0.001). On
the other hand, not having both biological parents at home is associated with a decrease in
religious identity salience (p < 0.05), less prayers (p < 0.01), and less frequent attendance at
religious events (p < 0.001). Parental education does not seem to aﬀect the child’s religious
identity salience or religious practice, but this may be due to the fact that parent education
is strongly tied to immigrant background and religiosity.
Growth between ninth and eleventh grade
Figure 2.2 models the latent growth curve using estimates of the unconditional models
in Table 2.3 for religious identity salience, frequency of prayer, and attendance at religious
events. Each ﬁgure’s vertical axis is scaled to the minimum and maximum score possible
for each outcome, which provides correct comparisons of diﬀerences across outcomes. The
baseline and growth values for each religious group are calculated by adding the baseline and
growth estimates for natives with the diﬀerence between each group and natives.
Between ninth and eleventh grade, there is a steady decrease in religious identity salience
and religious practice for Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants, though
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Christian children of immigrants do not become more similar to natives. Christian natives
consider religion less important and practice religion less between ninth and eleventh grade
(Table 2.3, p < 0.01). Christian children of immigrants are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
natives in any rate of change: their estimates for the decrease in measures of religious identity
salience and religious behaviors are actually smaller than Christian natives. Overall, the
decline in religious identity salience and religious practice for Christian children of immigrants
is similar to that of natives (Figure 2.2). Therefore, Christian children of immigrants have
a higher religious identity salience and practice religion more often than natives at ﬁrst and
the diﬀerence between the two groups is not reduced over time. Instead, Christian children
of immigrants have a higher religious identity salience and engage in religious behavior more
frequently compared to natives throughout high school.
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Figure 2.2: Baseline and growth estimates for the latent curves of changes in religious
identity salience and religious behavior for adolescents who identify with a religion (based
on estimates from Table 2.3 unconditional models, N=5,003).
Over time, Muslim children of immigrants have a slow decrease in importance given to
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religion and an increase in their frequency of attendance at religious events. The growth
estimates for importance and frequency of prayer for Muslim children of immigrants are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from natives and Christian children of immigrants (Table 2.3).
However, the estimate for the decrease in importance for religion is not as negative as other
groups and the estimate for changes in prayer is actually positive for Muslims. The greatest
diﬀerence between Muslims and everyone else is in the growth of attendance at religious
events. Muslim children of immigrants have an increase in religious attendance over time,
diﬀerent from Christian natives (p < 0.05) even accounting for family background. Over
time, Muslim children of immigrants become more and more diﬀerent than the two other
groups (Figure 2.2).
Experiences with social boundaries
Parent religiosity, cultural diﬀerences, and levels of incorporation explain some of the
high religious identity salience and frequent religious behavior of Muslims. However, Muslim
children of immigrants continue to have a more salient religious identity and attend religious
services more over time even accounting for parental background and social boundaries. In
Table 2.4, I present the conditional growth model for children of immigrants by religion and
the relationship between religious identity salience, religious practice, parental background,
experiences of social exclusion, and cultural incorporation/diﬀerences. In additional analysis,
I run these models with random intercepts for each school: the results are substantively the
same.
The diﬀerence in religious identity salience and religious practice between Muslim and
Christian children of immigrants is partially explained by parental background. Without any
controls, Muslim children of immigrants have a more salient religious identity in ninth grade
(p < 0.001), pray more often (p < 0.001), and attend more religious services (p < 0.01) than
Christian children of immigrants. However, the diﬀerence in baseline levels of attendance at
religious events disappears when comparing individuals with similar parental and cultural
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background. Once including parent’s religiosity, household composition, and region of origin,
the diﬀerence in importance given to religion and prayer is reduced. Children of immigrants
with one parent who believes religion to be important tend to also believe religion is more
important (p < 0.001), tend to pray more (p < 0.001), and attend more religious events
(p < 0.001) compared to children with less religious parents. Children of immigrants who
live in a single-parent or reconstructed family are less likely to pray (p < 0.001) and to attend
religious services (p < 0.001) compared to children living with both biological parents.
Muslim and Christian children of immigrants’ religious identities are even more similar
to each other once accounting for their cultural diﬀerences and levels of segregation from
natives. For children of immigrants with comparable cultural incorporation/diﬀerences and
social boundaries, Muslims are not more likely to pray than non-Muslims. However, Muslim
children of immigrants still have a more salient religious identity across all experiences of
boundaries and incorporation (p < 0.001). Children of immigrants have a higher baseline
religious identity salience and baseline religious practice if they experience segregation and
are very diﬀerent culturally. Children of immigrants who live in a school with more than 60%
immigrants give higher importance to religion, pray more, and attend more religious services
than children of immigrants who are in schools with less than 30% immigrants (p < 0.05).
Having few friends from the survey country also increases the levels of importance given
to religion (p < 0.05). Having non-western origins is associated with more importance to
religion, and more frequent prayer and religious attendance (p < 0.001). However, there is
no signiﬁcant eﬀect of perceived discrimination.
Culturally incorporated children of immigrants attend more religious services, but
Muslims’ growth in frequency of religious attendance is not shaped by parents, social
boundaries, or cultural diﬀerences. For children of immigrants, speaking another language
at home is associated with a lower baseline of religious attendance (p < 0.05). However,
Muslim children of immigrants have a growth in attendance between ninth and eleventh
grade greater than Children of immigrants (p < 0.05) that is not explained by these
55
covariates. In additional analysis, I compute the interaction between each covariate and the
estimate for growth to investigate how background, experiences of social exclusion, and
cultural diﬀerence/incorporation inﬂuence changes over time in attendance at religious
events. None of these measures signiﬁcantly interact with growth, and the diﬀerence
between Muslims and non-Muslims remains constant across models.
National identities
I investigate the changes in the strength of national identities over time for Christian and
Muslim children of immigrants. Even though baseline salience varies, both Christian and
Muslim children of immigrants become more German, Dutch, British, or Swedish over time.
I estimate the baselines and slopes for changes in origin country national identity salience
and host country national identity salience over time (Table 2.5). The visual representation
of the latent curves of changes in national identities for Muslim and Christian children of
immigrants are presented in Figure 2.3.
There is no evidence that Muslim children of immigrants become more attached to their
national origins over time. In ninth grade, Muslims have higher origin country national
identity salience than Christians (p < 0.05). For Muslims, the slope for changes in national
origins is negative and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero. On the other hand, Christian
children of immigrants have a positive slope for origin country identity salience (though again,
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero). Both Muslim and Christian children of immigrants have
stable ties to their national origins over time, and Muslims in this sample tend to believe
these origins are slightly less important over time (Figure 2.3).
Muslims increase their attachment to the host country over time, similarly to Christian
children of immigrants. Over the three years in high school, Muslim children of immigrants
have an increase in their ties to Germany, Sweden, England, and the Netherlands (p < 0.001)
even though they start with fewer ties to the host country compared to Christians (p < 0.05).
Muslims’ increase in ties with the host country is not slower than Christian children of
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immigrants (and the coeﬃcient for change is actually greater for Muslims). Both Muslim
and Children of immigrants give more and more importance to their host country national
identity over time.
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Figure 2.3: Baseline and growth estimates for the latent curves of changes in national identity
salience for Muslim and Christian children of immigrants (based on estimates from Table
2.5 unconditional models, N=2,086).
Summary
I investigate the development of religious identities and religious behaviors for
adolescents in four European countries. This is the ﬁrst paper that investigates diﬀerences
between children of immigrants and natives, and between Christians and Muslims. I ﬁnd
that children of immigrants have a stronger religious identity salience compared to religious
natives regardless of parents’ religiosity (H1). Muslims speciﬁcally have a more salient
religious identity compared to all other groups (H2). While Christian natives and Christian
children of immigrants experience a comparable decrease over time in both religious
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identity salience and religious practice (H3a), Muslim children of immigrants attend
religious events more over time (H3b). Some of the diﬀerences between Muslim and
Christian children of immigrants is explained by segregation and cultural diﬀerences (H4).
As they experience an increase in religious attendance, Muslim children of immigrants also
increase their ties to the host country and move away from their country of origin national
identity (H5).
Even as they incorporate into the host country, children of immigrants in adolescence
continue to be tied to their religion. In high school, children of immigrants who identify with
a religion give more importance to religion, pray more, and attend religious services more
frequently than Christian natives (H1). In line with my second hypothesis, Muslim children
of immigrants believe religion is more important than all Christians (H2). Diﬀerences in
religious doctrine might explain variations in the frequency of prayer, especially for Muslims,
however, it does not explain the robust diﬀerences in subjective religiosity nor does it explain
the diﬀerences between Christian children of immigrants and Christian natives. Parents’
experiences of migration lead to higher family religiosity, yet children of immigrants are more
religious than natives even when accounting for a parent’s strength of religiosity. For Muslim
children of immigrants, experiences with boundaries might explain their salient religious
identity. However, while most adolescents experience a decrease in religious identity salience
and religious practice, there are some diﬀerences across groups in the trajectories taken over
time.
There is no convergence between Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants
in religious identity and religious behavior, and there is a divergence between Muslims and
all other groups in religious practice. Most adolescents experience a decrease in both
religious identity salience and religious behavior between ninth and eleventh grade. In
adolescence, inﬂuenced by peers and schooling, children move away from family values and
traditions to become more secular. For children of immigrants, growing up is associated
with a distancing from religion and national origins. However, contrary to my hypothesis,
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there are no diﬀerences between Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants in
the magnitude of changes over time (H3a). Therefore, Christian children of immigrants
follow the same process in adolescence as Christian natives, and the two groups do not
become more similar over time. On the other hand, Muslim children of immigrants have a
growth in religious attendance over time, while other children practice religion less between
ninth and eleventh grade. The growth in Muslim children of immigrants’ attendance at
religious events partly supports my hypothesis of divergence between Muslims and
non-Muslims (H3b).
Children of immigrants learn about how they are excluded from the rest of society in
schools or friendship groups with many other foreigners, instead of through personal
experiences with discrimination. First, culturally incorporated children of immigrants are
more likely to attend religious services: children who speak another language at home are
less likely to attend religious services. Religious identities are therefore important for
culturally incorporated children of immigrants, who have learned mainstream cultures and
categorizations. Second, personal experiences of discrimination do not lead to higher
religious identity salience or more religious practice, while measures of segregation and
cultural diﬀerences account for some of the diﬀerences between Muslims and non-Muslims
(H4). However, some of the gap between Muslim and Christian children of immigrants is
still unaccounted for when including measures of social boundaries at school. Therefore,
social boundaries might also be learned through institutions beyond personal experiences
with social exclusion.
Finally, these ﬁndings contradict the hypothesis that a highly salient Muslim identity
is “reactive” and weakens ties to the host country. Christian children of immigrants have
stable ties to their national origins over time and are more attached to their host country
identity (H5a). Muslim adolescents show a slight decrease in the strength of their ties
to their parents’ national origins over time, in line with the pan-ethnic hypothesis (H5b).
Contrary to the reactive hypothesis, Muslim children of immigrants do not have less ties
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with the host country over time (H5c) and instead are more engaged with the mainstream.
Muslim children of immigrants therefore both attend religious services more over time and
incorporate culturally into the host country.
Discussion
Even as they incorporate and secularize in adolescence, children of immigrants are more
tied to their religion than native Europeans. Muslim children of immigrants are especially
unique: they give considerably more importance to their religious identity and start attending
religious services more frequently by eleventh grade. However, this increasingly frequent
religious behavior does not preclude more attachment to the host country. These ﬁndings
have implications for the role of religion during the process of identity development and for
the study of the political incorporation of children of immigrants. This study provides new
evidence about the expression of social boundaries and the possibilities for new politicized
identities.
Contrary to classic and new theories of assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964),
the strength of religious identities and the frequency of religious behavior for children of
immigrants and natives do not converge during high school. While children of immigrants
and natives both secularize over time, and thus might be inﬂuenced by the same greater social
forces, children of immigrants continue to identify more strongly with their religion even as
they increase their ties to the host country. Religion, therefore, may be important for second-
generation immigrants, as they try to connect with their parents’ culture and incorporate
into a new political context (Bankston and Zhou 1996; Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Chong
1998; Ebaugh 2001; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Smith 1978b). Children of immigrants can
use religion to navigate between two worlds — their parents’ national origins and their own
experiences in Europe.
There is evidence of a bright social boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims
expressed through segregation, cultural diﬀerences, and categorizations beyond day to day
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interactions. In continuity with previous research, bright social boundaries emerge between
religious traditions due to experiences of cultural diﬀerentiation and segregation (Alba
2005; Wimmer and Soehl 2014; Zolberg and Woon 1999). Beyond individual experiences
with native Europeans, segregated and culturally diﬀerent Muslims might learn that they
do not match the norm of what it means to be German, Swedish, Dutch, or British
through contact with larger institutions, such as the educational system and mainstream
media. The inﬂuence of boundaries and the construction of otherness might be expressed
both through personal interactions and through pervasive cultural diﬀerentiation.
Muslim children of immigrants might be developing new pan-ethnic solidarities fostered
through mosques and focused on engaging with the mainstream. There is no evidence that
the religious identity and religious behavior of Muslim children of immigrants is reactive
(Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997). Instead, culturally incorporated
adolescent Muslims continue to attend religious services even as they experience bright
religious boundaries that separate them from European natives. As Muslims try to
understand their place in Europe, they might turn to religious organizations to meet
similar others and ﬁnd a place for themselves as European Muslims. Mosques in Western
Europe play a signiﬁcant role in bringing Muslim children of immigrants together
regardless of national origins. Similar to religious communities in the US, Mosques are
important for the well-being and incorporation of Muslim children of immigrants in
Western Europe (Allen 2010; Hirschman 2004; Min 1992; Mooney 2009). Mosques can
provide important resources to children of immigrants as they are trying to understand
their place in the European political landscape.
As children of immigrants progress through adolescence, the increase in host country
identity salience is both a mark of acculturation and an indicator of nascent political
development. At the same time, children of immigrants enter adulthood with higher levels
of religious identity salience and religious behavior compared to natives. In the next
chapter, I investigate how religiosity among children of immigrants responds to the larger
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social and political context. In order to do so, I shift the analysis from adolescence to
adulthood and expand the analysis from four countries to twenty European countries.
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Chapter 3
European State Policies, Regional Social Contexts, and Children of
Immigrants’ Religiosity
During the process of incorporation, religion can provide children of immigrants with
a positive sense of self and a supportive community (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Warner
1997). In the previous chapter, I ﬁnd that even though all Christian adolescents secularize
between ninth and eleventh grade, children of immigrants continue to give more importance
to religion and practice religion more often compared to natives. Muslims are especially
unique and attend religious services more frequently all the while increasing their ties to the
host country. However, despite its potential for more meaning and community, religion can
also be a barrier to incorporation, especially for children of immigrants living in secular local
communities (Foner and Alba 2008). The religious traditions and expressions of children
of immigrants can exacerbate perceived cultural diﬀerences and lead to more exclusion and
discrimination by native Europeans. Therefore, children of immigrants sometimes encounter
a negative social context because of their distinctive religiosity.
The religiosity of children immigrants is inﬂuenced by the larger social and political
context. In the US, both new assimilation and segmented assimilation theorists agree that
the social context partly determines the incorporation trajectories of immigrants and their
children. European research focusing on ﬁrst-generation immigrants ﬁnds that their
religiosity is shaped by natives’ own religiosity (van Tubergen and Sindrado´ttir 2011) and
anti-immigrant attitudes (Connor 2010). However, the European social context is likely to
also have an enduring eﬀect on children of immigrants’ experiences in the host country and
might exacerbate already existing social boundaries around religious traditions. Children of
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immigrants and their local communities exist within a larger political context in which
state policies also sustain categorizations and promote incorporation (Lentin 2007; Light
2008; Massey et al. 2002). State policies have an eﬀect on the incorporation of children of
immigrants even if the they do not always have the intended consequences (Cornelius et al.
1994; Massey 1999). For example, there is a strong debate between political sociologists in
Europe about the eﬀectiveness of multiculturalism policies in actually reducing social
divisions and inequalities (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Vasta
2007). Research on the role of multiculturalism policies ﬁnds that even though they have
mixed eﬀects on the cultural and institutional incorporation of immigrants (Koopmans
2013b), they do enable more political engagement based on ethnic identities (Wright and
Bloemraad 2012). This debate around multiculturalism policies has ignored the possible
positive eﬀect of anti-discrimination provisions which have become increasingly common
due to an EU mandate (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; Kesler 2006).
This chapter bridges these two separate research domains: the religious incorporation of
immigrants on one hand and the eﬀects of immigration policies on the other. I focus on how
the sub-national (regional) social context and the national political context intersect to create
unique religious experiences for adult children of immigrants. Extending previous research
on immigrants in Europe, I investigate if children of immigrants’ religiosity is inﬂuenced by
regions’ overall levels of religiosity and anti-immigrant attitudes. I explore how bright social
boundaries around religion shape children of immigrants’ response to their social conditions.
To my knowledge, no empirical work has examined the religiosity of children of immigrants
from multiple religions across social settings. Drawing on theories of state policies, I argue
that multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies both shape the religiosity of children of
immigrants across faith traditions. However, children of immigrants from minority religions
(Orthodox Christians, smaller Christian groups, and Muslims) will beneﬁt the most from
policies protecting cultural diversity and will be more susceptible to the politicization of
their religious identity.
65
The Religiosity of Children of Immigrants in Europe
Immigrants in Europe come from countries that tend to be more religious than their
country of residence (van Tubergen 2006; van Tubergen and Sindrado´ttir 2011). However,
over time and generations, immigrants will be increasingly aﬀected by both native
Europeans living around them (the social context) and state level policies (de Hoon and
van Tubergen 2014; Jacob and Kalter 2013), a process described in Figure 3.1. First, as
they incorporate into European regions, children of immigrants will be aﬀected by general
levels of religiosity of native Europeans. Some children of immigrants might even stop
identifying with their parents’ religion, but still continue to practice religion with their
families. However, Muslim children of immigrants experiencing bright social boundaries
might not be able to incorporate into European regions. While some Muslim children of
immigrants might renounce to their religion in a negative context of reception, religion
could become more salient if they experience both anti-immigrant attitudes and bright
religious boundaries. Second, state policies on multiculturalism might enable religious
communities to feel legitimized and to organize. Moreover, anti-discrimination protections
might allow diverse immigrant groups to retain their strong religiosity. Due to the process
of politicization of religion, minority children of immigrants might be more religious in
countries with both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies in place.
Social Contexts and Bright Religious Boundaries
Through the process of incorporation, children of immigrants’ religiosity will be shaped
by natives’ own religiosity. According to classic and new assimilation theorists, children of
immigrants and natives become more similar over generations (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon
1964). Most European natives are white, and either non-religious or Christian. This majority
holds most of the political, economic, and cultural power in Europe; therefore, their beliefs,
actions, and attitudes will aﬀect children of immigrants’ incorporation and possibilities for
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advancements (Soininen 1999; Vasta 2007). First-generation immigrants might be tied to
their religion for support and community in a new environment (Akresh 2011; Allen 2010;
Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Warner 1993). However, second-generation children of immigrants
will be strongly inﬂuenced by the countries and localities in which they reside. Children of
immigrants who do not aﬃliate with a religious tradition still participate in some traditional
religious activities, especially with their families, and therefore are still inﬂuenced by the
social acceptability of religious behavior in the region. Due to the process of incorporation,
children of immigrants will have a religiosity similar to natives living around them.
Figure 3.1: Theoretical model for Chapter 3.
However, Muslim children of immigrants might not incorporate into their surrounding
social context due to experiences with bright boundaries around religion. Other minority
children of immigrants will incorporate but at a slower pace than those sharing the same
religion as natives. Due to the history of European migration, native Europeans with a
mostly Catholic or Protestant background consider Muslim children of immigrants as
especially diﬀerent from them and through day to day interactions form bright social
boundaries around religious diﬀerences (Alba 2005; Wimmer and Soehl 2014; Zolberg and
Woon 1999). Children of immigrants experiencing bright religious boundaries will be
especially aware of their outsider status and incorporate at a slower pace (Massey and
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Sa´nchez 2010). In line with Alba (2005), I argue that these bright religious boundaries
separate “us” Europeans and “them” Muslims. However, non-mainstream Christian
children of immigrants will not beneﬁt from Protestant or Catholic religious communities
and therefore will still experience some barriers to practice their religion. Children of
immigrants ﬁrmly inside of the religious boundary (Protestant or Catholic “mainstream”
Christians or non-religious) will have a lower religiosity in a secular context and a higher
religiosity in a religious context. Mainstream Christians will especially beneﬁt from
religious communities in their region. Non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants
will be less aﬀected by natives’ religiosity but still overall incorporate into the social
context. Finally, Muslim children of immigrants with religious identities at odds with
natives’ perception of what is normal will not be aﬀected by natives’ religiosity.
(H1) The religiosity of children of immigrants will depend on their religious
aﬃliation and on the religiosity of natives in the same region:
(H1a) Among Christians and the unaﬃliated, religiosity will be positively
correlated with the religiosity of natives in the local region.
(H1b) The positive correlation between the religiosity of children of immigrants
and the religiosity of natives will be stronger among mainstream
Christians as compared to other Christians or the unaﬃliated.
(H1c) There will be no correlation between the religiosity of Muslims and the
religiosity of natives in the local region.
In a context of anti-immigrant attitudes, Muslim children of immigrants outside of
bright religious boundaries might either suppress their religiosity to incorporate or have a
more salient identity due to continuous experiences of exclusion. Day to day interactions
between native Europeans and children of immigrants reinforce boundaries and shape
children of immigrants’ religious identity (Alba 2005; Massey and Sa´nchez 2010; Wimmer
2013). Therefore, anti-immigrant attitudes will exacerbate existing religious boundaries
that permeate European cultures and institutions. On the one hand, in line with classic
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assimilation theory, Muslim children of immigrants might hide any cultural distinctiveness
in order to incorporate economically to the host country (Gordon 1964; Park 1928). In a
context of anti-immigrant attitudes, Muslim children of immigrants will be at a
disadvantage and might be discriminated against if they remind others of their national
origins through their religiosity. On the other hand, in line with segmented assimilation
theory, under a context of anti-immigrant attitudes, Muslim children of immigrants may be
even more aware of their exclusion by European societies and therefore retreat in their
communities and reject norms from the majority (Ersanilli 2012; Padilla and Perez 2003;
Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2009).
(H2) The religiosity of Muslim children of immigrants will be moderated by natives’
anti-immigrant attitudes:
(H2a) Classic assimilation theory: Muslims living in regions with strong anti-
immigrant attitudes will be less religious, minimizing their “otherness.”
(H2b) Segmented assimilation theory: Muslims living in regions with strong ant-
immigrant attitudes will be more religious, embracing their “otherness.”
State Policies and Religion
Modern states are under pressure both from new immigrant groups asking for more
recognition and from natives asking for stronger nationalism (Cornelius et al. 1994; Joppke
1999; Soininen 1999). Moreover, European states are themselves subject to requirements
from supra-national entities such as the EU. While the goals of policies born out of these
conﬂicts might diﬀer, I argue that they will shape, directly or indirectly, the experiences
of children of immigrants (Cornelius et al. 1994; Massey 1999). Even though sometimes
policies do not have the intended consequences, they still aﬀect children of immigrants’
lives and the context for their incorporation (Massey 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 2006).
Policies surrounding immigration and incorporation will include or exclude groups and shape
future social stratiﬁcation and inequalities (Lentin 2007; Light 2008; Massey et al. 2002). In
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the following sections, I explain how multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies can
inﬂuence children of immigrants’ religiosity.
Multiculturalism policies reﬂect the relationship between states and minority groups,
and thus shape children of immigrants’ religiosity (Kastoryano 2002; Mooney 2009; Taylor
et al. 1994). Multiculturalism policies enable more religious freedom and provide a space
for religious communities. As deﬁned by Wright and Bloemraad (2012, pg.78),
multiculturalism policies are “government policies designed to positively recognize diversity
and help minorities maintain cultural and religious practices while integrating them into
public life.” Therefore, by design, multiculturalism policies should provide spaces for
minority religious communities and encourage or even celebrate non-native European
identities. However, there has been a discussion about the role of multiculturalism for the
“successful” incorporation of children of immigrants. Multiculturalism policies are
associated with less cultural assimilation from immigrants (Joppke and Morawska 2003)
but might reduce social divisions (Vasta 2007). More recently, multiculturalism experts
have been debating if multiculturalism policies increase segregation, and therefore might
lead to a rise of religious fundamentalism, or if they instead enable religion to play a
positive role for immigrants’ incorporation (Koopmans 2013b; Kymlicka and Banting 2006;
Modood 2013). Either way, children of immigrants should be more religious in countries
with more multiculturalism policies, especially non-mainstream religious groups.
Despite strong multiculturalism rhetoric, states may not actually protect minorities
against discrimination. In Europe, there has been a strong convergence regarding
anti-discrimination policies, following EU directives in 2000 (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004;
Joppke 2007; Kesler 2006; Koopmans 2013a). However, there are still variations by country
(Ersanilli 2012; Kesler 2006; Koopmans 2013a) which reﬂects diﬀerent levels of
acknowledgment of a multi-ethnic population and of dedication towards equality between
groups (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; Joppke 2007). Anti-discrimination policies can create
an accepting environment and may be a sign of blurred boundaries between groups
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(Ersanilli 2012). Therefore, due to more protection, anti-discrimination policies should be
reﬂected in higher levels of religiosity for children of immigrants. Minority groups may
especially need anti-discrimination policies to feel safe practicing their religion.
Multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies provide more rights and freedom to
children of immigrants; however, they also both reﬂect a national debate surrounding
minority religions. Therefore, the implementation of these policies can sustain and create
more politicization of religious identities. Multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies
are not created in a vacuum but instead emerge out of national level discussion and
concerns about new immigrant communities. If these policies emerge from the top-down
(EU mandate or from one political group), then native Europeans may become more aware
of religious diﬀerences and of perceived special treatment of certain religious groups
(Fossati 2011; Taylor et al. 1994). Therefore, both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination
policies might reﬂect a strong politicization of some or all religious identities. Through that
process, minority identities that are the focus of this debate will become more salient.
However, regardless of the mechanism, religious identities and subsequently religiosity will
be stronger in the context of either anti-discrimination or multiculturalism policies.
(H3) The religiosity of children of immigrants will be inﬂuenced by national polices:
(H3a) Strong multiculturalism policies will be associated with higher levels of
religiosity.
(H3b) Strong anti-discrimination policies will be associated with higher levels of
religiosity.
(H3c) Compared to mainstream Christians, the eﬀect of multiculturalism and
anti-discrimination policies on religiosity will be stronger for Muslims
and other Christians.
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Previous Findings on the Religiosity of Immigrants Across Regional and National
Contexts
Large cross-national studies on religiosity in Europe have been conﬁned to the
experiences of ﬁrst-generation immigrants (Connor 2010; van Tubergen 2006; van Tubergen
and Sindrado´ttir 2011). Empirical studies investigating children of immigrants tend to
focus only on Muslims in a few countries (e.g., de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014;
Fleischmann and Phalet 2011; Fleischmann et al. 2011; Jacob and Kalter 2013; Torrekens
and Jacobs 2016). However, ﬁndings regarding the ﬁrst-generation’s religiosity across
contexts can still inform the possible experiences of their children. First, at the
individual-level, Muslim immigrants are generally more religious than other groups (van
Tubergen and Sindrado´ttir 2011). Unlike natives, immigrant women are not more religious
than men (Fleischmann and Phalet 2011; van Tubergen 2006), but economic insecurity
does seem to predict higher levels of religiosity (van Tubergen and Sindrado´ttir 2011).
Second, at the sub-national or regional level, Connor (2010) is the only one who tests how
negative attitudes towards immigrants from the majority shape the religiosity of
immigrants. He ﬁnds that Muslim immigrants attend more religious services compared in
regions with less welcoming attitudes from natives towards immigrants (Connor 2010).
However, Connor (2010) does not compare Muslims to other religious immigrant groups.
Third, at the country-level, average religiosity in the country of origin, and average
religiosity and religious diversity in the host country, all aﬀect immigrants’ religiosity (van
Tubergen 2006; van Tubergen and Sindrado´ttir 2011). In both papers, van Tubergen (2006,
2011) does not include the potential role of multiculturalism and anti-discrimination
policies.
Previous empirical work ﬁnds that policies on multiculturalism and anti-discrimination
aﬀect some measures of incorporation other than religiosity. In his review, Koopmans
(2013b) summarizes European research on multiculturalism: they have no eﬀect on
socio-economic outcomes, negative eﬀects on socio-cultural integration, and positive eﬀects
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on political incorporation. However, Koopmans (2013b) does not present any research that
looks at the relationship between multiculturalism policies and religiosity. Gu¨ngo¨r et al.
(2013) and Fleischmann et al. (2011) all investigate the role of city-level policies in the
incorporation of Turks and Moroccans, but their results diverge when investigating the
eﬀects of policies on religiosity. Fleischmann and Phalet (2011) ﬁnd that second-generation
Turks secularize in cities with the least accommodations for Islam. However, Gu¨ngo¨r et al.
(2013) ﬁnd that there is a stronger Muslim identity in cities with less accommodations but
more social inequalities (segregation and educational diﬀerences). Little research looks
speciﬁcally at anti-discrimination policies and their consequences for incorporation. Unlike
multiculturalism policies, anti-discrimination policies alone do not have a positive eﬀect on
children of immigrants’ civic engagement (Aleksynska 2011; Fossati 2011).
Data Source, Measures, and Method
Data source and case selection
I investigate adult children of immigrants’ religiosity using the European Social Survey
(ESS) between 2010 and 2016. The ESS provides information on individuals nested in regions
within countries, which enables me to analyze individual religiosity under a variety of social
contexts and national policies. The ESS selects residents within private households using a
strict random probability method. I focus on individuals who are at least 18 years old to
analyze established religiosity after identity exploration in adolescence. As in Chapter 2, I
include children of immigrants with at least one parent born abroad and who either were
born in the survey country or moved there as young children (1.5, 2nd, and 2.5 generations). I
include adults who moved before or at ten years old, having thus spent at least eight years in
the survey country. To compare religious groups, I include unaﬃliated, Catholic, Protestant,
other non-mainstream Christian, and Muslim adults. Children of immigrants from other
non-Christian religions (only 2% of all adult children of immigrants) are excluded due to
small sample sizes across all countries. Orthodox Christians and members of other Christian
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sects are grouped together to represent children of immigrants who are Christians but still
part of a religious minority. I drop from the analysis children of immigrants missing on
covariates used in this chapter and the next. All variables in the analysis have less than 1%
of their observations missing, expect for measures of household income and political leaning
(used in the next chapter). Nevertheless, the results with multiply imputed data are not
substantively diﬀerent from those presented here.
I include twenty European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK).
These twenty countries represent north, west, south, south-east, central, and eastern
Europe; large immigrant countries, new immigrant countries, and countries with few
immigrants overall. My sample includes the four countries discussed in Chapter 2:
Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. I only include countries where
Catholicism or Protestantism is the majority religion, excluding countries with a majority
Orthodox population such as Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Russia, and the Ukraine,
and those with a majority Muslim population such as Kosovo. I use the Migrant
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) from 2008 to 2014 (to provide a lag time of two years
between policies and religiosity) for multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policy scores.
For national controls, I also include data from The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Pew Research Center. Two countries —
Croatia and Lithuania — are excluded because they do not have information on policies or
controls for these years. Two other countries — Iceland and Italy — are excluded because
they have only one year of data available with less than thirty children of immigrants
interviewed.
The ﬁnal sample comprises of 8,129 adult children of immigrants in 257 European
regions. To measure the social context, I use the ESS to estimate natives’ religiosity and
their attitudes towards immigrants for each year in each region. Regions in the ESS are
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sub-national entities that reﬂect each country’s actual administrative regions using the
NUTS nomenclature. Not every country has the same NUTS level for its regions: if a
country is so small that it would only contain one NUTS 2 unit, the ESS chooses instead
multiple NUTS 3 units. Half of the countries in this analysis use NUTS 2 regions, but the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden all
have NUTS 3 regions, and Germany and the UK both have NUTS 1 regions. Nine children
of immigrants are dropped because they live in a region with no natives interviewed that
year. To run the multilevel models, I only include children of immigrants in regions with at
least two observations: eleven regions (and children of immigrants) are subsequently
dropped.
National political contexts
In order to measure the strength of multiculturalism policies, I include a subset of MIPEX
indicators from 2008 to 2014. The MIPEX focuses on equal rights for immigrants and gives
a score from 0 to 100 to each country for each indicator within policy strands (e.g., access,
rights, eligibility) and policy dimensions (e.g., education, employment, etc.) (Huddleston
et al. 2015). As multiculturalism theorists explain, the MIPEX data is set up to measure
civic integration but not multiculturalism per se (Banting and Kymlicka 2013; Koopmans
2013b). However, the other alternative, the Multiculturalism Policy Index, is only available
until 2010 (Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Therefore, instead of using the whole MIPEX
index, I only include indicators that match Wright and Bloemraad (2012)’s deﬁnition of
multiculturalism: “government policies designed to positively recognize diversity and help
minorities maintain cultural and religious practices while integrating them into public life.”
I focus on policies that recognize, enable, and encourage diversity in schools, employment
opportunities, legal status, and in politics (when available). Policies that enable diversity
are necessary for the successful incorporation into public life and policies that encourage
diversity help minorities maintain cultural practices across generations. Measures of anti-
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discrimination policies are considered separate from multiculturalism policies as they focus
on equal rights rather than recognition and often reﬂect an EU mandate (Koopmans 2013b).
Measures of political rights for migrants, beyond funding and representation included in the
multiculturalism score, are examined in Chapter 4. In Appendix B.1, I describe each policy
strand and dimension used to measure the multiculturalism score and the scoring process.
The ﬁnal multiculturalism scores over time for each country are in Table 3.1 and averages
for the whole time-period are presented, with controls, in Table 3.3.
Table 3.1: Multiculturalism scores from 2008 to 2014 in twenty European countries.
Year
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Austria 43.9 46.4 46.4
Belgium 52.5 56.0 58.5 61.0 60.5 60.7
Czech Republic 22.4 31.5 32.5 32.5 37.6
Denmark 52.9 50.4 47.1 50.4 53.9
Estonia 32.9 40.5 40.5 45.5
Finland 69.0 66.4 73.9 73.9 73.9 73.9
France 54.6 57.9 49.8 50.7 51.4 51.4
Germany 67.9 70.1 63.9 64.0 67.1 67.1 70.5
Hungary 25.0 25.8 25.8 25.8
Ireland 64.0 57.3 56.1 56.1 56.1 56.1
Netherlands 69.4 66.5 67.1 51.3 48.1 38.7 37.9
Norway 78.7 78.7 77.3 77.3 77.3 74.5
Poland 16.5 17.7 17.7 22.6 22.6
Portugal 74.0 74.0 74.0
Slovakia 16.2 16.2 18.8 18.8
Slovenia 29.6 32.9 30.7 30.7 30.7 64.1
Spain 46.0 46.3 43.4
Sweden 82.1 82.1 84.6 84.6 84.6 84.6
Switzerland 35.6 36.1 37.9 37.9 37.9 37.9 38.1
United Kingdom 46.4 47.6 52.8 49.7 44.4 43.3 43.3
Source: MIPEX 2008-2014.
Sweden, Portugal, and Finland have many multiculturalism provisions. Between 2008
and 2014, Sweden has a multiculturalism score always higher than 80/1000 for recognizing,
enabling, and encouraging cultural diversity at school, in employment opportunities, in the
legal system, and in politics. On the other hand, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary do not
provide much recognition or encouragement for diverse cultures, with scores around
20/100. There are a few changes between 2008 and 2014 in multiculturalism provisions.
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Many countries — Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Poland, and
Switzerland — have a slow increase in their multiculturalism score over time. Nevertheless,
some countries with above average multiculturalism, such as Norway, France and the UK,
experience a small decrease over time in their scores. This is consistent with Banting and
Kymlicka (2013)’s descriptions of changes in multiculturalism over time by country: most
countries continue to have more multiculturalism policies over time even though the
political and public discourse has shifted away from the concept itself.
The Netherlands starts with many encouragements for cultural diversity, a score of
69.4/100 in 2008, but its score goes down to 37.9 in 2014. The Netherlands is a somewhat
unique country, its government was one of the strongest proponents for multiculturalism in
the 1980s, but then was faced with strong criticism due to the perceived lack of
incorporation of Muslims and the terrorist attacks on Theo van Gogh in 2004 (Vasta 2007).
In 2010, there was a general election in the Netherlands which was a victory for right-wing
and far-right political groups who used strong nationalistic rhetoric and anti-Muslim
feelings in the population. The election was won by the conservative-liberal People’s Party
for Freedom and Democracy (VDD), and there was a rise in popularity of the Party for
Freedom (PVV). The PVV, led by Geert Wilders, is known for racist language and strong
anti-Muslim sentiment (Erlanger 2011). Between 2008 and 2014 (Table 3.1), we see a
decline over time in the strength of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, with a sharp drop
between 2010 and 2011, reﬂecting the right shift of the Dutch government after 2010.
I include scores for the strength of anti-discrimination policies which is one policy
strand of the MIPEX data used to measure overall social integration. The MIPEX
anti-discrimination score includes multiple dimensions: deﬁnitions of anti-discrimination,
ﬁelds of application, enforcement mechanisms, and equality policies. Adding the strength
of anti-discrimination policies to multiculturalism scores can distinguish countries who just
give lip service to multiculturalism from those who actually protect ethnic and religious
minorities. In Appendix B.2 are each policy dimension and indicators used to measure
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anti-discrimination scores. The strength of anti-discrimination polices over time for each
country are in Table 3.2 and averages for the whole time-period are in Table 3.3.
Table 3.2: Anti-discrimination scores from 2008 to 2014 in twenty European countries.
Year
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Austria 56.8 56.8 56.8
Belgium 77.8 77.8 77.8 77.8 77.8 77.8
Czech Republic 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.4
Denmark 43.4 46.2 46.2 46.2 46.2
Estonia 32.2 32.2 32.2 32.2
Finland 74.5 74.5 74.5 74.5 74.5 77.3
France 75.9 75.9 75.9 75.9 77.3 77.3
Germany 55.9 55.9 55.9 55.9 58.0 58.0 58.0
Hungary 81.1 81.1 83.2 83.2
Ireland 66.0 66.0 66.0 66.0 66.0 66.0
Netherlands 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.6
Norway 59.2 59.2 59.2 59.2 59.2 59.2
Poland 26.6 47.7 52.4 52.4 52.4
Portugal 88.0 88.0 88.0
Slovakia 70.3 70.3 70.3 70.3
Slovenia 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0
Spain 49.1 49.1 49.1
Sweden 84.9 84.9 84.9 84.9 84.9 84.9
Switzerland 30.9 30.9 30.9 30.9 30.9 30.9 30.9
United Kingdom 82.5 82.5 86.6 86.6 85.2 85.2 85.2
Source: MIPEX 2008-2014.
Portugal, Sweden, and the UK provide the most protections for immigrants and ethnic
minorities while Switzerland and Estonia have the fewest. Switzerland, being outside of the
EU, is not required to have a minimum of anti-discrimination policies. These results match
other work investigating anti-discrimination policies in Europe (Geddes and Guiraudon
2004; Joppke 2007). For example, the UK is known for having the most anti-discrimination
provisions while Germany is reticent to provide more protections, even under EU mandate.
Anti-discrimination policy scores are more stable over time compared to multiculturalism
scores, partly because of the smaller number of indicators used in the measure. If there is a
small change, they tend to increase over time. Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, all give
a few more protections to minorities in 2014 compared to 2008.
The biggest increase in anti-discrimination policies over time happens in Poland, going
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from a score around 27/100 in 2008 to 52 in 2014. In 2004, Poland joined the EU and
therefore had to implement EU mandates for anti-discrimination legislature. In 2010,
Poland passed the “Act of 3rd December, 2010 on the implementation of some regulations
of the European Union regarding equal treatment.” This act was put in place to reduce
discrimination based on sex, race, ethnic origin, nationality, religion, beliefs disability, age
and sexual orientation (Tusk 2010). It covered areas such as employment, health care,
education, and state sponsored services. However, since 2015, the Law and Justice party in
power has been dismantling the democratic system and ending the previous provisions put
in place to implement anti-discrimination policies (New York Times Editorial Board 2016;
Polskie Radio 2016). However, my analysis, from 2008 to 2014, only reﬂects the
implementation of new anti-discrimination laws.
As shown in Figure 3.2, countries tend to have both strong (or many) multiculturalism
and anti-discrimination policies. For each country, I compute the average score between
2008 and 2014 for multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies (Figure 3.2). Most
countries have more anti-discrimination policies if they have many multicultural provisions,
and vice versa. However, there is a large variation between countries. Norway, Germany,
and Denmark, for example, have fewer anti-discrimination policies than the average for
that level of multiculturalism. Estonia and Switzerland who have few multiculturalism
policies have even less anti-discrimination protections. On the other hand, Portugal, the
UK, and Hungary have stronger anti-discrimination policies than the average for their level
of multiculturalism.
As a national level control, I measure migrant inﬂow per capita. Immigration ﬂow can
redeﬁne communities and increase the salience of religious identities and religious behavior
(Foner and Bertossi 2011; Jime´nez 2008). For the total number of migrants moving into
the country in one given year, I use the OECD international migration database (OECD
2014). The OECD dataset provides easily comparable numbers of migrants by countries.
To calculate the total number of migrants per capita (of the destination population), I
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Figure 3.2: Relationship between multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies in twenty
European countries between 2008 and 2014.
include total population indicators from the United Nations World Population Prospects
(WPP) (United Nations 2017). On average, Switzerland and Austria have the largest ﬂow
of immigrants per capita (1.8% and 1.6% respectively, Table 3.3). They are followed by
Norway, Belgium, Germany, and Slovenia. On the other hand, Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia
have on average an inﬂow of immigrants that comprises only around 0.1-0.2% of their total
population.
I control for the percentage of Christians in the country using Pew Research Center
estimates for each religious group in 2010 (Hackett et al. 2015). I include this measure as a
proxy for overall religiosity in the country and if the country has a strong Christian
identity. This measure also reﬂects country-level religious diversity, or lack thereof. Poland
and Portugal have both around 90% of their population that identiﬁes as Christian in
2010. The Czech Republic and Estonia have lower proportions of residents identifying as
Christian. In 2010, 76.4% of the Czech Republic was unaﬃliated and 59.1% of Estonians
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Table 3.3: Country-level policy scores and controls in twenty European countries between
2008 and 2014.
Average 2008-2014 2010
Country Multiculturalism
score
Anti-discrimination
score
Migrant inﬂow per
capita
Percent
Christian
Austria 45.6 56.8 1.61 80.4
Belgium 58.2 77.8 1.05 64.2
Czech Republic 31.3 48.4 0.29 23.3
Denmark 50.9 45.6 0.65 83.5
Estonia 39.8 32.2 0.12 39.9
Finland 71.8 74.9 0.40 80.1
France 52.6 76.3 0.37 63.0
Germany 67.2 56.8 1.08 68.7
Hungary 25.6 82.1 0.26 81.0
Ireland 57.6 66.0 0.82 92.0
Netherlands 54.1 72.6 0.69 50.6
Norway 77.3 59.2 1.29 84.7
Poland 19.4 46.3 0.11 94.3
Portugal 74.0 88.0 0.41 91.9
Slovakia 17.5 70.3 0.24 85.3
Slovenia 30.9 67.0 1.06 78.4
Spain 45.2 49.1 0.68 78.6
Sweden 83.8 84.9 0.90 67.2
Switzerland 37.4 30.9 1.83 72.7
United Kingdom 46.8 84.8 0.69 64.3
Source: MIPEX 2008-2014, OECD 2008-2014, WPP 2008-2014, Pew Research Center 2010.
also did not choose any religion (Hackett et al. 2015). Both countries experienced a decline
of Catholicism and Protestantism under Soviet occupation. According to the Pew Research
Center’s estimates (Hackett et al. 2015), the Czech Republic has the most people in the
world who do not aﬃliate with any religions.
Regional social contexts
I measure the religiosity and attitudes of natives in each region of the ESS. I consider
individuals to be European natives if they themselves and their parents were born in the
survey country (the ESS does not provide information on grandparents), if they only speak
an oﬃcial language at home, and if they are not part of a minority religion (and therefore are
either unaﬃliated, Catholic, or Protestant). For each year available, I divide the ESS using
their regional categories and use survey weights to estimate natives’ average religiosity and
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attitudes towards immigrants. In Table 3.4, I present the 2010-2016 averages and standard
deviations for all regions within each country.
Table 3.4: Regional social context in twenty European countries between 2010 and 2016.
Regions’ average and standard deviation
Country Number
of regions
Natives’ anti-immigrant
attitudes
Natives’ religiosity
All 257 0.041 (.308) −0.100 (.392)
Austria 9 0.304 (.206) 0.139 (.140)
Belgium 11 0.051 (.145) −0.306 (.066)
Czech Republic 14 0.535 (.08) −0.646 (.129)
Denmark 5 −0.12 (.148) −0.274 (.063)
Estonia 5 0.201 (.071) −0.509 (.071)
Finland 21 −0.036 (.158) 0.024 (.136)
France 37 0.150 (.182) −0.320 (.137)
Germany 16 −0.264 (.232) −0.237 (.306)
Hungary 17 0.425 (.131) −0.129 (.204)
Ireland 8 0.121 (.121) 0.557 (.118)
Netherlands 12 −0.053 (.089) −0.207 (.156)
Norway 7 −0.224 (.105) −0.286 (.091)
Poland 16 −0.180 (.123) 0.827 (.212)
Portugal 5 0.296 (.083) 0.304 (.241)
Slovakia 8 0.262 (.151) 0.478 (.288)
Slovenia 12 0.222 (.142) 0.017 (.137)
Spain 14 0.007 (.117) −0.049 (.158)
Sweden 21 −0.549 (.088) −0.407 (.093)
Switzerland 7 −0.185 (.121) 0.081 (.095)
United Kingdom 12 0.179 (.133) −0.284 (.230)
Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).
Standard deviations for regions within the country in parenthesis.
To investigate the incorporation process of children of immigrants within regions, I include
an average measure of natives’ religiosity. I standardize measures of subjective religiosity,
religious attendance, and frequency of prayer into a summated scale for each native European
in the region (α = 0.854). I then estimate the average religiosity by region and year using
population weights provided by the ESS. Poland, Ireland, and Slovakia have on average
regions with very religious natives while natives in the Czech Republic and Estonia are not
very religious. This matches the Pew Research Center’s estimates of religious aﬃliation by
country in 2010 (Hackett et al. 2015). Germany and Slovakia have the largest variation in
their native residents’ religiosity.
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For each region, I also average natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes using both opinions on
how migration is aﬀecting the country and how much migration should be allowed. This
includes the three measures used by Connor (2010): would you say it is generally bad or
good for [country]’s economy that people from other countries come to live in [country]
(1-10), is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here
from other countries? (1-10), and would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally
undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? (1-10). However,
I supplement these three measures with an additional three questions on allowing none, few,
some, or many immigrants from the same racial group, from a diﬀerent racial group, and
from outside of Europe. These additional questions add critical information on how natives
perceive migration and migrants generally and not just their eﬀect on the host country. All
these measures are standardized and summated to create a scale (α = 0.893) for each native
European. I then compute the estimated average of anti-immigrant attitudes for all natives
in that region, using population weights.
European children of immigrants’ religiosity, SES, cultural incorporation, and
demographics
I investigate the religiosity of unaﬃliated children of immigrants and those who identify
with a religion: Catholic or Protestant (mainstream Christian), other non-mainstream
Christian (Eastern Orthodox and smaller Christian sects), and Muslim. I do not include
other non-Christian religions due to variation in dogma and small sample numbers. In my
sample (Table 3.5), most children of immigrants are not aﬃliated with any religion
(51.6%). The second largest group are mainstream Christians (35.0%). Muslims and other
Christians are smaller minorities (7.5% and 6.0% of all children of immigrants in the
sample respectively). Non-mainstream Christians are mostly Orthodox (74.7%) but also
include smaller Christian sects (25.2%).
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Table 3.5: Children of immigrants’ religiosity, SES, cultural incorporation, and
demographics in twenty European countries.
Mean/Proportion
Mainstream Other
All Christians Christians Muslims Unaﬃliated
Variable Range N=8,129 N=2,843 N=484 N=608 N=4,194
Religiosity
Subjective religiosity 0 - 10 4.357 6.008 6.219 7.299 2.596
(Std. dev) (3.139) (2.375) (2.177) (2.255) (2.718)
Frequency of prayer 0 - 6 1.934 3.176 3.101 3.558 0.723
(Std. dev) (2.317) (2.300) (2.173) (2.435) (1.537)
Religious attendance 0 - 5 1.223 1.963 2.056 2.053 0.505
(Std. dev) (1.371) (1.401) (1.298) (1.619) (0.819)
Summated scale -1 - 2 −0.094 0.423 0.456 0.640 −0.614
(Std. dev) (0.833) (0.730) (0.688) (0.759) (0.530)
Controls
SES
Secondary education or more 0 - 1 0.593 0.540 0.756 0.457 0.63
Household income percentile 1 - 10 5.450 5.420 5.424 4.850 5.561
(Std. dev) (2.784) (2.780) (2.724) (2.658) (2.801)
Cultural incorporation/diﬀerences
Citizen of country 0 - 1 0.914 0.936 0.707 0.837 0.934
Speaks only oﬃcial language 0 - 1 0.933 0.961 0.909 0.656 0.958
Western origins only 0 - 1 0.759 0.841 0.829 0.146 0.784
Demographics
Women 0 - 1 0.513 0.547 0.548 0.482 0.491
Age 18 - 96 46.148 51.095 44.039 31.533 45.157
(Std. dev) (17.123) (17.458) (15.574) (9.929) (16.446)
Children living at home 0 - 1 0.370 0.362 0.430 0.475 0.353
Paid work last week 0 - 1 0.561 0.501 0.607 0.572 0.594
Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).
Religiosity combines three measures: subjective religiosity, frequency of prayer, and
attendance at religious events. I do not include measures of religious belief as the subject
of belief will vary across faith traditions. First, I include responses to the question “how
religious would you say you are” on a scale of 0 (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious).
Second, I measure frequency of prayer from 0 (never) to 6 (every day). Even though
Muslims are more likely than Christians to pray multiple times a day, there should not be
any diﬀerences, due to dogma, on the probability of praying every day. Finally, I include a
question on frequency of attendance at religious events, coded from 0 (never attends) to 5
(more than once a week). I create a summated scale of these three standardized measures
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of religiosity for each adult with immigrant parents (α = 0.819). This is a popular measure
of religiosity in empirical sociological research using the ESS and captures both public and
private aspects of religion (Connor 2010; van Tubergen and Sindrado´ttir 2011). While
unaﬃliated children of immigrants do not identify with a religion, some of them still call
themselves religious and behave as such. On average, unaﬃliated children of immigrants
give a score of 2.59/10 for their personal religiosity. Moreover, 8.5% of unaﬃliated adults
pray at least once a week and 13.6% attend religious services at least for holy days.
Muslim children of immigrants in adulthood believe they are more religious, pray more
frequently, and attend religious services more often than all other groups. On a scale of
-1 to 2 for overall religiosity, Muslims on average consider themselves 0.2 of a point higher
compared to all Christian children of immigrants. While mainstream Christians tend to
pray on average around once a month (3), Muslims are closer to praying once a week (4).
Mainstream Christians, however, pray slightly more often than other Christian children of
immigrants. All Christians have close averages for frequency of attending religious events:
mostly just for special holy days (2). Muslims tend to attend religious services more often.
Yet, Muslim children of immigrants have a higher standard deviation for religious practice:
Muslims in this sample are a more heterogeneous group compared to Christians.
Muslims are less educated, have lower incomes, and are less culturally incorporated
compared to other children of immigrants. While 63.0% of unaﬃliated children of
immigrants have a secondary education or more, only 45.7% of Muslims do.
Non-mainstream Christians have the highest proportion of members with a secondary
education or more (75.6%), a potential consequence of high educational attainment in
ex-USSR countries. Muslim children of immigrants are also part of a slightly lower income
percentile. At the other extreme, unaﬃliated children of immigrants are on average in a
higher income percentile compared to all other groups, but also have the largest variation
around that number. Many children of immigrants are citizens of the survey country
(91.4% of the sample) but there are fewer Muslims (83.7%) and even less non-mainstream
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Christians (75.6%) who have that status. There is an especially large diﬀerence between
Muslims and other groups in language patterns. Only 65.6% of Muslim children of
immigrants speak the oﬃcial language at home compared to around 93% of mainstream
Christians or unaﬃliated children of immigrants, and 90.9% of other Christians. Finally, I
include a measure of region of origins, separating children of immigrants with “Western”
origins from the rest. Western countries include Europe, the US, Canada, Israel, and
Australia. As expected, Muslim children of immigrants are the least likely to have only
Western origins (14.6% do).
Controls. To be able to compare individuals with diﬀerent backgrounds, I control for
gender, age, household, and employment status. There are slightly more women in the
sample and children of immigrants are on average around 46 years old. There is quite a
variation in the average age between groups, Catholic and Protestant children of immigrants
are the oldest (on average 51 years old) while Muslims are younger (on average 32 years
old). Mainstream Christian children of immigrants also have one of the largest variation for
age. This might reﬂect the timing of earlier Catholic migrations from Southern Europe and
later Christian migration from sub-Saharan Africa. Around a third of children of immigrants
above eighteen have children at home, and Muslims have the largest proportion of parents
(47.5%). Between 50.7% and 60.7% of children of immigrants are employed full time, the
rest being unemployed, in school, at home, or retired.
Method: random intercept multilevel models for children of immigrants nested
in regions
Model speciﬁcation. I break down the ESS dataset by regions and conduct mixed eﬀects
linear regressions on religiosity for children of immigrants nested in regions. I use a two-
level random intercept model to account for non-independence between individual betas for
children of immigrants in the same regions. In the ﬁxed eﬀects model with only individual-
level covariates described above (Table 3.5), 14.8% of the variance in religiosity is due to
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variations across regions (F(256,7857) = 1.85, p < 0.001). Using Likelihood ratio tests, I
ﬁnd that a random intercept model using maximum likelihood estimations is better than
the linear model (χ2(1) = 53.22, p < 0.001). Moreover, regional predictors increase the ﬁt
of the model compared to having ﬁxed eﬀects for regions (χ2(2) = 86.64, p < 0.001), and
national level variables increase the ﬁt compared to only having regional-level variables
(χ2(2) = 23.80, p < 0.001). I include national-level variables (scores on policies and controls)
as ﬁxed eﬀects for each region and do not include country varying intercept due to the
relatively small number of countries (Bryan and Jenkins 2016). While regional context does
matter for predicting religiosity, once accounting for individual-level predictors, there is only
0.6% of variation in religiosity due to diﬀerences between regions within the same countries.
Most of the variation between regions is accounted for by variations between countries, and
vice versa. However, there is enough evidence described above to use regions as the second
level of analysis. I use the following model to predict individual i’s religiosity in region j:
Yij = β0j + β1jXij + ij
β0j = γ00 + γ01Wj + μ0j
The ﬁrst equation is similar to a simple linear regression where Yij is the estimated
outcome and the errors ij have a normal distribution. This equation predicts the religiosity
for the adult child of immigrant(s) i in region j with a matrix of covariates Xij. The second
equation predicts each region’s average religiosity for children of immigrants, which was
allowed to vary in the previous equation (β0j), with a variability between regions of (μ0j)
and region-speciﬁc covariates Wj (which includes both regional- and country-level variables
that do not vary within regions). The ESS does not provide weights for regions which
precludes multilevel analysis with population weights.
Analysis Plan. For my baseline models, I investigate children of immigrants’ average
religiosity with only individual-level variables and ﬁxed eﬀects for regions. I then investigate
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how regional levels of native religiosity inﬂuence the religiosity of children of immigrants,
and diﬀerences by religious aﬃliation (H1). I further explore the role of the regional social
context by testing how anti-immigrant attitudes inﬂuence religiosity, speciﬁcally for Muslim
children of immigrants (H2). Finally, I include measures of the national political context
and investigate how strong multiculturalism (H3a) and strong anti-discrimination policies
(H3b) lead to higher levels of religiosity regardless of the regional context and across religious
aﬃliations (H3c).
Results
The religiosity of children of immigrants across social contexts
The ﬁxed eﬀects models (Models 1 and 2) and the multilevel models (Models 3 through
5) for individuals nested in regions are in Table 3.6. I only include religious aﬃliation when
comparing eﬀects across groups (Models 2 and 5). Identifying with a religion is correlated
with strong religiosity and therefore including controls for religious traditions in the model
would not give a good estimate on how the regional context shapes children of immigrants’
religiosity. As shown in the random eﬀects component, the variance between and within
regions decreases across models except when adding the interaction between religious
aﬃliation and natives’ anti-immigrant attitudes. No additional information is gained when
considering that the attitudinal context shapes children of immigrants’ religiosity
diﬀerently by religion.
Classic predictors of religiosity apply to children of immigrants in Europe. Children of
immigrants with a high school degree or more are less religious compared to those with less
education (p < 0.05), and an increase in income percentile is associated with lower religiosity
(p < 0.001). Women are more likely to be religious than men (p < 0.001) and having children
or being older are both associated with higher religiosity (p < 0.001). In this case, working
does not have a signiﬁcant relationship with religiosity.
Culturally incorporated children of immigrants are less religious. Children of immigrants
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who are citizens of the survey country have a lower religiosity compared to non-citizens
(p < 0.001). Moreover, children of immigrants who only have western origins are less religious
compared to those who have at least one parent from a non-western country (p < 0.001).
Finally, children of immigrants who speak only the oﬃcial language have lower religiosity
scores compared to those who speak another language at home (p < 0.001). However, some
of the relationships between SES, incorporation, and religiosity change when including a
control for religious aﬃliation.
Muslims are more religious than Christians (Table 3.6, Model 2). As expected,
unaﬃliated children of immigrants are less religious than mainstream Christians
(p < 0.001) and Muslim children of immigrants are more religious than mainstream
Christians (p < 0.001). There are no diﬀerences between mainstream Christians and other
Christians. I used Wald tests to see if the estimates between unaﬃliated, other Christian,
and Muslim children of immigrants are diﬀerent from each other. I ﬁnd that in the ﬁxed
eﬀects model (Model 2), Muslims are more religious than both unaﬃliated (p < 0.51) and
other Christian children of immigrants (p < 0.05). Non-mainstream Christians have a
higher religiosity compared to unaﬃliated children of immigrants (p < 0.05). Controlling
for religious aﬃliation decreases the eﬀects of education and citizenship. This might be
because Muslim children of immigrants have very low rates of education and citizenship
compared to any other group.
Children of immigrants incorporate into a particular religious context but are not aﬀected
by natives’ attitudes towards immigrants (Table 3.6, Model 3). Children of immigrants living
in a region with natives with high levels of religiosity are themselves more religious compared
to children of immigrants in other regions (p < 0.001). However, there is not a signiﬁcant
relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and religiosity for children of immigrants (in
additional analysis I remove regional religiosity from the model and the results are the same).
I investigate further the regional context by religious aﬃliation in the next two paragraphs.
In Figure 3.3, I present predicted children of immigrants’ religiosity by religious aﬃliation
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and across the range of regional social contexts. The values for the predicted religiosity
scores under extreme natives’ religiosity and attitudes are in Table 3.7.
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Figure 3.3: Predicted religiosity scores for children of immigrants in 257 European regions
(linear estimates based on Table 3.6 Models 4 and 5, N= 8,129).
The strength of natives’ religiosity has the opposite eﬀect for Muslims than it has for
non-Muslims. Most groups — unaﬃliated, mainstream Christians, and other Christians —
are more religious in regions with natives who are also religious (Figure 3.3). Mainstream
Christian children of immigrants have the highest increase in religiosity when comparing
those living in regions with the lowest religiosity to those in regions that are very religious
(0.677, Table 3.7, p < 0.001). Unaﬃliated children of immigrants, who are the least religious,
also experience a large increase in their scores when comparing extreme regions (0.559,
p < 0.001). Non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants have a stable religiosity
across regions but are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from mainstream Christians or unaﬃliated
children of immigrants. However, Muslim children of immigrants are less religious in regions
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with high native religiosity compared to those living in regions with low native religiosity
(Figure 3.3). Muslim children of immigrants living in regions with low native religiosity
have a religiosity score of 0.747, and this score goes down to 0.297 in regions with high
native religiosity. The change between the two types of regions is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
unaﬃliated and mainstream Christian children of immigrants (p < 0.05).
Table 3.7: Predicted religiosity scores for children of immigrants in 257 European regions
(linear estimates based on Table 3.6 Models 4 and 5, N= 8,129).
Minimum Maximum Diﬀerence
Value: natives’ religiosity (Model 4) −1.022 1.296
Predicted religiosity:
Christian: mainstream 0.129 0.806 0.677∗∗∗M
Christian: other 0.352 0.590 0.238
Muslim 0.747 0.297 −0.449U,C
Unaﬃliated −0.792 −0.233 0.559∗∗∗M
Value: natives’ anti-immigrant attitude (Model 5) −0.997 1.069
Predicted religiosity:
Christian: mainstream 0.347 0.406 0.060
Christian: other 0.551 0.353 −0.198
Muslim 0.467 0.755 0.288
Unaﬃliated −0.559 −0.636 −0.077
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Under-script signiﬁes estimate is diﬀerent (p < 0.05) with: O - other Christians, M - Muslims, and U
- unaﬃliated children of immigrants.
Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).
Children of immigrants have similar levels of religiosity in regions with more or less anti-
immigrant sentiments. Children of immigrants living in regions with strong anti-immigrant
attitudes are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to those living in regions with low anti-immigrant
attitudes (Table 3.7). There are, however, some descriptive diﬀerences reﬂected in Figure 3.3.
Mainstream Christians and Muslim children of immigrants both tend to be more religious
in regions with more anti-immigrant attitudes. On the other hand, other Christians and
unaﬃliated children of immigrants have a weaker religiosity in a similar context. All the
results described above hold even when accounting for the national context.
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The religiosity of children of immigrants across political contexts
To investigate the national context, I test the eﬀects of the strength of multiculturalism
and anti-discrimination policies on religiosity (Table 3.8). These results include individual
controls and regional social contexts described in Table 3.6. The overall explained variance in
religiosity (ICC) does not decrease after adding national level controls (Model 1) or policies
(Model 2), compared to the model with only regional variables (Table 3.6 Model 3). However,
it decreases from 1.6% to 0.4% when including interactions between religious aﬃliation,
multiculturalism, and anti-discrimination scores (Model 4). Model 4 of Table 3.8 has the
smallest variation left unexplained of all models. This reﬂects the diversity of experiences
by religious aﬃliation in response to national policies.
For children of immigrants in a similar regional context, national controls do not have the
expected eﬀect. First, children of immigrants living in countries with a higher percentage
of Christians (e.g., Poland, Norway, and Austria) are not more or less religious than those
living in countries with average levels of Christian representation (Model 1). Second, a large
recent inﬂow of immigrants (typical of Switzerland, Austria, and Norway) does not increase
children of immigrants’ religiosity. On the contrary, in countries with a larger recent inﬂow
of immigrants, children of immigrants are on average less religious (p < 0.001). Migration
inﬂows may only shape ﬁrst-generation immigrants’ religiosity but not their children’s. The
ethnic, racial, and religious composition of recent migrants may be too diﬀerent from children
of immigrants already part of established communities.
Children of immigrants living in countries with stronger multiculturalism policies are on
average less religious. However, on average, the strength of anti-discrimination policies
does not have any inﬂuence on religiosity (Model 2). This is true for children of immigrants
living in regions with similar levels of religiosity and anti-immigrant attitudes. Across all
faith traditions, the combination of strong multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies
does not change the levels of religiosity among children of immigrants (Model 3). However,
the relationships between multiculturalism, anti-discrimination, and religiosity changes
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when looking at eﬀects by religious groups. In Figure 3.4, I present the estimated scores for
religiosity by religious aﬃliation under various national contexts. The score estimates’
conﬁdence intervals are listed in Table 3.9.
Depending on their faith tradition, children of immigrants respond very diﬀerently to
national policies. As shown in Figure 3.4, the direction of eﬀects for each religious aﬃliation
are somewhat opposite. For unaﬃliated children of immigrants (the largest group), there
is not much change between countries with various policy conﬁgurations: their religiosity is
weak across national contexts (Figure 3.4.a-d). I will now focus on children of immigrants
who identify with a religion.
Overall, children of immigrants who identify with a religion are less religious in
countries with more multiculturalism policies but few anti-discrimination protections.
Compared to countries with weak anti-discrimination policies and weak multiculturalism
policies (such as Poland or the Czech Republic), children of immigrants who live in a
country with only multiculturalism (Denmark or Germany) have a weaker religiosity
(Figure 3.4.a). This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant for mainstream Christians (Table 3.4,
p < 0.001). With many anti-discrimination provisions in place, more multiculturalism
policies do not make much of a diﬀerence, except for Muslim children of immigrants
(Figure 3.4.b). On the other hand, with strong or weak multiculturalism policies, children
of immigrants living in a country with more anti-discrimination policies have stable and
sometimes even stronger religiosity.
Non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants are the most aﬀected by the strength
of anti-discrimination policies. With many or few multiculturalism policies in place, non-
mainstream Christians who live in a country with strong anti-discrimination provisions are
more religious compared to those in countries with low provisions (Figure 3.4.c-d). For
non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants, being in a country with only strong anti-
discrimination policies — for example, Hungary and Slovakia — or with both strong anti-
discrimination policies and multiculturalism — such as Sweden or Finland — is associated
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with higher religiosity compared to countries with only strong multiculturalism provisions
(Table 3.4, p < 0.05). However, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between non-mainstream
Christians who live in a country with strong or weak multiculturalism.
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Figure 3.4: Predicted religiosity scores for children of immigrants in twenty European
countries (linear estimates based on Table 3.8 Model 4, N= 8,129).
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Table 3.9: Predicted religiosity scores for children of immigrants in twenty European
countries (linear estimates based on Table 3.8 Model 4, N=8,129).
Religious aﬃliation Both types of policies weak Strong multiculturalism
policies
Christian: mainstream 0.528 [0.415, 0.641] 0.144 [-0.035, 0.322]
Christian: other 0.533 [0.196, 0.869] -0.182 [-0.715, 0.351]
Muslim 0.560 [0.187, 0.934] 0.009 [-0.462, 0.480]
Unaﬃliated -0.527 [-0.640, -0.415] -0.578 [-0.740, -0.417]
Religious aﬃliation Strong anti-discrimination
policies
Both types of policies
strong
Christian: mainstream 0.465 [0.352, 0.577] 0.353 [0.256, 0.449]
Christian: other 0.968 [0.610, 1.326] 0.795 [0.536, 1.053]
Muslim 0.584 [0.302, 0.866] 0.897 [0.663, 1.132]
Unaﬃliated -0.709 [-0.813, -0.606] -0.566 [-0.639, -0.494]
95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets.
Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016), MIPEX 2008-2014, OECD 2008-2014, WPP
2008-2014, Pew Research Center 2010.
Muslim children of immigrants beneﬁt the most from multiculturalism, but only in
countries that also have many anti-discrimination polices. Moreover, Muslim children of
immigrants need multiculturalism policies in place to beneﬁt from anti-discrimination
policies. Muslim children of immigrants, as all other children of immigrants, have a
decrease in religiosity with only more multiculturalism policies in place. However, Muslims
have stronger religiosity in countries with both more multiculturalism and
anti-discrimination policies in place (Figure 3.4.b). They are the only religious group to
have a stronger predicted religiosity in countries with both strong multiculturalism and
anti-discrimination policies compared to countries with only strong anti-discrimination
policies. Muslim children of immigrants have a predicted religiosity score of 0.584 in a
country with only anti-discrimination policies (a similar score to all other groups), which
goes to 0.897 in countries with both strong multiculturalism and anti-discrimination
policies, a score signiﬁcantly higher than mainstream Christians (Table 3.4, p < 0.05).
Anti-discrimination policies alone also do not increase the religiosity of Muslims. Muslim
children of immigrants who live in countries with low multiculturalism (for example Poland
or Slovakia) are not strongly aﬀected by the strength of anti-discrimination policies (Figure
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3.4.c).
Summary
Muslims are more religious compared to all other children of immigrants. However,
beyond religious aﬃliation, religiosity is also shaped by both the local social environment
and the national political context. Indeed, Christian children of immigrants are more
religious in regions with more religious natives (H1a), though the relationship is stronger
for mainstream Christians compared to Orthodox or other Christians (H1b). Muslim
children of immigrants’ religiosity runs opposite to the religiosity levels of natives in the
same region (H1c). Surprisingly, anti-immigrant attitudes do not seem to lead to less or
more religiosity for children of immigrants of all faith traditions (H2). National policies
only aﬀect religious minorities (H3d): non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants are
more religious in countries with more anti-discrimination policies (H3b) and Muslim
children of immigrants are more religious in countries with both strong anti-discrimination
and multiculturalism policies.
Most children of immigrants incorporate into regions with speciﬁc levels of religiosity
(H1a). However, Muslim children of immigrants are the only group for whom religiosity is
low in regions with high levels of natives’ religiosity, and high in regions with low levels of
natives’ religiosity (H1b). Mainstream Christians, other Christians, and unaﬃliated
children of immigrants, all have strong religiosity if they live in a region where natives also
have a strong religiosity. As expected, mainstream Christians and unaﬃliated children of
immigrants are the most aﬀected by natives, having a similar religious identity. However,
the relationship is also positive for other Christian children of immigrants who do not share
the in-group status with natives. Unlike all other groups, Muslim children of immigrants
have the opposite religiosity compared to natives living in the same region.
Children of immigrants tend to have a stable religiosity regardless of anti-immigrant
attitudes from natives (H2). Surprisingly, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in how
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children of immigrants react to negative attitudes towards them, even if, in this sample,
Muslim children of immigrants have a slightly higher religiosity in an anti-immigrant
context. Combining results from hypothesis testing and descriptive analyses, there is no
evidence that Muslim children of immigrants try to leave their religion because of
discrimination. For non-mainstream children of immigrants, there is no evidence that they
have a more salient religiosity in response to discrimination. However, there is descriptive
evidence that each religious sub-group might react diﬀerently to anti-immigrant attitudes.
Mainstream Christians and unaﬃliated children of immigrants are overall unaﬀected
by multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies, but non-mainstream Christians and
Muslims beneﬁt from the combination of both provisions. Children of immigrants are not
more religious in countries with only multiculturalism policies in place (H3a). While there
is no evidence of a positive eﬀect of anti-discrimination policies for children of immigrants of
all faith traditions (H3b), the strength of anti-discrimination policies is important for non-
mainstream Christians’ religiosity (H3c). For Muslim children of immigrants, their religiosity
is highest in countries with both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies. More
multiculturalism policies enable higher religiosity of Muslims if anti-discrimination policies
are in place, and anti-discrimination policies only have a positive eﬀect on Muslims’ religiosity
if strong multiculturalism policies are also present (H3c).
Discussion
Most children of immigrants incorporate into their local communities; however,
Muslims have a distinctively high religiosity across contexts. Moreover, the religiosity of
minority religious groups is dependent on the country’s provision of multiculturalism and
anti-discrimination policies. Research on religiosity among immigrants in Europe has
largely centered on the foreign-born generation, and the handful of studies that address the
second-generation are limited to a single country. By introducing a cross-national
framework centered on children of immigrants, this research shows that religiosity is
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shaped not only by immigrant family origins, but also by local and national contexts.
Christian children of immigrants from majority or minority religions incorporate into
their local religious communities. However, there is evidence of a bright social boundary
between Muslims and all other groups, exempliﬁed in salient Muslim religiosity across social
contexts. In Europe, the “us” and “them” diﬀerentiation seems to be between Muslims and
non-Muslims (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999) instead of between mainstream Christians
and all other groups (Wimmer and Soehl 2014). In line with new assimilation theories, I
ﬁnd that children of immigrants inside of these bright boundaries — all Christians and the
unaﬃliated — seem to be culturally incorporating into European regions and have similar
levels of religiosity than natives around them (Alba 2005). Muslim children of immigrants
outside of this boundary are less culturally assimilated: keeping strong ties to religion across
social contexts. However, this boundary seems to be infused in the culture and institutions
rather than through experiences with discrimination. Even though Muslims do not suppress
their religiosity for incorporation, there is no evidence of a “reactive” religiosity in the context
of anti-immigrant attitudes. Muslims therefore might be very religious as a way to engage
with the European mainstream.
Lip service to multiculturalism alone does not encourage religiosity; however,
anti-discrimination policies have a signiﬁcant eﬀect for religious minorities. The
multicultural intentions of the state do have the intended consequences on religious
diversity, but only if the state also provides legal protections and requirements (Cornelius
et al. 1994; Massey 1999). Anti-discrimination policies, mandated by the EU, are critical in
providing a space for minorities to practice their religion. Children of immigrants may feel
especially free to identify with their minority religion in countries with strong
anti-discrimination policies traditionally deﬁned as economically laissez-faire, such as the
UK and Portugal. The role of multiculturalism is less clear: Muslim children of
immigrants, being outside of social boundaries, might be more religious as a result of the
politicization of their identity. In the debate over the future of multiculturalism, I provide
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evidence that other provisions, such as anti-discrimination policies, should go alongside
multicultural rights and recognition.
This chapter demonstrates how the religiosity of children of immigrants is shaped
within a speciﬁc context. In the next chapter, I turn from contextual inﬂuences on
religiosity to the consequences of religiosity for immigrant incorporation into the political
sphere. Speciﬁcally, I examine the relationship between engagement with religious
institutions and political participation among children of immigrants. In addition, I
continue the analysis of the political context in twenty European countries by asking
whether state policies can facilitate or inhibit political participation among children of
immigrants.
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Chapter 4
Immigrant Religious Communities, Collective Identities, and Political
Participation Across European Countries
Across social and political European contexts, religion is important for children of
immigrants, especially Muslims. A question that remains is how religiosity, and speciﬁcally
involvement in religious communities, fosters or inhibits political incorporation. Through
participation in political acts, children of immigrants demonstrate their inclusion in the
host country and in the national political discourse. Political engagement is critical when
assessing immigrants’ assimilation, as it represents a cultural, social, and institutional
incorporation (Bloemraad 2006; de Rooij 2012). By participating in politics, immigrants
and children of immigrants can also actively change the political landscape and policies
aﬀecting them (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Putnam 2001; Warner 1993). Cross-national
studies in Europe have found that western and non-western children of immigrants are
overall less likely to participate in non-electoral politics compared to natives (Aleksynska
2011; de Rooij 2012). However, studies in Germany and the Netherlands ﬁnd that ethnic
organizations and strong ethnic identities are associated with more political activities
(Fennema and Tillie 2001; Fischer-Neumann 2014; Klandermans 2008; Martinovic and
Verkuyten 2014).
European research on the political participation of children of immigrants has neglected
the role of religious organizations and state policies. According to theories of political
engagement and social capital, ethnic organizations provide resources for group
mobilization and other political activities (Brady et al. 1995; Coleman 1988; Leighley and
Vedlitz 1999; Portes 1998; Putnam 2001; Verba et al. 1995). In practice, religious
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institutions are often the only ethnic organization available to children of immigrants. In
the US, religious organizations have been found to increase children of immigrants’ human
resources, material security, group identity, social capital, and group consciousness
(Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1993). I expect these resources to be present in
European immigrant religious organizations as well. The bright social boundary in Europe
between Christianity and Islam (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999) results in an imposed
social categorization shared by Muslim immigrants from multiple countries, cultures, and
diverse religious traditions. I argue that Muslim children of immigrants will use religious
organizations to connect with individuals across ethnic groups who experience that same
imposed categorization. Therefore, I posit mosques as pan-ethnic organizations which
foster new identities as a platform for collective action (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto
2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). While European countries tend to give less freedom and
recognition to religion than the US (Foner and Alba 2008; Mooney 2009), multiculturalism
policies and political rights for foreigners will both enable more collective political
participation of children of immigrants and increase the potential for religious
organizations to link their members to the political mainstream (Kastoryano 2002;
Koopmans et al. 2005; Mooney 2009).
I combine theories of political participation, ethnic organizations, pan-ethnic identities,
and state policies to explain how religious organizations can be a forum for collective
political mobilization. Using the ESS dataset, I ﬁrst investigate how participation in
religious events encourages political participation of children of immigrants in twenty
European countries. Second, I test if attendance at religious events intersects with
experiences of religious discrimination to create a sense of group consciousness. I ask if the
role of religious organizations is greater for Muslims compared to mainstream Christians
(Protestant and Catholic), other Christians (Orthodox and other sects), and the
unaﬃliated. Finally, I investigate cross-national variation in the relationship between
involvement with religious organizations and political engagement, and whether this
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relationship is moderated by states’ strength of multiculturalism policies and political
rights for foreigners.
Models of Individual and Collective Political Participation
Political participation consists of the set of “voluntary activities by ordinary people
directed towards inﬂuencing directly or indirectly political outcomes at various levels of the
political system” (de Rooij 2012, p.456). Classical political theorists argue that multiple
individual factors can shape political participation: material and human capital are the
strongest predictors, however, organizational resources (civic skills and culture) and
psychological resources (interest in politics, group identity, and political knowledge) all
increase participation as well (Brady et al. 1995; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Verba et al.
1995). Since then, research has moved away from individual resources to focus instead on
group level factors shaping political participation. Social capital theory re-conceptualized
organizational resources to include networks and the creation of collective identities
(Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Putnam 2001). I investigate if religious organizations increase
political participation overall but also speciﬁcally by increasing a sense of shared resources
and new collective identities. I supplement theories of organizations and political
participation by including the state as an active agent shaping institutions.
In Figure 4.1, I present the theoretical framework. I argue that religious organizations
lead to more political engagement of children of immigrants from all faiths, but this eﬀect
will be moderated by a sense of group consciousness. For Muslim children of immigrants
under bright boundaries, their religious identity can also become a pan-ethnic identity — a
form of group consciousness reaching across ethnic backgrounds — and religious
organizations can thus encourage even more political participation. Finally, the strength of
multiculturalism policies and political rights for migrants will aﬀect political engagement of
children of immigrants directly and indirectly through increasing the eﬀect of religious
organizations.
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Figure 4.1: Theoretical model for Chapter 4.
Religious Organizations and Children of Immigrants’ Political Participation
Religious organizations provide critical human and material resources to children of
immigrants in often-tenuous situations in the host country. First, children of immigrants
can develop political skills and increase their knowledge of the host country’s political
system through religious messages, religious classes, and religious organizational structures.
Religious leaders sometimes discuss directly the political landscape and upcoming
opportunities for political engagement. For example, Catholic and Protestant churches in
the US are found to increase the political participation of ethnic minorities through
information spread through the pulpit (Harris 1994; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). Minority
religious organizations often hold classes and meetings to help children of immigrants
incorporate in the host country and develop their civic skills. During classes, immigrants
can learn basic skills necessary for political participation, such as reading and speaking in
the host country language (Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Local religious organizations also
have their own bureaucratic structure that enables individuals to practice their civic skills
(Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Secret et al. 1990). Children of immigrants with more human
capital gained through religious organizations will be able to be active in the mainstream
political arena. Second, religious organizations sometimes provide actual material resources
to their members, enabling them to be more civically and politically engaged. Religious
organizations can help their members directly with ﬁnancial and other necessary resources
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to participate in politics (Pattillo-McCoy 1998; Timpone 1998). For example,
African-American churches often function as a bank and benevolent society for their
members (Pattillo-McCoy 1998). If children of immigrants feel more secure ﬁnancially
because of their religious organization’s propensity to help, they can spend more time and
resources attending rallies, calling representatives, etc.
Religious organizations also provide a larger and stronger social network for children of
immigrants, bridging ties across social class and bonding individuals from similar cultures
(Allen 2010; Cadge and Ecklund 2007). First, by attending religious organizations,
individuals can expand their network. According to classic theories, ethnic organizations
are a key place to increase social capital (Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Putnam 2001). At
religious organizations, members can meet individuals in their own ethnic group but from
higher social classes, with more human and material capital (Allen 2010; Withnow and
Hackett 2003). Through their social contacts at religious organizations, congregants with
less resources can learn about political issues and receive information necessary to be
engaged. Second, religious organizations not only oﬀer a larger network, but a group of
similar others and a place to develop strong group identities (Cadge and Ecklund 2007).
This is especially the case for minority groups who tie religion to their ethnic origins.
Religious organizations can oﬀer a “free space” for immigrants and their children to
embrace and celebrate their cultural particularities (Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 2001;
Lim and Putnam 2010; Putnam 2001; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1993). Through
participating in traditional activities at religious organizations, children of immigrants can
learn about their cultural origins (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Mooney 2009; Warner 1993).
For example, churches in the US are a place for Korean and Vietnamese Americans to learn
about and maintain cultural traditions (Bankston and Zhou 1996; Min 1992). These
activities are essential for building a strong ethnic identity which has been found to
increase political participation (Cadge and Ecklund 2007).
I expect religious organizations to provide children of immigrants with human and
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material resources as well as large and strong social networks. Theories of the role of
religious organizations and political participation are based in the US, where most religious
organizations become de facto congregational (Warner 1993) and the place of religious
organizations is well established and accepted by larger institutions (Mooney 2009).
However, European countries are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the US American context:
many have been secularizing at a fast rate and have weaker religious institutions (Foner
and Alba 2008; Gorski and Atinordu 2008; Mooney 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2011). Even
so, children of immigrants in Europe also experience economic or social insecurity;
therefore, they are likely to turn to religious communities for help and resources.
(H1) Attendance at religious services will be associated with higher levels of political
participation for children of immigrants.
Collective Identities, Group Consciousness, and Pan-ethnic Organizations
Participation in a religious community can be a resource for immigrants who share a
faith tradition and experience discrimination because of it. Across aﬃliations, religious
organizations can develop a sense of religious group consciousness for children of
immigrants who experience religious discrimination. However, when religion forms a bright
social boundary, religious identities can also become politicized and even racialized
(Kastoryano 2004; Lamont 2003). In Europe, a bright religious boundary separates
Christianity and Islam. Therefore, mosques might act as pan-ethnic organizations and help
Muslim children of immigrants from various national origins to mobilize around politicized
and racialized categorizations.
High levels of group consciousness lead individuals to realize that their group might be
at a disadvantage but also that they can take action and inﬂuence politics (Peterson 1992).
The political science literature deﬁnes group consciousness as a strong group identity with
an added sense of power deprivation and commitment to collective action (Harris 1999;
Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Wilcox and Gomez 1990). Mobilization around a collective
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identity develops in the context of shared personal experiences of stigma and
discrimination (Bernstein 2005; Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Kastoryano 2002;
Koopmans et al. 2005). Religious organizations are both a place of refuge from
discrimination and a place to learn about systematic discrimination happening by all
members of the same group. In the US, African Americans and Latinos/as discuss issues
pertaining to their group and narratives of empowerment at church events and services;
therefore, church members have a greater sense of group consciousness (Bobo and Gilliam
1990; Harris 1999; Sanchez 2006; Secret et al. 1990; Stokes 2003; Wilcox and Gomez 1990).
I expect children of immigrants who attend religious services and have a sense of group
consciousness to participate more in politics.
(H2) Religious attendance will have a stronger eﬀect on political participation for
children of immigrants who perceive their religious group to be discriminated.
The bright social boundaries around Islam imply that religious organizations will play a
larger role for Muslim children of immigrants’ political participation through the development
of new politicized collective identities. For children of immigrants across faith traditions,
personal experiences of religious discrimination may increase a sense of group consciousness.
However, bright social boundaries which impose categorizations on children of immigrants
can create new types of identities across ethnic backgrounds and within organizations. Social
boundaries in Europe are around religion and children of immigrants will integrate into the
division between “us” Christians and “them” Muslims (Alba 2005; Zolberg 1999). Through
this process, Islam is politicized and racialized by European natives, institutions, and cultures
(Kastoryano 2004; Lamont 2003). Therefore, Muslim children of immigrants have a greater
potential for political engagement if they mobilize around their Muslim identity.
In Europe, mosques can function as pan-ethnic organizations: encouraging Muslims from
various backgrounds to re-interpret imposed categorizations and mobilize as a collective.
Due to similar experiences with bright social boundaries, children of immigrants appropriate
imposed identities and use them as a tool for political mobilization (Kibria 1998; Lopez and
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Espiritu 1990; Nagel 1994; Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). Studies in the US
ﬁnd that children of immigrants from multiple countries are inﬂuenced by current social
boundaries and experiences of discrimination, and thus take on labels such as “Latino”
and “Asian” for collective solidarity and mobilization (Cornell 1996; Feliciano 2009; Kibria
2000; Portes and MacLeod 1996; Tuan 1999; Waldinger et al. 1990). This re-interpretation
of a categorization unifying individuals from diﬀerent backgrounds is called a pan-ethnic
identity. Pan-ethnic organizations promote these identities and help individuals to bring
their concerns to the national level (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 2014; Vasquez and
Wetzel 2009). In the US, Hispanic organizations brought together Mexicans, Puerto Ricans,
and other central and south American groups together to push for a Hispanic category on
the census which helped them advance their rights as a group (Mora 2014). Pan-ethnic
Asian-American organizations continue to play a key role in connecting Asian children of
immigrants from diﬀerent national backgrounds but experiencing the same discrimination
and anti-Asian violence (Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 2014). In Chapter 2, I ﬁnd that Muslim
children of immigrants attend religious services more in adolescence while moving away
from their national origins, a sign that this religious identity may indeed be pan-ethnic. If
the Muslim identity functions as a pan-ethnic identity, mosques will function as pan-ethnic
organizations and will be a way for children of immigrants to organize around a collective
identity and advocate for their rights as a religious minority.
(H3) Religious attendance will have a stronger eﬀect on political participation for
Muslims compared to all other children of immigrants.
States, Political Participation, and Religious Organizations
Policies on political rights and multiculturalism can shape the political participation of
children of immigrants, and the relationship between religious organizations and politics.
Political rights for foreigners will increase political engagement directly and moderate the
role of religious organizations for political engagement. Political rights for non-citizens will
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directly enable non-citizen children of immigrants to vote at the regional and European
level. The potential for voting in these elections will increase children of immigrants’
involvement in other political acts such as signing a petition or participating in a protest.
Ethnic minorities have a greater trust in institutions if the state defends political freedom
and there is diverse political representation as a result. This trust can be translated into
more political mobilization and dissent (Aleinikoﬀ and Klusmeyer 2001; Bloemraad 2006;
Bloemraad et al. 2008; Joppke 1999). Indirectly, political rights for foreigners will enable
resources from religious organizations to be translated in actual political participation.
Multiculturalism policies create a greater sense of inclusiveness in the country and
enable religious organizations to provide more resources to children of immigrants.
Multiculturalism policies also create a culture of trust in institutions and acceptance of all
cultures. Therefore, in countries with more multiculturalism polices, children of immigrants
will feel more comfortable participating in mainstream politics. Multiculturalism policies
foster religious communities through acknowledging the presence of minority groups and
recognizing the legitimacy of minority organizations (Koopmans 2013b; Wright and
Bloemraad 2012). In countries with fewer religious rights and recognition, religious
organizations might not be able to provide the capital and resources necessary for
engagement with national institutions. There is qualitative evidence that the relationship
between the state and minority groups will either reinforce or damper the positive role of
religious organizations (Kastoryano 2002; Mooney 2009). For example, Mooney (2009)
ﬁnds that while Haitian immigrants and their children in the US use religious organizations
to help them with bureaucratic and language issues, Haitians in France cannot turn to
religious organizations for help due to the fragile institutional position of minority
churches. The relationship between the state and diversity will therefore shape if and how
religious organizations can help children of immigrants.
(H4) States will shape children of immigrants’ political participation directly and
indirectly through religious organizations:
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(H4a) Expansive political rights for foreigners will be associated with higher
levels of political participation.
(H4b) The positive relationship between religious attendance and political
participation will be stronger in countries with expansive political rights
for foreigners.
(H4c) Strong multiculturalism policies will be associated with higher levels of
political participation.
(H4d) The positive relationship between religious attendance and political
participation will be stronger in countries with more multiculturalism
policies.
Previous Findings on the Political Participation of Children of Immigrants in
Europe
In Europe, civic organizations increase the political participation of children of
immigrants, but the eﬀects vary by country, group, and type of organization. Klandermans
(2008) measures immigrants’ organization memberships (including political parties,
religious organizations, sports organizations etc.) and ﬁnds that an increase in membership
is associated with more political participation in the Netherlands. More broadly, a special
issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies called on authors to test Fennema and
Tillie (1999)’s hypothesis that diﬀerences in political participation are due to diﬀerent
levels of social capital drawn from ethnic civic communities. Looking at associative
participation in Berlin, which includes ethnic and German organizations, Berger et al.
(2004) ﬁnd that participants in German organizations are more active politically. In
Amsterdam, Tillie (2004) ﬁnds that membership in ethnic organizations, cross-ethnic
organizations, and trade unions are all associated with greater political participation for
Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans, and the Surinamese. However, Togeby (2004) ﬁnds variation
in the eﬀects of membership by type and by ethnic group in Denmark. For example,
113
second-generation Turks who are members of ethnic organizations or cross-ethnic sports
club, but not in trade-unions, are more likely to participate in politics; ethnic organizations
also have a positive eﬀect for Pakistanis but not for Ex-Yugoslavs (Togeby 2004). Jacobs
et al. (2004) ﬁnd that while Turks in Brussels are part of more ethnic civic communities,
Moroccans are more likely to participate in politics.
Despite substantial interest in the role of civic and community organizations in fostering
political participation, very few studies have speciﬁcally investigated the role of religious
attendance or aﬃliation in shaping immigrants’ political incorporation. The few existing
studies hint at a potential positive relationship between religion and politics. In the UK,
McAndrew and Voas (2014) ﬁnd that immigrant religiosity (and index of importance and
practice) does promote civic engagement of second-generation immigrants. Compared to
other immigrant religious groups, Aleksynska (2011) ﬁnds that ﬁrst-generation Muslims are
less aﬀected by the participation culture in the host country and more aﬀected by their
country of origin and the migration contexts. Martinovic and Verkuyten (2014) ﬁnd that
for Dutch and Germans with Turkish origins, identifying as Muslim leads to more political
action. These studies are limited to either the ﬁrst-generation immigrants or only a couple
national contexts.
Perceived discrimination has also been studied as a motivating factor in minority political
participation. However, evidence on the relationship between perceived discrimination and
political participation in Europe is inconclusive. Perceived religious discrimination does
not signiﬁcantly predict political engagement, even when combined with strong religious
identity. However, discrimination based on national origins does seem to increase political
participation in some countries. Martinovic and Verkuyten (2014) do not ﬁnd evidence that
perceived religious discrimination increases the relationship between Muslim identiﬁcation
and political participation in the Netherlands and Germany. On the other hand, Fischer-
Neumann (2014) ﬁnds that children of immigrants’ dual identiﬁcation is only associated with
political interest in Germany if combined with feelings of discrimination based on ethnic
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origins. She ﬁnds that this eﬀect is more pronounced for Turkish children of immigrants
(Fischer-Neumann 2014). Klandermans (2008), also in Germany, ﬁnds that grievances —
belief that the government does not treat one’s group well — is associated with more political
participation of immigrants. However, Sanders et al. (2014) ﬁnd that, in Britain, perceived
ethnic discrimination is not related to political participation. To date, researchers have not
considered how religious discrimination might interact with religious attendance in predicting
political engagement.
Finally, previous studies have also considered the role of the state. Past studies show
how multiculturalism can increase individual political engagement through ethnic identities
and foster group demands and mobilization through religious identities. Wright and
Bloemraad (2012) ﬁnd that multiculturalism policies foster political engagement of
immigrants across national context through ethnic identity but does not include the role of
religious communities and religious identities. On the other hand, Kastoryano (2002) and
Koopmans et al. (2005) both look at the relationship between the state and religious
leaders or groups but do not include individual-level political participation. In her
interviews with immigrant and political leaders in Germany, France, and the US,
Kastoryano (2002) explains how the state creates group identities which are then used by
groups to make claims. Koopmans et al. (2005) further explains how political institutions
need to ﬁrst recognize Islam for Muslims to then organize and make group demands.
However, no previous research focuses on how multiculturalism might lead to more
individual political engagement through religious attendance.
Data Source, Measures, and Methods
Data source and case selection
I investigate the relationship between religious attendance and political participation for
adult children of immigrants in twenty European countries between 2010 and 2016. My
primary data source is Waves 5 through 8 of the European Social Survey (ESS), a sample I
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describe in Chapter 3. I focus on adult children of immigrants who are unaﬃliated or identify
as either Catholic, Protestant, another non-mainstream Christian tradition, or Muslim and
with no observations missing on covariates of interest. I include European countries with
Catholicism or Protestantism as the majority religion and with at least thirty children of
immigrants interviewed. The ﬁnal sample includes 8,129 individuals from twenty countries.
I augment these individual-level data with Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)
data on multiculturalism and political rights for foreigners. I include policy scores for
multiculturalism and political rights between 2008 and 2014 to provide a two-year lag time.
As in Chapter 3, the strength of multiculturalism policies is measured using a subset of the
MIPEX, only considering policies that recognize, enable, and encourage diversity in
schools, employment opportunities, the legal system, and politics. Two countries —
Croatia and Lithuania — are excluded because they do not have MIPEX scores between
2008 and 2014.
Political rights in Europe
In addition to multiculturalism scores, I include MIPEX indicators for the strength of
political rights and political liberties for legally residing foreign citizens in each country.
These scores measure if legally residing foreign citizens can vote in local, regional and national
elections, stand in local elections, and join organizations or political parties. The MIPEX
assigns a score for each country by year: 100 representing if the political act is completely
allowed, 50 if there are some requirements, and 0 if it is not allowed at all (Huddleston et al.
2015). All the indicators used to measure the strength of political rights for foreigners are
in the Appendix B.3. Below, in Table 4.1, I present the average scores for political rights by
country between 2008 and 2010.
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden provide the most political rights for legally
residing foreigners. In all three countries, there are no restrictions on the creation of
associations or on the compositions of associations by foreigners, and there is equal access
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with nationals to membership and involvement in political parties. Moreover, while no
European country in this sample gives the right to legally residing foreign citizens to vote
in national elections, foreigners can still stand and vote in local elections in the
Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. In Denmark and Sweden, foreigners are also allowed
to vote in regional elections, but that is not the case in the Netherlands.
Table 4.1: Political rights for foreigners scores from 2008 to 2014 in twenty European
countries.
Year
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average
Austria 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Belgium 56.3 56.3 56.3 56.3 56.3 56.3 56.3
Czech Republic 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 15.0
Denmark 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5
Estonia 20.8 20.8 20.8 20.8 20.8
Finland 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3
France 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Germany 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Hungary 58.3 58.3 58.3 45.8 55.2
Ireland 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3 83.3
Netherlands 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
Norway 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5
Poland 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
Portugal 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
Slovakia 31.3 31.3 31.3 31.3 31.3
Slovenia 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3
Spain 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5
Sweden 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5 87.5
Switzerland 68.8 68.8 68.8 68.8 68.8 68.8 68.8 68.8
United Kingdom 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
Source: MIPEX 2008-2014.
On the other hand, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia have the fewest provisions
for immigrants and their children to participate and be represented in politics. None of
these countries allow legally residing foreigners to vote in any national or regional elections
or to be part of a political party. In Poland and the Czech Republic, foreigners are also not
allowed to participate in local elections. However, in Estonia, foreigners who follow certain
requirements (such as length of stay, reciprocity, or other conditions) can vote locally. In
Poland and Estonia, associations cannot be composed of only foreigners. In the Czech
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Republic, one of the two countries with changes in political rights over time, legally residing
foreigners have been able to freely join associations since 2012.
Children of immigrants’ political participation, religious attendance, and
perceived discrimination in Europe
To measure the political participation of children of immigrants, I include seven questions
which ask if the respondent has done any of the following political acts in the last 12 months:
contacting an oﬃcial, working in a group or party, working in an organization, displaying
a campaign sticker, signing a petition, attending a protest, and boycotting a product. This
scale is based on traditional deﬁnitions and measurements of political participation (Alford
and Friedland 1975; Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995) and is still used in many recent
empirical works comparing the political participation of multiple groups (Aleksynska 2011;
Klandermans 2008; Read 2007; Sanders et al. 2014). Contrary to many others, I do not
include voting in my scale due to the large group of non-citizen children of immigrants
and country-variation in voting requirements. I create a scale using these questions to
diﬀerentiate between levels of participation (alpha 0.646). This scale covers acts that are
political and those that are civic, conventional and unconventional, and high and low costs
(Aleksynska 2011; de Rooij 2012; Sanders et al. 2014). de Rooij (2012) ﬁnds that for children
of immigrants in Europe, all these participation measures are strongly related. As expected,
this political participation scale signiﬁcantly predicts voting for all individuals in the ESS
even controlling for individual demographics (p < 0.001). Political participation ranges from
0 (no acts) to 7 (participation in all possible political acts in the last year).
Table 4.2 shows the averages or proportions of key measures used in the analysis, for
the full sample and by religious aﬃliation. On average, children of immigrants participate
in a little bit more than one political act in the last year. Children of immigrants who are
unaﬃliated are the most likely to participate in political activities. Looking at children of
immigrants who identify with a religion, mainstream Christians are the most likely to
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participate in politics while other Christians have the lowest average value of political
participation, less than one activity in the last year. This variation in political
participation for children of immigrants from diﬀerent religions may be due to their various
levels of SES and incorporation. In Chapter 3 page 84, I discuss the structural and cultural
incorporation of each religious group in detail.
I am interested in how religious attendance can increase the political participation of
children of immigrants across religious aﬃliations, even those with low SES and cultural
incorporation. In the ESS, individuals are asked how often they attend religious services
nowadays, apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals. Frequency of
attendance at religious events is measured on a 5-point scale: more than once a week (5),
once a week (4), at least once a month (3), only on special holidays (2), less often (1) and
never (0). In the original ESS questionnaire, respondents were able to diﬀerentiate between
more than once a week and once a day but less than 1% of the sample attended religious
services every day.
Muslim children of immigrants are the most likely to attend religious services every week
or more, but a large proportion of Muslims also never attend religious services. 9.2% of
Muslim children of immigrants attend religious services more than once a week compared
to only 6.2% of non-mainstream Christians and 3.6% of mainstream Christians. Muslim
children of immigrants are also the most likely to attend religious services once a week (15.1%)
though they are closely followed by mainstream Christians (14.0% of which attend religious
services once a week). However, mainstream and other Christian children of immigrants
are more likely to go to church for special holidays compared to Muslims and less likely
than Muslims to never attend religious services. The distribution of religious attendance for
Muslims is bi-modal: many attend religious services very often while quite a few never attend.
Speciﬁcally, 22.7% of Muslims never attend religious services. Many unaﬃliated children of
immigrants never attend religious services (66.8%). However, some unaﬃliated children of
immigrants still attend religious events rarely (18.8%) or only for holy days (12.0%). A few
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unaﬃliated children of immigrants (a total of 2.4%) attend religious services at least once a
month.
Table 4.2: Children of immigrants’ political participation and religious attendance in
twenty European countries.
Mean/Proportion
Mainstream Other
All Christians Christians Muslims Unaﬃliated
Variable Range N=8,129 N=2,843 N=484 N=608 N=4,194
Political participation scale 0 - 7 1.156 1.167 0.649 1.115 1.213
(Std. dev) (1.411) (1.404) (1.148) (1.404) (1.433)
Religious attendance 0 - 5
Never 0.430 0.179 0.091 0.227 0.668
Rarely 0.201 0.215 0.269 0.174 0.188
Only for holy days 0.200 0.282 0.345 0.253 0.120
At least once a month 0.077 0.148 0.147 0.102 0.018
Once a week 0.068 0.140 0.087 0.151 0.005
More than once a week 0.024 0.036 0.062 0.092 0.001
Religious discrimination 0 - 1 0.029 0.009 0.027 0.289 0.005
Controls
Subjective religiosity 0 - 10 4.357 6.008 6.219 7.299 2.596
(Std. dev) (3.139) (2.375) (2.177) (2.255) (2.718)
Placement on left-right scale 0 - 10 4.774 5.125 4.814 4.171 4.619
(Std. dev) (2.174) (2.103) (1.94) (2.051) (2.228)
Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).
Controls for SES, cultural incorporation, and demographics are presented in Chapter 3, page 84.
I investigate the relationships between political participation, religious attendance, and
perceived religious discrimination. In the ESS, respondents are asked if they would describe
themselves as being part of a group that is discriminated against in that country. If the
respondent says yes, the interviewer then asks on what grounds is their group discriminated,
and then checks all that might apply: color or race, nationality, religion, language, ethnic
group, age, gender, sexuality, disability, or other. I separate children of immigrants who say
they are discriminated because of their religion from those who did not mention religion at all
in their cause for discrimination. Alongside identifying with a religious group, this measure
represents a sense of group consciousness. For simplicity, I do not include additional measures
of in-group favoritism or attribution of blame to the political system which are part a strong
feeling of group consciousness (Fischer-Neumann 2014). Muslim children of immigrants are
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especially likely to consider their group discriminated because of religion. Indeed, 26.8% of
Muslim children of immigrants believe their group is discriminated based on religion while
only 2.7% and 0.9% of Christians believe in the same unfair treatment. Unsurprisingly,
unaﬃliated children of immigrants are the least likely to feel like their religious group is
discriminated.
In addition to all the individual controls described in Chapter 3 page 84, I control for
subjective importance given to religion (on a scale from 1 to 10) to diﬀerentiate the beneﬁts
of a religious community from religiosity itself. However, I do not include frequency of
prayer as for Muslims, praying often happens at mosques and therefore is part of
participating in religious organizations. Finally, I include a measure of political leaning to
compare individuals with the same political ideas. Mainstream Christians on average are
more right-leaning while Muslim children of immigrants are the most left-leaning group.
Methods: ﬁxed eﬀects and hybrid multilevel models for children of immigrants
nested in countries
Model speciﬁcation. I pool four ESS rounds together and break down the dataset by
countries to conduct both ﬁxed eﬀects and hybrid random intercept multilevel linear
regressions on the political participation scale, with clustered errors by country. Clustering
by country for both models pulls out the average eﬀect of country entirely. The ﬁxed
eﬀects models are used to investigate the role of individual characteristics in shaping the
political participation of children of immigrants while controlling for each country
individually. In the ﬁxed eﬀects model with individual covariates described above, 10.75%
of the total variance in the political participation scale is due to country speciﬁc
unobserved eﬀects (F19,8081 = 33.08, p < 0.001).
The random intercept multilevel linear regression models include country-level variables
for multiculturalism and political rights for foreigners. However, due to the small sample of
countries (Bryan and Jenkins 2016), I conduct a regression-based Mundlak test to
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investigate if the country-level error for each covariate is correlated with the individual’s
political engagement, and thus leads to biased estimates (Mundlak 1978). The results from
Wald tests show that country level proportions of all ESS respondents in the same country
and year with high school degrees and who speak only the oﬃcial language (a proxy for
country level number of foreigners), as well as the average number of children in the
country, all predict individual political participation. Therefore, I include country-level
averages as ﬁxed eﬀects as well as individual diﬀerences with the country average to
produce a random intercept “hybrid model” (Allison 2009).
Analysis Plan. I ﬁrst investigate the relationship between attendance at religious events
and political participation for Christian, Muslim, and the unaﬃliated across European
countries (H1). I test if the eﬀect of attending religious events on political participation is
greater when children of immigrants believe their religious group is discriminated (H2).
Then, I compare the eﬀect of attending religious events on political participation between
Muslims, mainstream Christians, and other Christians (H3). I compute the linear
predictions of political participation for each group over the diﬀerent levels of frequency of
religious attendance. Finally, I investigate if political rights for foreigners and
multiculturalism policies directly aﬀect children of immigrants’ political participation and
moderate the eﬀect of religious organizations (H4).
Results
Religious organizations and political participation
I look at the consequence of religious attendance for political incorporation. I run ﬁxed
eﬀects models for children of immigrants nested in countries and investigate if attendance
at religious events inﬂuences political engagement (Table 4.3). I ﬁrst predict political
participation using only frequency of religious attendance and ﬁxed eﬀects for each year
and country of survey (Model 1). I then add controls for SES and cultural incorporation
(Model 2) and other demographics (Model 3). Finally, I investigate diﬀerences by religious
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aﬃliation and perceived discrimination (Model 4). Across the models in Table 4.3, we see a
slow decrease in the variance of political participation between and within countries.
There is a positive relationship between religious attendance and political participation
when controlling for SES and incorporation. In the ﬁrst model of Table 4.3, without
accounting for SES and incorporation, an increase in the frequency of religious attendance,
no matter the level, is not associated with an increase political participation of children of
immigrants. However, in Model 2, when we consider children of immigrants with similar
levels of education, income, and cultural incorporation, attending religious events more
than once a week is associated with more political participation (p < 0.05). Across levels of
religious attendance, having a high school degree or being in a higher income percentile
leads to more political participation (p < 0.001). As expected, speaking only the oﬃcial
language and being a citizen are both associated with an increase in the political
participation scale of a quarter of a point (p < 0.001 and p < 0.01 respectively).
The relationship between religious attendance and political participation is even
stronger when comparing individuals of the same age, gender, family type, work status,
subjective religiosity, and political leaning (Model 2). When I control for demographics,
attending religious services more than once a week is associated with an increase in the
political participation score of 0.427 (p < 0.001). Moreover, children of immigrants who
attend religious services just once a week have a political participation score 0.248 higher
than those who never attend religious services (p < 0.05), and children of immigrants who
attend once a month have a political participation score higher by about 0.341 (p < 0.05).
While subjective religiosity, gender, family and work status do not signiﬁcantly predict
political participation, being older (but not too old) is associated with more political acts
in the last year (p < 0.001 for age and p < 0.001 for the quadratic eﬀect). Interestingly,
children of immigrants who are more left-leaning are less likely to participate in politics
(p < 0.001).
Muslims and non-mainstream Christians participate in politics less often than
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Table 4.3: Fixed eﬀects linear models on political participation for children of immigrants
in twenty European countries between 2010 and 2016, clustered by country (N=8,129).
(1)
Simple
(2)
SES and
culture
(3)
Demographics
(4)
Aﬃliation and
discrimination
Religious attendance (ref=never)
Rarely 0.022 0.040 0.078 0.106∗
(0.049) (0.044) (0.041) (0.040)
Only for holy days 0.032 0.030 0.088 0.138∗
(0.083) (0.071) (0.064) (0.064)
At least once a month 0.238 0.270 0.341∗ 0.404∗∗
(0.144) (0.132) (0.126) (0.126)
Once a week 0.071 0.128 0.248∗ 0.289∗∗
(0.101) (0.090) (0.094) (0.098)
More than once a week 0.216 0.328∗ 0.427∗∗ 0.481∗∗
(0.139) (0.134) (0.145) (0.139)
Year (ref=2010)
2011-2013 NS NS NS NS
2014 0.247∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046)
2015 -2016 NS NS NS NS
Individual SES
Secondary education or more 0.546∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.048) (0.047)
Household incomea 0.030∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Cultural incorporation/diﬀerences
Citizen of country 0.253∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗
(0.072) (0.071) (0.068)
Speaks only oﬃcial language 0.228∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.055) (0.044)
Western origins only −0.062 −0.048 −0.071
(0.039) (0.040) (0.049)
Individual demographics
Women −0.037 −0.041
(0.027) (0.027)
Children living at home −0.013 −0.008
(0.038) (0.037)
Women with children at home −0.064 −0.067
(0.043) (0.042)
Agea 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Age squareda −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Paid work last week −0.061 −0.065
(0.037) (0.036)
Subjective religiositya −0.007 0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Placement on left right scalea −0.077∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010)
Continued
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Table 4.3 (Continued)
(1)
Simple
(2)
SES and
culture
(3)
Demographics
(4)
Aﬃliation and
discrimination
Aﬃliation (ref=Christian: mainstream)
Christian: other −0.197∗
(0.087)
Muslim −0.228∗
(0.086)
Unaﬃliated 0.128∗∗∗
(0.029)
Religious discrimination 0.435∗∗
(0.133)
Constant 1.042∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.093) (0.087) (0.094)
Between countries (σμ0) 0.451 0.449 0.456 0.450
Within countries (σ) 1.348 1.312 1.300 1.296
ICC (ρ) 0.101 0.105 0.110 0.107
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
a Variable centered on median: income (5), age (45), religiosity (5), left-right scale (5).
Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).
mainstream Christians, however, perceived religious discrimination is on average associated
with more political engagement for all children of immigrants (Model 4). Muslim children
of immigrants have a participation score that is 0.228 points lower than mainstream
Christians (p < 0.05) and other Christians have a score that is 0.197 lower (p < 0.05). On
the other hand, unaﬃliated children of immigrants participate more in politics than all
other children of immigrants. Perceived religious discrimination is associated with a higher
political participation score (p < 0.01). Nevertheless, the relationship between attending
religious events and participating in politics is stronger when including religious aﬃliation
and discrimination as predictors (Model 4), a sign of potentially signiﬁcant interactions
between religious identities, discrimination, and participation in religious events. There is a
large unexplained variation in the full model (Model 5): a between-country variance (σμ0)
of 0.450 and a within-country variance (between individuals: σ) of 1.290.
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Religious group consciousness and religious organizations
To investigate the role of organizations in fostering group consciousness, I compared
unaﬃliated children of immigrants with religiously aﬃliated children of immigrants who
believe their religious group is discriminated and those who believe their group is not
discriminated. Triple interaction eﬀects are complicated to interpret; therefore, I present
below the predicted linear estimates for the political participation scores by attendance and
discrimination patterns in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.2. All the models with the full
interaction eﬀects are in Appendix A.2.
Table 4.4: Predicted political participation scores for children of immigrants in twenty
European countries (Linear estimates based on Appendix A.2 Model 3, N=8,129).
Religious attendance
More than
Never once a week Diﬀerence
Religiously aﬃliated
Religious discrimination 0.733 [0.402, 1.064] 2.234 [1.225, 3.243] 1.501 [0.682, 2.320]
No religious discrimination 0.950 [0.865, 1.035] 1.321 [1.091, 1.552] 0.371 [0.108, 0.634]
Unaﬃliated 1.121 [1.060, 1.183] 1.137 [-0.717, 2.990] 0.015 [-1.830, 1.860]
95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets.
Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).
Perceiving one’s religious group to be discriminated against increases the positive eﬀect
of religious attendance on political participation. This reverses the gap in political
engagement between unaﬃliated and aﬃliated children of immigrants. Unaﬃliated children
of immigrants, who do not identify with a religion, have the same linear prediction of
participating in politics if they never attend religious services or attend more than once a
week (about 1.1, Table 4.4). However, aﬃliated children of immigrants start with a
predicted score of 0.950 (less than one act in the past twelve months) when they never
attend religious services which jumps to 1.321 (more than one act) once they attend
religious services more than once a week (p < 0.05). Aﬃliated children of immigrants who
believe their group is discriminated against based on religion diﬀerences have the lowest
prediction of participating in politics when they never attend religious services but the
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highest predicted participation score (2.234) when they attend religious services more than
once a week (an increase of 1.501 p < 0.05), this is a signiﬁcantly bigger increase than
aﬃliated children of immigrants who do not think their group is discriminated against
(p < 0.05).
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Figure 4.2: Predicted political participation scores for children of immigrants in twenty
European countries (Linear estimates based on Appendix A.2 Model 3, N=8,129).
Religious organizations as pan-ethnic mobilizers
Attending religious events is especially important for the political incorporation of Muslim
and Mainstream Christian children of immigrants. In Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3, I present
predicted scores for political participation derived from the full interaction model of political
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participation by religious aﬃliation (Appendix A.2 Model 4).
Table 4.5: Predicted political participation scores for children of immigrants in twenty
European countries (Linear estimates based on Appendix A.2 Model 4, N=8,129).
Religious attendance
More than
Religious aﬃliation Never once a week Diﬀerence
Christian: mainstream 0.972 [0.869, 1.074] 1.609 [1.264, 1.954] 0.638 [0.267, 1.009]
Christian: other 1.196 [0.845, 1.547] 0.860 [0.310, 1.411] -0.335 [-0.944, 0.274]
Muslim 0.740 [0.589, 0.891] 1.460 [0.964, 1.956] 0.720 [0.253, 1.187]
Unaﬃliated 1.130 [1.063, 1.197] 1.081 [-0.753, 2.915] -0.049 [-1.878, 1.780]
95% conﬁdence intervals in brackets.
Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).
Muslim children of immigrants, the least politically active group, gain the most from
attending religious services. Muslim children of immigrants have the most dramatic increase
in political participation when they attend religious events more frequently (Figure 4.3).
Muslim children of immigrants who never attend religious services have predicted values of
political participation of 0.740 (Table 4.5). This predicted value is signiﬁcantly lower than
unaﬃliated children of immigrants (p < 0.05). However, the diﬀerence between Muslims and
unaﬃliated children of immigrants disappears once we compare children of immigrants who
attend religious services more than once a week. Religiously engaged Muslims are predicted
to have a 1.460 score on the political participation scale. Between children of immigrants
who never attend mosques and those who attend more than once a week, there is an increase
of 0.720 in the political participation score (p < 0.05). Unaﬃliated and other Christian
children of immigrants do not have a signiﬁcant increase in political participation when they
attend religious services more frequently. As shown in Figure 4.3, the increase in Muslim
political participation for each additional category of religious attendance is almost linear.
Mainstream Christians also have an increase in their predicted political participation
score when they attend religious services more than once a week compared to never
attending. Mainstream Christians who never attend religious services have similar levels of
political participation than all other children of immigrants (predicted score=0.972).
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However, mainstream Christian children of immigrants who attend religious services more
than once a week have the highest predicted political participation score (1.609). As they
attend religious services more often, mainstream Christians gain 0.638 points on their
predicted political participation scale (p < 0.05).
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Figure 4.3: Predicted political participation scores for children of immigrants in twenty
European countries (Linear estimates based on Appendix A.2 Model 4, N=8,129).
Unaﬃliated children of immigrants have a stable political participation across religious
attendance while non-mainstream Christians exhibit a non-linear relationship between
attendance and participation. For unaﬃliated children of immigrants, attending religious
events a few times seems to be associated with more political participation, but then the
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predicted value goes down if children of immigrants attend religious services more than
once a month (Figure 4.3). None of these changes are signiﬁcant. Non-mainstream
Christian children of immigrants have a decrease in their predicted values of political
participation if they attend religious services rarely, for holy days, once a week, or more.
However, the trend over the range of attendance frequency is not signiﬁcant. The small
sample size of non-mainstream Christians or unaﬃliated children of immigrants who attend
religious services explains the large conﬁdence intervals, however, the results are not
substantively diﬀerent when I compare children of immigrants who never attend religious
services to those who attend once a week.
Multiculturalism policies and political rights for foreigners
The hybrid models for political participation with random intercepts by country are in
Table 4.6. All individual-level variables presented previously are included in the
estimations. However, in these random intercept models with both individual variables and
country average controls, there is no more variation across countries in predicting political
participation (ρ = σmu0 = 0). This is due to having both random intercepts and clustering
of errors by country. Combined, this accounts for all the average eﬀect of countries; the
between R2 is 0.664 which leaves little left to be explained.
Country-level characteristics shape the political participation of children of immigrants
(Table 4.6 Model 1). Children of immigrants living in countries with a higher proportion of
individuals who only speak the oﬃcial language (and therefore with less immigrants) are
less likely to participate in politics (p < 0.05). Children of immigrants might feel more
comfortable participating in mainstream politics in countries with a larger migrant
community. Children of immigrants in countries with larger families are less likely to
participate (p < 0.001). Family size probably accounts for country level diﬀerences in
economic development. However, these eﬀects disappear once accounting for
multiculturalism policies and political rights (Model 2). The proportion of foreigners and
130
Table 4.6: Hybrid random intercept linear models on political participation for children of
immigrants in twenty European, clustered by country (N=8,129).
(1)
Simple
(2)
National
policies
(3)
Moderation of
political rights
(4)
Moderation of
multiculturalism
Fixed estimates
Religious attendance (ref=never)
Rarely 0.085 0.086∗ 0.081∗ 0.079∗
(0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039)
Only for holy days 0.051 0.094 0.097 0.102
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.058)
At least once a month 0.340∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.346∗∗
(0.123) (0.126) (0.124) (0.121)
Once a week 0.248∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.248∗∗
(0.079) (0.091) (0.083) (0.090)
More than once a week 0.444∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗
(0.118) (0.134) (0.125) (0.128)
Proportion of country population:
With at least a high school degreea −0.310 −0.825∗ −0.789∗ −0.810∗
(0.717) (0.369) (0.372) (0.364)
Speaking only oﬃcial languagesa −3.317∗ −1.095 −1.120 −1.127
(1.653) (0.865) (0.852) (0.852)
With children at homea −3.924∗∗∗ −1.373 −1.475 −1.339
(1.074) (0.887) (0.901) (0.908)
Political rights for foreigners scoreb 0.145∗ 0.136∗ 0.143∗∗
(0.056) (0.058) (0.055)
Attendance and political rights N.S.
N.S.
Multiculturalism policies scoreb 0.154∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Attendance and multiculturalism
Rarely 0.082∗∗
(0.030)
Only for holy days 0.125∗
(0.057)
At least once a month 0.094
(0.110)
Once a week −0.009
(0.078)
More than once a week −0.068
(0.087)
Individual-level controls included included included included
Constant 0.485∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.091) (0.093) (0.094)
Random estimates
Within countries (σ) 1.299 1.298 1.298 1.298
ICC (ρ) and between (σμ0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parenthesis., ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
a Variables centered on median.
b Standardized.
Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016) and MIPEX 2008-2014.
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the economic development correlates with the strength of multiculturalism and political
rights for foreigners. Once controlling for the eﬀect of policies (Model 2), children of
immigrants living in a more educated country are less likely to participate in politics
(p < 0.05).
Attendance at religious events is still positively associated with political participation
even accounting for country-level characteristics and variations. For individuals in
countries with similar levels of education, foreign population, and family size, attending
religious services at least once a month is associated with an increase in 0.340 in the
political participation scale (Model 1, p < 0.01). Children of immigrants who attend
religious services more than once a week have a score 0.444 higher than to those who never
attend religious services (p < 0.001). This holds true even accounting for political rights
and multiculturalism policies (Model 3). In countries with average multiculturalism and
political rights scores, attending religious services even rarely is associated with higher
scores on the political participation scale.
Regardless of religious attendance, children of immigrants who live in countries with
more political rights for foreigners and multiculturalism policies are more likely to
participate in politics. An increase of one standardized point, centered on the average
score, of political rights for foreigners leads to an increase of 0.145 in the political
participation scale (p < 0.05). Moreover, a centered increase of one standardized point in
the score for multiculturalism policies is associated with an increase of 0.154 in children of
immigrants’ political participation (p < 0.001). Surprisingly, the strength of
multiculturalism policies seems to matter more than political rights for foreigners in
predicting the political participation of children of immigrants.
The interactions between policies and religious attendance are in Model 3 and 4 of Table
4.6. Figure 4.4 presents the predicted political participation score by religious attendance
and given diﬀerent levels of national policies. I compared children of immigrants who live
in countries with the highest possible score for political rights (87.5) and multiculturalism
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(84.6) to those in countries with the lowest scores (0 and 16.2 respectively). The predicted
values for children of immigrants in countries with average policy scores, not shown, are in
between these two lines, though slightly closer to the high score countries.
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Figure 4.4: Predicted political participation scores for children of immigrants in twenty
European countries (Linear estimates based on Table 4.6 Models 3 and 4, N=8,129).
More political rights for foreigners increases the political engagement mostly among
children of immigrants who never or rarely attend religious services and therefore political
rights do not moderate the eﬀect of attendance at religious events on political participation
(Table 4.6). Strong political rights for foreigners increase the prediction scores for political
participation for children of immigrants who never, rarely, or only attend religious services
for holy days. However, the increase in political participation between children of
immigrants who never attend religious organizations compared to those who attend at least
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for holy days is the same in countries with more or less political rights for foreigners. On
the one hand, political rights for immigrants are associated with more political engagement
and are especially important for children of immigrants who do not engage often with
religious organizations. On the other hand, religious organizations are associated with more
political engagement and especially in countries with less expansive political rights for
immigrants.
Multiculturalism policies inﬂuence political participation directly and indirectly through
religious attendance, even controlling for political rights. Children of immigrants beneﬁt
more from attending religious services rarely and for holy days if they live in a country
with more multiculturalism policies. As seen in Figure 4.4, the slope of change in political
participation between children of immigrants who never attend religious services and those
who attend only for holy days is positive in a country with strong multiculturalism while
it is negative in a country with few multiculturalism provisions. Children of immigrants
who attend religious services rarely have an increase in their political participation score
of 0.082 (Table 4.6, Model 4, p < 0.01) in a country with strong multiculturalism and
those who attend for holy days have an increase of 0.125 (p < 0.05). However, there are
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between countries with high and low multiculturalism scores for
children of immigrants who attend religious services more often.
Summary
I test if children of immigrants who are active in their religious community also
participate in politics, and how identities, discrimination, religion, and state policies shape
that relationship. I ﬁnd that European children of immigrants who attend religious services
often have higher levels of political participation compared to children of immigrants who
do not attend religious services (H1). Religious organizations have a stronger eﬀect on
political participation for children of immigrants who identify with a religion and perceive
their religious group to be discriminated (H2). Religious organization also have a stronger
134
eﬀect on the political participation of Muslims and mainstream Christians compared to
other groups (H3). Political rights for foreigners directly inﬂuence political participation
(H4a) while multiculturalism policies aﬀect political engagement both directly (H4c) and
indirectly through organizations (H4d).
In line with my ﬁrst hypothesis, I ﬁnd that children of immigrants who participate at
least once a month in religious events are more politically active than those who never
attend religious services (H1). This is true when comparing individuals of the same SES,
level of cultural incorporation, and demographics. Moreover, this relationship holds when
controlling for country level population statistics and policies. Religious communities link
children of immigrants to the political mainstream even if these adults are from lower SES,
not culturally incorporation, and living countries with few open policies.
Politicized collective identities and religious organizations interact to increase children
of immigrants’ political engagement. Attending religious events is more important in
predicting political participation for children of immigrants who perceive their religious
group to be discriminated (H2) and for children of immigrants who experience bright
boundaries (H3). Children of immigrants who identify with a religion, believe their
religious group is discriminated against, and attend religious services more than once a
week have the highest predicted value of political participation. Muslim children of
immigrants in this sample are the most likely to believe their group is discriminated
against and have the largest increase in their political participation score if they attend
religious services more than once a week compared to all other groups. This is especially
relevant as a ﬁfth of Muslim children of immigrants in this sample never attend religious
services. However, mainstream Christians have a similar increase in their predicted scores
for attending services more often. The political participation of other Christians and
unaﬃliated children of immigrants is unaﬀected by engagement with religious
organizations.
While political rights for foreigners enable more political engagement among children of
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immigrants across religiosity levels, multiculturalism policies both enable more engagement
and increase the eﬀect of religious organizations (H4). Children of immigrants who rarely
or never attend religious events have a bigger increase in their political participation if they
live in a country with more political rights for foreigners (H4a). However, I do not ﬁnd any
evidence that political rights for immigrants moderate the eﬀect of religious organizations
(H4b). In line with my hypothesis, children of immigrants participate more in politics in
countries with more multiculturalism policies, even children of immigrants who never
participate in religious events (H4c). There is mild support for the hypothesis that in
countries with more multiculturalism policies, the relationship between religious
organizations and political participation is stronger. Children of immigrants who attend
religious events rarely or for holy days are more politically engaged in countries with more
multiculturalism policies (H4d).
Discussion
Attendance at religious events is associated with more political engagement across faith
traditions. The relationship is even stronger for children of immigrants who experience
discrimination, for those who identify as Muslims, and for those who live in countries with
more multiculturalism policies. Previous research ﬁnds that children of immigrants are
generally less active than native Europeans (Aleksynska 2011; de Rooij 2012), but does not
investigate if membership in religious organizations, speciﬁcally, increases political
participation across religions. This is the ﬁrst paper to connect religious organizations,
discrimination, and state policies to predict political engagement of children of immigrants
in Europe.
Religion is not just a “barrier” for immigrants’ inclusion in Europe (Foner and Alba
2008) but can instead be a bridge to political incorporation. Even though Europe is more
secular than the US, religious organizations might provide a larger network, a tight
community, human capital, and material support to children of immigrants (Coleman 1988;
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Pattillo-McCoy 1998; Portes 1998; Putnam 2001; Warner 1993). These ﬁndings call into
question the presumption that children of immigrants’ high religiosity is inversely related
to a successful incorporation into Europe. Moreover, religious organizations may provide
resources beyond those necessary for political engagement and therefore lead to even more
cultural and structural incorporation.
There is evidence that a sense of group consciousness is developed in religious
organizations, and this identity could be pan-ethnic for Muslims. Group consciousness
develops in religious organizations for children of immigrants from all faith traditions.
However, Muslim children of immigrants are both less politically incorporated and are more
likely to experience religious discrimination. Mosques may be going beyond the role of
typical religious organizations by closing the political incorporation gap between Muslims
and other immigrant groups. In mosques, Muslim children of immigrants who are otherwise
ostracized can ﬁnd a group of similar others and discuss their experiences in Europe.
Future research should focus on how mosques and other religious organizations might
attract individuals from various backgrounds and create a sense of pan-ethnic solidarity.
The size, composition, and racial makeup of religious communities may shape the
importance of religious organizations in mobilizing its members. I ﬁnd that religious
attendance increases the political engagement of mainstream Christians and Muslims, but
not of Orthodox or other Christian children of immigrants. Mainstream Christian children
of immigrants may beneﬁt from being more like natives in their religious beliefs while other
Christians may not be able to ﬁnd a bridging social network or tight community because of
the small size of their congregations. Future work should examine how the size and
strength of co-religious communities may shape group political mobilization. However,
mainstream Christian children of immigrants are also sometimes racially diﬀerent from
European natives. For example, many sub-Saharan African immigrants are Protestant or
Catholic due to a history of colonialism. Therefore, Black Protestant or Catholic children
of immigrants might experience more discrimination than white Orthodox Christians on
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the basis of race; religious organizations may therefore be more important in their process
of incorporation. More work should examine the intersection of racial and religious
boundaries in the formation of group identities.
State policies matter for the political incorporation of children of immigrants and
somewhat inﬂuence the role of organizations (Massey 1999). This paper underlines the
continued importance of multiculturalism policies for the successful incorporation of
children of immigrants. However, many European countries have recently been
experiencing a retreat from multiculturalism policies (Joppke 2004). Multiculturalism
policies shape the relationship between states and children of immigrants and create a
culture of acceptance and encouragement for individuals to participate in mainstream
politics (Kastoryano 2002; Modood 2013; Taylor et al. 1994). In line with these ﬁndings,
European states should work alongside religious organizations to promote political
incorporation and national cohesion.
The longstanding trend towards secularization has fostered a decline in scholarly interest
in the relationship between religious institutions and politics in Europe. This is in stark
contrast to the extensive literature on religion and politics in the US. However, recent waves
of immigrants are contributing to a resurgence of religiosity, and this research demonstrates
that religious institutions in Europe can be a forum for political engagement. As this new
generation of Europeans continues to rely on religion as a source of identity and community,
a renewed interest in the relationship between religiosity and political engagement is likely
to bear fruit for scholars of immigration, politics, and religion.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion: Religion and The Political Incorporation of Children of
Immigrants in Europe
Since World War II, European states have implemented various policies that reﬂect a
more multicultural society. However, many native Europeans worry that these policies
exacerbate diﬀerences and do not lead to successful incorporation of immigrants.
Speciﬁcally, the European political and popular discourse is centered on the perceived lack
of incorporation of Muslim children of immigrants, who are more religious than their peers
and sometimes even than their parents. This discourse often assumes that high religiosity
reﬂects a lack of incorporation and a reaction against Western values. However, I argue in
this dissertation that religion can also lead to new collective identities and political
participation for children of immigrants. Political participation of children of immigrants
reﬂects their cultural, social, and economic incorporation. To participate in politics,
children of immigrants need to understand the political system and have the resources
necessary to be engaged, both of which can be developed through networks and
organizations. Through religious communities, children of immigrants develop a strong
sense of collective religious identity and a motivation to change the political landscape. In
this dissertation, I investigate how children of immigrants’ religious identity and religiosity
can be associated with more political engagement in Europe.
This dissertation aims to determine the role of religion in the political incorporation of
children of immigrants across European countries. To address this issue, I investigate the
development of politicized religious identities and religious behavior during adolescence and
in adulthood, two keys stages in individual’s political lives. For adolescents, I focus on
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changes in religious identity salience and frequency of religious acts over time, comparing
children of immigrants to European natives. I investigate the role of social boundaries in
explaining diﬀerences between Muslims and non-Muslims. In adulthood, I investigate how
the social and political contexts shape the religiosity of children of immigrants. I consider if
children of immigrants are more religious in countries with both multiculturalism and anti-
discrimination policies, as a result of greater religious freedom and increased politicization
of religion. Then, I further examine the role of religious communities in fostering political
participation among adult children of immigrants, directly and through group consciousness.
I consider whether, in a context of multiculturalism policies and political rights, children of
immigrants participate more in politics and whether religious organizations play a more
important role in their incorporation. Throughout the dissertation, I investigate if Muslim
children of immigrants strong religious identity and religiosity are a sign of a pan-ethnicity
or instead a reaction against the mainstream.
This dissertation provides a better understanding of the political engagement of
religious children of immigrants within various social and political contexts in Europe. I
ﬁnd that instead of being a barrier to incorporation or a reaction towards the mainstream,
religion is key to the political incorporation of children of immigrants. Children of
immigrants give more importance to religion and practice religion more often than natives
throughout adolescence, and their attendance at religious events is associated with more
political engagement in adulthood. Minority groups’ religiosity and political engagement
ﬂourish if the state provides them with encouragements, rights, and anti-discrimination
protections. For children of immigrants experiencing bright social boundaries, such as
Muslims, religious identities seem to have the potential to be a tool for pan-ethnic
mobilization. This project connects theories of adolescent identity formation, religion,
immigrant incorporation, pan-ethnic identities, multiculturalism, and political participation
in new ways, while advancing each theoretical framework individually.
140
Contributions of Empirical Research
1 Politicized religious identities and religious behaviors in adolescence
Religion is important for the political incorporation of children of immigrants. In the
analysis of adolescents in Chapter 2, I ﬁnd that children of immigrants do have a higher
religious identity salience and more frequent religious practice compared to natives.
Moreover, even though most adolescents secularize over time, there is no evidence of
convergence between natives and children of immigrants. As children of immigrants are
more attuned to discrimination and political issues concerning them, they might hold on to
religion in order to make sense of their place in the political landscape. This is the ﬁrst
study to examine religious identities and religious behaviors over time for multiple religious
groups in Europe.
There is evidence of a bright boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims infused
through European cultures. In Chapter 2, I show that Muslim children of immigrants have
a stronger religious identity salience than all other groups in adolescence, and that they
experience an increase in religious practice over time. High levels of religious identity
salience for children of immigrants is partly explained through segregated friendships and
schools. However, much of the diﬀerence between Muslims and non-Muslims remains
unexplained. Bright social boundaries may not only be reinforced through interactions
with natives, but might also be inherent to European cultures and institutions. In line with
previous studies on children of immigrants’ religiosity, this dissertation does not ﬁnd a
strong relationship between discrimination and religious identities (Fleischmann and Phalet
2011; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Schulz and Leszczensky 2016; Verkuyten and Yildiz
2007). However, this is the only study which attempts to measure the consequences of
various kinds of social boundaries on religious identities in Europe.
The religiosity of Muslim children of immigrants is not reactive but instead closer to the
concept of a pan-ethnic identity. In Chapter 2, I ﬁnd that Muslim children of immigrants
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not only hold a stronger religious identity than that of all other groups but their religious
practice grows more frequent over time. At the same time, Muslim children of immigrants
give increased importance to their host country’s identity during adolescence. This indicates
that they are not disengaging with the mainstream, which is one of the signs of a reactive
identity. There is some evidence that co-religious communities supersede national ties for
children of immigrants at the end of adolescence. Through their attendance at religious
events, Muslim children of immigrants can meet peers, discuss social and political issues
aﬀecting them, and create a new sense of collective identity. While other research ﬁnds
cross-sectional evidence of a strong religiosity among Muslim children of immigrants (Jacob
and Kalter 2013; Platt 2014; Verkuyten et al. 2012), this dissertation is the ﬁrst to use
theories of identity exploration and political socialization to examine religious identities and
religious behaviors over time in adolescence for children of immigrants in Europe. My ﬁndings
provide longitudinal evidence that contradicts cross-sectional analyses which associate high
Muslim identity and low attachment to the host country (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Gu¨ngo¨r
et al. 2011; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012).
2 Minority religions within various social and political contexts
Chapter 3 provides additional evidence of a bright boundary between Muslims and non-
Muslims, as expressed through children of immigrants’ response to their social context in
adulthood. Muslims are more religious than all other groups, which is a result of bright
cultural religious boundaries but not a reaction against the host country. In line with Chapter
2, I ﬁnd that Muslim adults are more religious compared to other groups. In fact, among
all immigrant groups, they are the least religiously similar to natives living in the same
region. These ﬁndings point to the potential role of culture and institutions in sustaining
and shaping social boundaries. Yet, this strong religiosity does not develop due to anti-
immigrant attitudes from natives, in that Muslim children of immigrants do not seem to
attempt to minimize their diﬀerence or react against the mainstream. The high religiosity
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of Muslim children of immigrants is in line with the van Tubergen and Sindrado´ttir (2011)
analysis of ﬁrst-generation immigrants. However, contrary to Connor (2010), who ﬁnds a
relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and religiosity for ﬁrst-generation Muslims,
this is not the case for 1.5 and second-generation immigrants. This dissertation is the ﬁrst to
investigate the social context of religion for children of immigrants across multiple European
countries.
As shown in Chapter 3, Muslim children of immigrants are the most religious in
countries with both multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies, suggesting that
multiculturalism policies alone do not provide enough protection for minority children of
immigrants to be religious in a secular and sometimes hostile context. Non-mainstream
Christians (Orthodox and others) are also more religious in countries with
anti-discrimination provisions but are not aﬀected by multiculturalism policies. Together,
these ﬁndings provide evidence that multiculturalism is still important for some children of
immigrants, but lip service to multiculturalism is not enough to actually enable public
expression of minority identities to ﬂourish. I also conﬁrm that Muslim and
non-mainstream Christian children of immigrants are especially sensitive to
anti-discrimination policies. Beyond their impact on religious freedom, multiculturalism
and anti-discrimination policies might strengthen religiosity by politicizing religious
identities. This research is the ﬁrst to analyze the relationship between multiculturalism
policies, anti-discrimination provisions, and religiosity. In doing so, it adds to the relatively
few existing studies of anti-discrimination policies and their role in children of immigrants’
incorporation (Aleksynska 2011; Schlueter et al. 2013).
3 Religion as a political mobilizing force
In Chapter 4, I ﬁnd that multiculturalism policies contribute to more political
engagement and grant religious communities a greater role in incorporation. Speciﬁcally,
they increase the political engagement of children of immigrants, especially among those
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who sometimes attend religious services. Multiculturalism policies both remove the barriers
for the political engagement of many children of immigrants and reﬂect a politicization of
certain religious groups. This conﬁrms some of the previous qualitative and descriptive
analyses of policies and group mobilization (Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005;
Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Moreover, in line with the only qualitative analysis of the
relationship between states and religion (Mooney 2009), this dissertation provides
cross-country quantitative evidence that national policies moderate the role of religious
organizations in the successful incorporation of children of immigrants. However, more
expansive political rights are also key in encouraging political engagement of children of
immigrants, regardless of faith tradition and frequency of religious attendance.
Chapter 4 also conﬁrms that religious organizations can foster political incorporation,
especially for Muslim children of immigrants. Children of immigrants who attend religious
services often are more politically engaged, and this relationship is particularly strong among
those who identify with a religion and believe their group to be discriminated. The political
engagement of religiously active children of immigrants coupled with a greater sense of
religious group consciousness may be the sign of strong politicized religious identities. In
addition, religious communities signiﬁcantly increase the political engagement of Muslim
children of immigrants, more than they do for other groups. Religious organizations may
bring individuals together from diﬀerent national origins and encourage political engagement
through collective identities. These ﬁndings conﬁrm that US-based theories of the role of
religious organizations for political engagement (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Leighley and
Vedlitz 1999; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1993) are applicable to the European context.
This research extends ﬁndings on ethnic civic organizations in Europe (Fennema and Tillie
1999; Fischer-Neumann 2014; Klandermans 2008; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2014) to religion
speciﬁcally, and applies work on pan-ethnicity in the US (Espiritu et al. 2000; Kibria 1998;
Okamoto 2006) to the framework of religious identities in Europe.
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Limitations of the Dissertation
Throughout the dissertation, religions are used as a unit of analysis and comparison.
However, by deﬁning these groups as having meaningful consequences for children of
immigrants’ political incorporation, I set up hypotheses and models which are more likely
to conﬁrm group diﬀerences (Brubaker 2009). In fact, by grouping children of immigrants
by religious aﬃliation, I am more likely to ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between religious
groups. However, social boundary theory and my own ﬁndings provide some justiﬁcation
for grouping children of immigrants by religion. First, following Alba (2005) and Zolberg
(1999), I argue that bright boundaries in Europe centered on religious diﬀerences make
these groups relevant not only to researchers but also for native Europeans and children of
immigrants themselves. Second, when I include religious groups in the analysis of religious
identity salience (Chapter 3) and political participation (Chapter 4), the unexplained
variation between individuals and countries reduces signiﬁcantly, even when accounting for
socioeconomic status and other measures of cultural incorporation. Nonetheless, my
presupposition of religions as meaningful groups inﬂuences my analyses and interpretations.
These issues are exacerbated by the lack of systematic measurement of religious boundaries
and identities, as well as gaps in our understanding of the causal eﬀects of national policies.
This dissertation reﬂects the diﬃculties that arise when trying to empirically test social
boundary theory. I ﬁnd that experiences with segregation and discrimination explain some
group-level diﬀerences, but not all (Chapter 2). Moreover, I do not ﬁnd evidence that
religious boundaries are exacerbated by anti-immigrant attitudes (Chapter 3). To explain
this lack of empirical evidence, I argue that boundaries are infused in cultures and
institutions which are not measured in these analyses. However, the absence of empirical
methods for identifying cultural and institutional boundaries is a limitation throughout my
dissertation. Social boundaries are a theoretical construct used to understand group
identities and perceptions of otherness (Alba 2005; Sanders 2002; Wimmer and Soehl
2014), and it is rare and diﬃcult to measure and test boundaries at the empirical level
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(Wimmer and Soehl 2014). This dissertation uses concepts of social boundaries to explain
group level diﬀerences without proving that these bright religious boundaries exist or
showing how they permeate cultures and institutions. Bright religious boundaries do lead
to salient religious identities, but identity salience is also a diﬃcult concept to measure.
Religious identity salience as measured in this dissertation does not account for
relationships with other identities. In these chapters, I measure religious identity salience
using importance given to religion and sense of religious group discrimination, in line with
other research on religious identities in Europe and the US (Ashmore et al. 2004; Peek
2005; Platt 2014; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). However, even though these variables
represent an expression of identity salience, they do not measure salience as deﬁned by
many social psychologist theorists (Stets and Burke 2000; Stryker 1968). These argue that
salience of identities should instead be measured using the ranking of an identity against
other types of identities, or using the likelihood of bringing up an identity in a particular
context. Children of immigrants who give high importance to religion and who practice
religion often, may not actually believe religion is more important than other identities and
may not bring up that identity in various situations. Issues pertaining to measuring
religious identity salience also impact the concepts of politicized collective identities and
pan-ethnic identities.
In this dissertation, I show that religion should not be excluded as a possible source for
politicized collective identities and pan-ethnic identities in Europe, and provides partial
evidence for the emergence of politicized identities among some children of immigrants. To
fully test my hypotheses, I would need to improve my measures of politicization, group
consciousness, group mobilization, and pan-ethnicity. First, I do not measure the extent to
which political debates on religion are occurring in each European country at the same
time that adolescents are exploring their identities. Furthermore, there is no information
on how much these children of immigrants relate political issues to their own religious
identity. I also cannot test if multiculturalism and anti-discrimination policies lead to more
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salient religious identities through a politicization of religious identities or through other
mechanisms. Second, group consciousness, as deﬁned in the political science literature,
should include a commitment to collective action, often measured as interest in politics and
a sense of political eﬃcacy (Harris 1999; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Wilcox and Gomez
1990). In this dissertation, I only use measurements of group aﬃliation and discrimination.
Third, I am unable to show that individual political participation reﬂects a sense of group
consciousness. Individuals may participate in politics for reasons beyond their strong
religious identity. Finally, measuring pan-ethnic identities, a more precise concept than
politicized collective identities, oﬀers even more challenges. In both Chapters 2 and 4, I can
only prove that Muslim children of immigrants have the potential to develop a pan-ethnic
identity. In order to test the pan-ethnic hypothesis for Muslim children of immigrants, I
would need information on how children of immigrants rank their religious identity
compared to other ethnic-based identities, how religious organizations bring various ethnic
groups together, and how religious identity leads to collective mobilization beyond
individual participation (Kibria 1998; Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Nagel 1994; Okamoto 2014;
Vasquez and Wetzel 2009).
As with many statistical analyses in the social sciences, causality is assumed and theorized
but not always tested. In Chapter 2, I investigate identities over time; however, due to
dataset limitations, I do not test if this increase in religious identity salience is associated
with an increase in political interest and participation. This limits my claims that religious
identities are politicized in adolescence, and that Muslim religious identities are pan-ethnic.
Moreover, the ESS dataset used in Chapter 4 is cross-sectional. Therefore, I am only able
to show that children of immigrants who frequently attend religious services also participate
in many political acts. Children of immigrants with a greater sense of civic engagement and
duty are often more likely to participate in both institutions. However, religious attendance
and political participation are mutually reinforcing acts, and together represent a sense of
group consciousness and have the potential for politicized religious identities. In part, I
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rely on previous work on other groups, which has shown that causal mechanisms connect
participation in religious organizations and political engagement (Coleman 1988; Harris 1999;
Portes 1998; Putnam 2001; Secret et al. 1990; Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Warner 1997).
Studying the national context using multilevel statistical analysis has strong limitations,
in particular in regard to issues of measurement, model ﬁt, and causality. In particular, this
dissertation uses a new measure of the strength of multiculturalism policies, based on its
deﬁnition by Wright and Bloemraad (2012) and on a popular policy index (MIPEX). Even
though this measure is consistent with other work on multiculturalism, it has not been
previously empirically tested. Furthermore, the models of religious identity salience and
political engagement used in this dissertation may be too demanding for the actual sample
of twenty European countries. Signiﬁcance and relationships may arise as an artifact of the
many controls and levels used in each model. This applies particularly in Chapter 4 where
variance within and across countries is mostly explained by individual-level controls.
Finally, in both Chapters 3 and 4, it is not possible to conclude that children of immigrants
are more religious and politically engaged because of multiculturalism policies. Instead,
multiculturalism policies might reﬂect other country-level characteristics, children of
immigrants’ religiosity and political engagement might lead to more multiculturalism
policies, or it might even be that more religious and politically engaged immigrants might
choose to move to countries with more multiculturalism policies. Though these limitations
nuance my ﬁndings, they do not reduce this dissertation’s theoretical relevance and instead
oﬀer many additional directions for future research.
Theoretical Contributions, Future Research, and Broader Implications
Findings from the ﬁrst empirical chapter provide new insights for future work on
adolescents and identity exploration. In adolescence, children of immigrants go through
processes of political socialization and identity exploration (Flanagan 2010; Phinney 1993).
However, existing research on identity exploration in adolescence, which is mostly situated
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in a US context, does not consider the potential development of political religious
identities. This dissertation shows that religious identities and religious behaviors are
malleable in adolescence and can have consequences for political engagement in adulthood.
Studies on identity exploration can beneﬁt from considering religion as an important
component in the search for a positive sense of self in adolescence. Religion provides a way
for children of immigrants to be tied to their parents’ origins, to develop a sense of meaning
and belonging, and to adapt to a sometimes-negative social context. Future work studying
adolescents should investigate how religion, politics, and national origins intersect in
adolescence as children of immigrants develop identities. In particular, questionnaires could
be developed that ask adolescents how the current political context makes them think
about their religious, ethnic, and racial identities.
This dissertation advances the ﬁeld of sociology of religion by investigating the role
religion can play for various groups outside of the US. Speciﬁcally, I investigate religion
in a secularizing, but still heavily Christian, Europe. Partly due to its religious vitality,
there is a long tradition of religious studies in the US, many of which focus on religion’s
role in creating meaning and community (Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Smith 2003; Stark and
Finke 2000; Warner 1993). However, the theories are based on US experiences and cannot
always attest to the variety of meanings and roles religion can take in diﬀerent cultures.
In this dissertation, I treat religious identity and religiosity as separate factors inﬂuencing
the incorporation of children of immigrants. This dissertation shows the value in looking at
religion as an identity similar to ethnic identities, as it is for many Jews or Muslims across
the world, along with concomitant context of bright boundaries and potential for group
mobilization. This dissertation encourages future research in sociology of religion to analyze
contexts beyond the US and to use a comparative approach, such as carried out by Mooney
(2009). Future work in sociology of religion should continue to explore how immigrant groups
understand and use religion in their day to day lives across diﬀerent national contexts. An
interesting extension of this project would be to compare the meaning and role of religion
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for Orthodox and Muslim children of immigrants in secular European countries, versus those
living in predominantly Catholic countries.
This dissertation highlights the positive role of religious identities and communities for
children of immigrants in a secular European context. In this way, it challenges the
traditional theoretical framework in which religion is conceptualized as a barrier to
incorporation in Europe (Foner and Alba 2008). In particular, I argue that strong
religiosity and involvement in religious organizations lead to more political engagement of
children of immigrants across European countries. Future research in Europe should move
beyond the assumption that religion is a barrier to incorporation and instead also consider
religion as a politicized collective identity, one with possible beneﬁts for children of
immigrants. For instance, studies should investigate if a strong religious identity in Europe
can provide children of immigrants a sense of meaning and stronger networks, thus leading
to better mental health during the diﬃcult process of incorporation.
This study advances theories on immigrant incorporation by showing the advantages of
using boundaries as a framework for understanding group-level diﬀerences. I apply the
concept of bright social boundaries to children of immigrants in Europe to explain why
religious identities matter and become salient in particular contexts (Alba 2005; Zolberg
1999). I extend new assimilation theory by showing that while bright boundaries might
slow down the cultural and structural incorporation of some immigrant groups (Alba and
Nee 2003), they also encourage stronger group communities, identities, and political
mobilization. However, this project, like many others, focuses on individual-level
discrimination and segregation (Wimmer and Soehl 2014) and, as detailed above, I do not
ﬁnd evidence of religious boundaries in many of these personal experiences. Instead, bright
social boundaries may be insidious and infused in European culture and institutions. In
order to advance the study of boundaries and incorporation, empirical work should focus
on operationalizing and measuring boundaries beyond discrimination and segregation. For
instance, future studies could analyze how popular media, cultural events, schools,
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marketing, and other socio-cultural institutions create and sustain categorizations.
In this dissertation, I demonstrate the importance of the concept of pan-ethnicity, as
well as the limits of segmented assimilation theory, beyond the US American experience.
This paves the way for future work on the meaning and purpose of a strong Muslim
identity for children of immigrants. My approach utilizes segmented assimilation theory in
investigating the role of the social context in the development of identities (Rumbaut 1994)
but does not ﬁnd strong evidence of the formation of a reactive identity. More work is
needed to investigate how children of immigrants in Europe connect across national origins
and how religious organizations can use pan-ethnic identities for political mobilization.
Future research should investigate if adolescent Muslim children of immigrants develop
more co-religious friendships instead of friendships based on national origins. These
networks could shape both the strength of adolescents’ religious identities and their interest
in politics. Future research should also investigate diﬀerences between Muslim communities
(e.g., Turks vs. Moroccans, Suﬁs vs. Sunnis) to understand if this politicized collective
identity is truly pan-ethnic. Finally, in line with other pan-ethnic research in the US,
future research should consider the context and role of Muslim organizations in fostering a
pan-ethnic mobilization. It should examine the development and strategies of mosques,
Muslim political parties, and other Muslim organizations across Europe.
This dissertation considers the current and future role of multiculturalism policies in
Europe, thereby advancing the debate on the relationship between state policies and
incorporation. Theorists of state policies in Europe argue that multiculturalism either
increases group diﬀerences, and thus slows down incorporation, or instead promotes
understanding across groups (Joppke and Morawska 2003; Koopmans 2013b; Vasta 2007).
However, I ﬁnd that strong multiculturalism policies contribute to more religiosity and
political participation among children of immigrants. These policies thus simultaneously
promote both group diﬀerences and incorporation. Somewhat paradoxically, this suggests
that European states dealing with a multicultural reality (Kastoryano 2002) can promote
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incorporation by politicizing and encouraging minority group identities. More broadly, in
the context of the rise of supra-national entities, I ﬁnd that nation-states are still
important in shaping the relationship between religion and incorporation for children of
immigrants. Future work should keep the state as a unit of analysis and explore how other
policies can shape the relationship between mainstream institutions and minority identities
and organizations. However, considering the limitations of this research, there is a need for
new and empirically tested methods for measuring the strength of multiculturalism, and for
more detailed analysis of policies dealing with religion speciﬁcally.
Last but not least, the ﬁndings of this dissertation are relevant to the study of
individual political participation and collective mobilization through organizations. In line
with social psychology literature and political participation theories, this research shows
that the presence of collective identities may be critical to the political participation of
minority populations (Miller et al. 1981; Peterson 1992; Simon and Klandermans 2001).
Future empirical research should investigate how to measure group consciousness and its
eﬀects on children of immigrants. Moreover, analyses of identity politics, popular in the
US, have received less attention in Europe and have ignored politicized religious identities
(Bernstein 2005), but my research illustrates that group identities can be meaningful in the
European context. I ﬁnd that even in countries that base their democracy on a strong
nationalistic sentiment, religious identities and organizations can lead to more mainstream
political engagement. Group mobilization can happen through religious communities and
identities in Europe. Future work should explore the role of diﬀerent identities, fostered in
religious organizations, as a source of group political mobilization. Qualitative work could
analyze religious organizations and ethnic organizations to compare their strategies for
encouraging the formation of collective identities and group mobilization.
This study is important not only for sociologists but may also be useful for the public at
large, policy makers, social workers, school oﬃcials, and organizers. This research’s
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primary goal is to help the public understand Islam and its place in Europe. More
speciﬁcally, this research could provide school oﬃcials and social workers with tools that
promote the development of a healthy identity among children of immigrants in
adolescence. These ﬁndings also hope to inform the creation of programs and structures
that decrease marginalization and increase political engagement of immigrant populations.
Policy makers in the US and in Europe are struggling to balance public opinion on
migration with the reality of an increasingly diverse population. These ﬁndings may help
policy makers across the world develop national policies that improve understanding
between groups and incorporation of immigrants. Finally, these ﬁndings could be useful to
community leaders as they seek to mobilize their group and push forward for change. By
participating in political acts, individuals can contribute to the national political discourse
and increase their agency. This research shows how descendants of immigrants can play an
active role in shaping their future in Western Europe.
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Table A.2: Fixed eﬀects linear models on political participation for children of immigrants
in twenty European countries between 2010 and 2016, clustered by country (N=8,129).
(1)
Aﬃliated
(2)
Religious
discrimination
(3)
Identity and
discrimination
(4)
By aﬃliation
Religious attendance (ref=never)
Rarely 0.146∗ 0.065 0.142∗ 0.105
(0.057) (0.039) (0.056) (0.061)
Only for holy days 0.145 0.087 0.145 0.145
(0.102) (0.067) (0.100) (0.075)
At least once a month 0.020 0.334∗ 0.039 0.509∗∗
(0.141) (0.131) (0.152) (0.162)
Once a week −0.087 0.215∗ −0.085 0.317∗∗
(0.349) (0.096) (0.351) (0.091)
More than once a week −0.009 0.302∗ 0.015 0.638∗∗
(0.941) (0.121) (0.941) (0.189)
Religiously aﬃliated −0.188∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.032)
Attendance if religiously aﬃliated
Rarely −0.052 −0.084
(0.060) (0.062)
Only for holy days 0.011 −0.004
(0.109) (0.106)
At least once a month 0.456∗ 0.413
(0.186) (0.202)
Once a week 0.431 0.382
(0.326) (0.322)
More than once a week 0.523 0.356
(1.014) (1.010)
Religious discrimination 0.034 0.689
(0.165) (0.338)
Attendance if discriminated
Rarely 0.432∗ 0.647
(0.196) (0.472)
Only for holy days 0.012 0.321
(0.338) (0.371)
At least once a month 0.265 −1.706∗∗∗
(0.482) (0.388)
Once a week 0.345 0.582
(0.276) (0.300)
More than once a week 0.879 1.130∗
(0.471) (0.416)
Religious aﬃliation and discriminated −0.906∗
(0.374)
Attendance if aﬃliated and discriminated
Rarely 0.040
(0.556)
Only for holy days −0.055
(0.515)
At least once a month 2.267∗
(0.848)
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Table A.2 (Continued)
(1)
Aﬃliated
(2)
Religious
discrimination
(3)
Identity and
discrimination
(4)
By aﬃliation
Aﬃliation (ref=Christian: mainstream)
Christian: other 0.224
(0.216)
Muslim −0.232∗
(0.083)
Unaﬃliated 0.158∗∗
(0.045)
Attendance by aﬃliation
Rarely: other Christian −0.417
(0.229)
Rarely: Muslim 0.095
(0.128)
Rarely: unaﬃliated 0.032
(0.084)
Only for holy days: other Christian −0.384
(0.225)
Only for holy days: Muslim 0.217
(0.165)
Only for holy days: unaﬃliated −0.011
(0.103)
At least once a month: other Christian −0.467
(0.238)
At least once a month: Muslim −0.098
(0.163)
At least once a month: unaﬃliated −0.498∗
(0.190)
Once a week: other Christian −0.444
(0.334)
Once a week: Muslim 0.304
(0.153)
Once a week: unaﬃliated −0.404
(0.309)
More than once a week: other Christian −0.973∗∗
(0.332)
More than once a week: Muslim 0.082
(0.260)
More than once a week: unaﬃliated −0.687
(0.997)
Constant 0.510∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗
(0.084) (0.091) (0.087) (0.108)
All models include individual controls.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Source: ESS rounds 5-8 (2010-2016).
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